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BALANCING HEARSAY AND CRIMINAL
DISCOVERY
John G. Douglass·
"You can't hit what you can't see."

Walter Jolznson 1

INTRODUCTION
the law of evidence, conventional theory suggests a direct
Iallows
connection between hearsay and discovery. Broader discovery
for more liberal admission of hearsay. The logic of the
N

connection goes something like this. We exclude hearsay because we
lack the ordinary adversarial means of testing the out-of-court
declarant through cross-examination.2 Nevertheless, courts still admit
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Richmond; A.B., Dartmouth
College, 1977; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1980. I gratefully acknowledge the support
of the law firm of Hunton & Williams, which provided research grants to make this
project possible. For their patience and helpful insights, I thank my research
assistants, John Guarino, Katherine Benson, Damian Santomauro. and Michael
Gryzlov.
1. Hall of Farner Walter Johnson was one of the hardest throwing pitchers in
baseball history. In the course of his career with the Washington Senators from 1907
through 1927, he set the Major League record for shutouts. The quoted passage aptly
describes a batter's futility in facing a Johnson fastball. See The Baseball Almanac
(visited Apr. 12, 2000) <http://baseball-almanac.com/quojhns.shtml>.
2. The absence of some or all of the typical adversarial mechanisms for testing
the truth of in-court testimony forms the principal justification for a general rule
excluding hearsay. For example, in Williamson v. United Stares, 512 U.S. 594 (1994),
the Court explained:
The hearsay rule, Fed. Rule Evid. 802, is premised on the theory that out-ofcourt statements are subject to particular hazards. The declarant might be
lying; he might have misperceived the events which he relates; he might have
faulty memory; his words might be misunderstood or taken out of context by
the listener. And the ways in which these dangers arc minimized for in-court
statements-the oath, the witness's awareness of the gravity of the
proceedings, the jury's ability to observe the witness's demeanor. and, most
importantly, the right of the opponent to cross-examine-arc generally
absent for things said out of court.
Id. at 598-602; see also Fed. R Evid. art. VIII advisory committee's note (stating the
justifications for excluding hearsay testimony); John W. Strong ct al., McCormick on
Evidence: Hombook 426-27 (4th ed. 1992) (hereinafter McCormick Hombook)
(same); 6 John Henry Wigmore, Evidence§ 1766 {Chadbourn rev. 1976) (hereinafter
Wigmore] (same); Gordon Van Kessel, Hearsay Hazards in rile American Criminal
Trial: An Adversary-Oriented Approad1, 49 Hastings LJ. 477, 485 (1998) (same).
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most hearsay, often out of necessity-the declarant is dead, or in
Brazil-or even out of convenience-it is simply impractical to
assemble all the clerks who provided the data for company payroll
records. In most instances, we justify categorical exceptions to the
basic hearsay rule because we find such categories of hearsay
sufficiently reliable to allow those statements before a jury even
without the typical process of adversarial testing through crossexarnination.3
But the adversarial process does not simply evaporate once hearsay
is admitted. 4 Where a declarant is available, the law of evidence
permits the opponent to put her on the witness stand for cross-

3. As Wigmore explained:
The theory of the hearsay rule . . . is that the many possible sources of
inaccuracy and untrustworthiness which may lie underneath the bare
untested assertion of a witness can best be brought to light and exposed, if
they exist, by the test of cross-examination. But this test or security may in a
given instance be superfluous; it may be sufficiently clear, in that instance,
that the statement offered is free enough from the risk of inaccuracy and
untrustworthiness, so that the test of cross-examination would be a work of
supererogation.
Wigmore, supra note 2, § 450, at 251; see also Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 819
(1990) (quoting Wigmore).
Whether categorical hearsay exceptions developed at common law really provide
an accurate measure of reliability, however, seems open to question. Professors
Nesson and Benkler express a scepticism shared by many modem scholars:
(M]any exceptions have worn too thin to remain convincing ....
Consider, for instance, the dying declarations exception, which arises from
the cultural experience of "facing one's Maker" as a moment of truth. But
in a culture that only grows more cynical about the authenticity of religious
experience, the exception loses its rhetorical force. Dying declarations no
longer evoke the image of a person making a solemn statement on the death
bed, before a confessor, surrounded by family members. Instead, we more
commonly envision a drugged, whispering patient in an impersonal hospital,
alone except for a detective holding a little black book and straining to hear
a name gasped against the flow of pure oxygen. The contemporary image
lacks the comforting effect of the traditional one.
As knowledge of human psychology becomes more sophisticated and
widely disseminated, that discomfort extends to more of the hearsay
exceptions. Do we still believe that people excited by an upsetting event are
more likely to tell the truth than to exonerate themselves, to distance
themselves from blame? Do we still believe that a plaintiff is more likely to
tell the truth to the physician hired to testify as an expert at the plaintiff's
trial than to any other person whose testimony does not fit another hearsay
exception?
Charles R. Nesson & Yochai Benkler, Constitutional Hearsay:
Requiring
Foundational Testing and Corroboration Under the Confrontation Clause, 81 Va. L.
Rev. 149, 156 (1995) (footnotes omitted); see also John W. Strong et al., 2 McCormick
on Evidence: Treatise§§ 309-15, at 324-34 (4th ed. 1992).
4. Of course, the testing process is also relevant in defining some hearsay
exceptions. Some hearsay is admissible because it has already been subject to an
adversarial process, see Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(l) (former testimony), while some is
admissible because the declarant is subject to cross-examination at trial, see id. Ruic
801(d)(l) (prior statement by witness).
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examination.5 Where the opponent does not, or cannot, call the
declarant as a witness, he still may attack the credibility of the
declarant with any evidence that would be admissible for that purpose
had the declarant testified in court.6 The testing process can go
forward even after the hearsay is in evidence.7
This is where discovery enters the hearsay picture. Adversarial
testing of hearsay requires information.8 In the case of a live witness,
effective cross-examination often depends on obtaining two kinds of
information. The first is advance notice of what the witness is likely to
5. Federal Rule of Evidence 806 provides:
When a hearsay statement, or a statement defined in Rule 801(d)(2)(C),
(D), or (E), has been admitted in evidence, the credibility of the declarant
may be attacked, and if attacked may be supported, by any evidence which
would be admissible for those purposes if declarant had testified as a
witness. Evidence of a statement or conduct by the declarant at any time,
inconsistent with the declarant's hearsay statement, is not subject to any
requirement that the declarant may have been afforded an opportunity to
deny or explain. If the party against whom a hearsay statement has been
admitted calls the declarant as a witness, the party is entitled to examine the
declarant on the statement as if under cross-examination.
Id. Rule 806.
6. See id. When the declarant is absent, Rule 806 permits the opponent of
hearsay to use much of the same material which one would expect to surface during
live cross-examination if the declarant were in the courtroom. For example, an absent
declarant's inconsistent statements, prior criminal convictions, the letter promising
immunity or a favorable sentencing recommendation in exchange for testimony, and
the medical record showing the eye-witness declarant to be legally blind are
admissible under Rule 806. Of course, that evidence does not simply materialize in
the courtroom. Much of it can, and should, be presented during the crossexamination of the government witness who relates the hearsay. Applied effectively
then, Rule 806 envisions a process of "virtual cross-examination" which can have the
look, the sound, and at least some of the drama of real cross-examination of the
declarant. For a more complete description of the process of impeaching an absent
hearsay declarant through virtual cross-examination, see John G. Douglass, Beyond
Admissibility: Real Confrontation, Virtual Cross-E:camination, and the Right to
Confront Hearsay, 67 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 191, 251-60 (1999).
7. Despite the clear opportunity provided by Rule 806, relatively few trial
lawyers make effective use of their right to impeach an absent hearsay declarant.
Trial lawyers and judges are quite accustomed to courtroom battles over the
admissibility of hearsay, but few have much ex-perience at contests over the crec/ibility
of hearsay. Though they may have fought hard to keep hearsay from the jury, once it
is admitted in evidence even the most able advocates often proceed as if the hearsay
battle were over, at least until the appeal. See Fred Warren Bennett. How to
Administer the "Big Hurt" in a Criminal Case: The Life and Times of Federal Rule of
Evidence 806, 44 Cath. U. L. Rev. 1135, 1142 (1995) (explaining how an attorney can
dispute the credibility of a hearsay statement once it has been admitted); Anthony M.
Brannon, Successful Shadowboxing: The Arr of Impead1ing Hearsay Declarants, 13
Campbell L. Rev. 157, 158 (1991) (noting trial lawyers' "virtual total neglect" of
opportunities to impeach hearsay declarants}; Margaret Meriwether Cordray,
Evidence Rule 806 and the Problem of lmpead1i11g the Nontestifying Declarant, 56
Ohio St. LJ. 495, 495 (1995) (stating that Rule 806 is "overlooked by lawyers").
8. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 66 (1987) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) ("[T]he right of cross-examination also may be significantly infringed by
events occurring outside the trial itself, such as the wholesale denial of access to
material that would serve as the basis for a significant line of inquiry at trial.").
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say. Without that information, the cross-examiner scarcely knows
where to begin. 9 The second is the "ammunition" necessary to attack
credibility: the witness's prior convictions or bad acts, evidence of
bias, failed memory or inaccurate perception, and-perhaps most
important of all-the witness's prior statements. 10 Discovery operates
in the same way when it comes to hearsay. Where the discovery
process equips the opponent of hearsay with the necessary advance
notice and "ammunition," he can often test the hearsay in much the
same way he might challenge the testimony of a live witness. 11 And
9. In American courts, jury trials typically take place in a "unitary" or "one-shot"
proceeding. The court empanels a jury, the parties present evidence, and the jury
returns a verdict, all in a single, continuous proceeding. Many cases begin and end
the same day. Because of the impracticality of reconvening a jury, lengthy
adjournments are unusual after trial has begun. Unfair surprise poses a greater
danger in this type of proceeding than it might in systems which adjudicate cases in an
"episodic" or piecemeal fashion, with several proceedings over the course of weeks or
months, where parties enjoy more time to react to testimony that unfolds
unexpectedly. See Mirjan Damaska, Of Hearsay and Its Analogues, 76 Minn. L. Rev.
425, 428-30 (1992) (comparing Anglo-American common law trials to the more
"episodic" proceedings of many Continental systems); Roger Park, A Subject Matter
Approach to Hearsay Reform, 86 Mich. L. Rev. 51, 62 (1987) (hereinafter Park.
Subject Matter Approach] ("The unitary nature of the American trial makes surprise a
greater danger than in other systems, where adjournments and continuances can
mitigate its effect.").
In a unitary system, pretrial discovery becomes essential to effective crossexamination of any hostile witness. See id. ("Attorneys need time and preparation to
be ready to impeach witnesses, to contradict them with the testimony of others, and to
construct arguments dealing with their testimony."). In a system where trials begin
and end with little interruption, hearsay creates special risks of unfair surprise.
Parties may prepare to cross-examine witnesses whom they can anticipate will testify.
But hearsay often appears unannounced. And even where the declarant is alive and
available, a unitary trial can make it difficult or impossible for an opponent to find the
declarant, subpoena her, and get her to court before it is too late.
10. In Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957), the Court noted the importance
of discovery, especially the discovery of witness statements, to the process of crossexamination:
Every experienced trial judge and trial lawyer knows the value for
impeaching purposes of statements of the witness recording the events
before time dulls treacherous memory. Flat contradiction between the
witness's testimony and the version of the events given in his reports is not
the only test of inconsistency. The omission from the reports of facts related
at the trial, or a contrast in emphasis upon the same facts, even a different
order of treatment, are also relevant to the cross-examining process of
testing the credibility of a witness's trial testimony.
Id. at 667.
11. For live cross-examination, that "ammunition" serves two important
functions. First, it is the predicate for tactical decision making. In preparing for
cross-examination, a lawyer sifts through the available facts from the witness's past.
trying to identify material which will convince the jury to discount the witness's story.
When the lawyer finds such ammunition-an inconsistent statement or even a change
in emphasis, a prior dishonest act, or evidence of failing memory-he can construct a
line of questioning for cross-examination. Second, once the lawyer chooses to pursue
a line of questioning, that ammunition provides the reins which control the witness.
The lawyer confronts the witness with the impeaching material-a written prior
statement, for example-to insure a predictable answer. If the witness denies an
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discovery can perform an even more important function in the case of
an available declarant who can be located and subpoenaed. It can
turn an absent hearsay declarant into a testifying witness, subject to
full cross-examination in front of the jury.
In this manner, hearsay rules and discovery rules are linked in
conventional theory. 12 Where more complete discovery permits more
complete testing of hearsay, our basic reason for excluding hearsaylack of adversarial testing-becomes less of a concern. Thus, the
more a party can discover about the opponent's hearsay, the more
freely a court can admit hearsay. 13 This hearsay-discovery connection
impeaching fact, the lawyer uses that material to prove that the denial is false. Most
basic treatises on trial advocacy devote considerable attention to the process of
"controlling" witnesses on cross-examination in this manner. See Steven Lubet,
Modem Trial Advocacy 109-47 (2d ed. 1997); Thomas A. Mauet, Trial Techniques
221-26 (1996).
"Ammunition" serves essentially the same purposes in impeaching an absent
hearsay declarant. In preparing to impeach a hearsay declarant, counsel surveys the
available factual material to determine what "points" he can make about the
declarant's credibility and how he can prove those points in the declarant's absence.
At trial, though he has no concern about "reining in" an absent declarant, he uses that
factual material to confront and to control the responses of t11e government \\itness
who related the hearsay to the jury and who, on cross-examination, will be asked to
confirm the weaknesses and limitations of that same hearsay. See Douglass. supra
note 6, at 255-56.
For the opponent of hearsay, that ammunition plays another important role as well.
In those not infrequent cases where the declarant is available to testify, though not
called as a government witness, defense counsel will rely on that information in
making the tactical decision whether to call the declarant to the stand for the hostile
examination permitted by Rule 806. Without access to the necessary "ammunition"
in the discovery process, he must make that decision in the dark. If he exercises the
level of caution typical of most eiq>erienced trial lawyers, quite often he \\ill forgo
cross-examination altogether. See Randolph N. Jonakait, Restoring the Co11fro111a1io11
Clause to the Sixth Amendment, 35 UCLA L. Rev. 557, 617 n.158 (1988) (hereinafter
Jonakait, Co11fro11tatio11 Clause] ("Time-worn admonitions tell the advocate not to
call someone without knowing what he will say."); Park, Subject i'vla11er Approach,
supra note 9, at 102 ("Without such information, calling the declarant is a risky
proposition, and trial lawyers are notoriously reluctant to step onto untested ground.
To call a witness for cross-examination and then fail to accomplish anything can be a
dramatic setback-whatever the judge may have told the jury about the adverse
nature of the examination.").
12. comparative law scholars seem to recognize the link most readily. In an
article comparing approaches to hearsay in Anglo-American and Continental courts,
Professor Dama5ka argues that the difference between "episodic" Continental
proceedings and "one-shot" Anglo-American trials accounts in part for the
development of rules excluding hearsay in the Anglo-American system. See Damal;ka,
supra note 9, at 428-30. The principal difference, as Professor Dama5ka points out, is
the opportunity and time to gather information that might contradict hearsay or to
locate and call the hearsay declarant as a witness. See id. In effect, more complete
access to information makes the admission of hearsay less of a concern. See Van
Kessel, supra note 2, at 519 ("[H]earsay dangers are particularly acute in jurisdic1ions
that do not provide for effective pre-trial mutual discovery ....").
13. It is no accident, then, that the accelerating trend toward liberalized
exceptions to the hearsay rule in the last quarter century has followed fast on the
heels of the trend toward more liberal discovery rules, especially in civil cases. See
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accounts for the near universal tendency to attach "notice" provisions
to new rules creating nontraditional hearsay exceptions. 14 Likewise,
the theory of a hearsay-discovery balance is at the heart of reform
proposals that would limit or modify traditional restrictions on
hearsay in exchange for broader notice requirements and increased
access to information regarding a hearsay declarant. 15 And the theory
accounts at least in part for the widely-held notion that trial judges
apply hearsay restrictions more stringently in criminal cases, where
discovery is more limited, than in civil matters. 16 The result, in theory,
Van Kessel, supra note 2, at 479 n.7 ("Hearsay rules in the United States, as
exemplified by the Federal Rules of Evidence, are in many instances more permissive
in civil than in criminal cases, and in practice have been substantially weakened by
modern expanded discovery systems and the relentless growth of hearsay
exceptions."); cf John J. Cound et al., Civil Procedure: Cases and Materials 761-63
(6th ed. 1993) (noting rapid expansion of modern discovery practices following
adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938); William J. Brennan, Jr.,
The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for Truth? A Progress Report, 68
Wash. U. L.Q. 1, 2 (1990) [hereinafter Brennan, A Progress Report] (noting
significant advances in criminal discovery since the 1960s).
14. The best known hearsay-notice provision appears in Rule 807 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, the "residual" hearsay exception. See infra note 240 and
accompanying text. Uniform Rule of Evidence 807, which provides for the admission
in evidence of certain hearsay statements of child victims or witnesses, requires not
only the pretrial disclosure of the statement itself, but also provides for out-of-court
questioning of the child declarant at the opponent's request. See Unif. R. of Evict.
807(a), (b) (amended 1986). The California Evidence Code contains a similar
provision, Cal. Evict. Code § 1360 (West Supp. 2000), as well as a broader hearsay
exception for statements of unavailable victims of physical injury, Cal. Evict. Code §
1370 (West Supp. 2000). Both require the proponent to give pretrial notice of an
intention to offer the statement, along with the particulars of the statement. See id. §§
1360, 1370.
15. In civil cases, for example, Professor Roger Park has proposed a "notice-based
residual exception that permits hearsay to be admitted in civil cases without being
screened for reliability by the trial judge." Park, Subject Matter Approach, supra note
9, at 122. Professor Eleanor Swift has proposed an approach which would condition
admissibility on a requirement that the proponent produce "foundation facts," that is,
"[i]nformation about the declarant and the circumstances that influenced her when
she perceived, remembered, and spoke about the relevant facts." Eleanor Swift, A
Foundation Fact Approach to Hearsay, 75 Cal. L. Rev. 1339, 1355 (1987) [hereinafter
Swift, Fact Approach]; see also Ronald J. Allen, A Response to Professor Friedman:
The Evolution of the Hearsay Rule to a Rule of Admission, 76 Minn. L. Rev. 797, 799
(1992) (noting that discovery systems are replacing hearsay restrictions, especially in
civil cases).
England, along with some other common-law jurisdictions, has eliminated the
hearsay rule in civil cases, replacing it with a requirement that the proponent give
advance notice of intention to offer hearsay. See Richard D. Friedman, The Elements
of Evidence 335 (2d ed. 1998) (citing the Civil Evidence Act 1995 (c. 38)).
16. See 5 Jack B. Weinstein et al., Weinstein's Federal Evidence§ 802.04(3][b], at
802-14, § 802.05(1], at 802-15 (2d ed. 1999) (identifying limited criminal discovery as
one factor which leads judges to apply the hearsay rule more strictly in criminal
cases); Park, Subject Matter Approach, supra note 9, at 87 ("[W]hatever the specific
content of the hearsay rules, the judicial attitude toward exclusion appears to be
stricter in criminal cases."); Van Kessel, supra note 2, at 481 (observing that the
Supreme Court has taken a more conservative approach toward some hearsay
exceptions in criminal cases).
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is a fair balance between hearsay admissibility and discovery rights in
both civil and criminal cases.
But theory does not always reflect reality. If fairness requires that
courts limit hearsay more carefully to protect parties with limited
hearsay-related discovery rights, then it is worth asking whether
courts actually behave that way. 17 My own conclusion is that they do
not. At least in the federal courts-the focus of this Article 18hearsay and discovery have drifted out of balance. Despite serious
disadvantages in the discovery process, federal criminal defendants
actually face a broader range of admissible hearsay than civil litigants
and prosecutors.
Part I of this Article argues that the conventional theory of hearsaydiscovery balance does not reflect the reality of modem federal
practice. An imbalance has arisen because, in the last quarter century,
developments in the law of evidence and confrontation are at odds
with developments-or one might say nondevelopments-in the law
of criminal discovery. Since enactment of the Federal Rules of
Evidence in 1975, both the law of evidence and modem Confrontation
Clause doctrine have evolved toward broader admission of hearsay in
criminal cases. Contrary to conventional theory, that evolution has at
least matched-and probably has outpaced-the trend toward more
liberal admission of hearsay in civil cases. 19 But while federal courts
Of course, according to the conventional view, limited discovery is not the only
factor which leads courts to apply hearsay rules more strictly in criminal than in civil
cases. The Federal Rules of Evidence themselves include a few restrictions on
hearsay that apply only in criminal cases. See infra note 58 and accompanying text.
And, in theory at least, the Supreme Court views the Confrontation Clause as a rule
excluding some otherwise admissible hearsay when offered against criminal
defendants. See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 814 (1990) ("The Confrontation
Clause ... bars the admission of some evidence that would othenvise be admissible
under an exception to the hearsay rule.").
17. Though the theoretical link between hearsay and discovery is widely
recognized, there is little scholarly work devoted to testing the theory. As far as I am
aware, there is no empirical study which demonstrates that courts actually limit
hearsay more strictly in criminal cases than in civil matters, despite the conventional
assumption to that effect. In fact, two relatively recent empirical studies suggest that
the opposite is true. See Eleanor Swift, The Hearsay Rule at Work: Has It Been
Abolished De Facto by Judicial Decision?, 76 Minn. L. Rev. 473, 477-84 (1992)
[hereinafter Swift, Judicial Discretion); Myrna S. Raeder, A Response to Professor
Swift, 76 Minn. L. Rev. 507, 508 & n.2 (1992) (hereinafter Raeder, Response).
18. I have limited my examination to federal cases because they provide a more
manageable universe of cases for study, and are governed by a single set of
evidentiary rules and rules of discovery. Most of my conclusions. and at least some of
my suggestions for reform, however, should apply to many state systems as well, since
the Federal Rules of Evidence and-to a lesser extent-the Federal Rules of both
civil and criminal procedure have served as models for many states. I also believe
that the federal system provides a clear illustration of a system that is out of balance.
The federal system has relatively liberal rules admitting hearsay and liberal rules of
civil discovery, but remains more conservative than many states in its criminal
discovery practices.
19. See infra Part I.A.2.
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are admitting more hearsay-and more problematic hearsay-in
criminal cases, the rules of criminal discovery show no sign of
adapting to that reality.20 As a result, in comparison to other litigants,
federal criminal defendants now face a litigation environment that
features both minimum discovery and maximum admissible hearsay.2 1
Part II offers some proposals to address that imbalance by
expanding a defendant's right to learn in advance what hearsay he
must face, and his right to gather "ammunition" to contest that
hearsay. Where appropriate, I have included proposals that would
require the amendment of existing rules. But recognizing the practical
difficulties facing any rule-making initiative,22 my principal focus is to
suggest more effective means of applying Rule 16,23 the Jencks Act,24
and the Brady doctrine25-the major discovery tools presently
available to criminal defendants-to the task of contesting
prosecution hearsay. 26
This Article is not a critique of developments in the law of evidence,
nor of the Court's application of the Confrontation Clause to
20. See infra Part LB.
21. To make matters worse, judging from the infrequency of reported opinions on
the subject, criminal defense counsel seldom attempt to employ the existing rules of
discovery-limited as they are-to anticipate the prosecution's use of hearsay or to
obtain material which might serve to impeach an out-of-court declarant once hearsay
has been admitted in evidence. For example, I have found only three federal cases in
which criminal defendants sought to use the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1994), as a
tool for discovering prior statements of a hearsay declarant. See United States v.
Williams-Davis, 90 F.3d 490, 512 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ("As far as we can tell, we arc the
first court of appeals to address this argument."); United States v. Pepe, 747 F.2d 632,
657 n.37 (11th Cir. 1984) (declining to order discovery on other grounds); United
States v. Padilla, No. Sl-94-CR-313-CSH, 1996 WL 389300, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 11,
1996) (finding that defendant failed to raise the issue in a timely manner).
22. The major practical roadblock to expanding the rules allowing criminal
discovery relating to hearsay declarants appears to be the reluctance of Congress to
adopt any rule compelling the government to disclose its witnesses before trial. See
infra text accompanying notes 170-72.
23. Fed. R. Crim. P. 16.
24. 18 u.s.c. § 3500.
25. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
26. For contrasting perspectives on the current rules of criminal discovery in
federal courts, compare Brennan, A Progress Report, supra note 13, at 3, 9-12
(applauding advancements under revised Rule 16, but criticizing continued limitations
on discovery of, inter alia, the identities and prior statements of government
witnesses), and H. Lee Sarokin & William E. Zuckerman, Presumed Innocent?:
Restrictions on Criminal Discovery in Federal Court Belie this Presumption, 43
Rutgers L. Rev. 1089, 1089 (1991) ("It is an astonishing anomaly that in federal courts
virtually unrestricted discovery is granted in civil cases, whereas discovery is severely
limited in criminal matters."), and Steven H. Goldberg, What Was Discovered in the
Quest for Truth, 68 Wash. U. L.Q. 51, 56-60 (1990) (arguing that the Supreme Court
has simultaneously diminished defense discovery required by Brady while unfairly
expanding reciprocal discovery from defendants), with Edward S.G. Dennis, Jr., The
Discovery Process in Criminal Prosecutions: Toward Fair Trials and Just Verdicts, 68
Wash. U. L.Q. 63, 63-64 (defending current restrictions against pretrial discovery of
names, addresses and prior statements of government witnesses).
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hearsay.27 It is not an argument that more, or less, hearsay should be
admitted in criminal cases. Instead, it takes as a starting point the
undeniable reality that, for good or ill, today's federal criminal trials
include a wider variety of admissible hearsay than ever before.2l' My
27. In an earlier article I argued that, when it comes to hearsay, the Confrontation
Clause should have less to do with exclusion of evidence and more to do \\ith a
process that allows for effective adversarial challenges to hearsay:
If the Confrontation Clause is ever to become more than a redundancy. then
we must move beyond exclusionary thinking and expand our notion of
confrontation to encompass a broad, affirmative right to challenge hearsay.
When a hearsay declarant is available, there is little reason to pause over the
issue of reliability. Instead, courts should be serious about providing the
defendant with an opportunity for real confrontation, if he really wants that
confrontation. When the declarant is unavailable, confrontation-hearsay
analysis should not begin with the assumption that confrontation is
impossible. Effective challenge to hearsay often is possible despite, or
sometimes especially because of, the physical absence of the declarant from
the courtroom.
Douglass, supra note 6, at 272. The discovery reforms which I propose in this Article
are an appropriate-indeed, a necessary-complement to a constitutional rule
protecting the adversarial right to test hearsay even after it is admitted in evidence.
28. The law of evidence no longer treats the rule against hearsay like much of a
rule. The modem history of hearsay exceptions has been a one-way street. Once
born, hearsay exceptions almost never die. See Allen, supra note 15, at 799
("[H]earsay exceptions, once formed, remain. To my knowledge. there are virtually
no examples of hearsay exceptions being eliminated ...."}. And once established,
those exceptions tend to expand in scope. Some "expansions" result from legislative
action. In White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992), for example, the Court faced a
Confrontation Clause challenge to hearsay admitted under a 1988 re\ision to the
Illinois Code dealing with statements for purposes of medical diagnosis. See id. at 34851. In the state proceedings in the same case, the Appellate Court of Illinois
characterized the revisions as an effort to "sever artificial restraints." People v. White,
555 N.E.2d 1241, 1251 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990). Other expansions of established hearsay
exceptions occur through the process of judicial interpretation. For example,
commentators have noted a tendency among modern courts, especially in child abuse
prosecutions, to expand the "medical diagnosis" exception to admit statements
identifying an abuser, see Margaret A. Berger, The Deconsrir111ionalizarion of the
Confrontation Clause: A Proposal for a Prosec111oria/ Resrraim Mot/el, 16 Minn. L
Rev. 557, 606 n.198 (1992), and to eiq>and the "spontaneous declarations" exception
by easing the time limitations traditionally imposed on the concept of "spontaneity,"
thereby admitting in evidence statements that occurred well after the abusive incident
which provoked the "declaration," see Allison C. Goodman, Note, Two Critical
Evitlentiary Issues in Child Sexual Abuse Cases: C/osetl-Circuit Testimony by Child
Victims and Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule, 32 Am. Crim. L Rev. 855, 876, 882 n.202
(1995).
Some scholars contend that the hearsay rule is "dead." For example, Professor
Allen asserts:
The hearsay rule is, in short, no longer a rule of exclusion: it is instead a rule
of admission that is doing its subversive work under the cover of darkness.
Article VIII of the Federal Rules purports to continue the common law
development of hearsay in most respects, but it is a false promise. The
Federal Rules, in concert with modern discovery principles, arc quite clearly
the harbinger of its demise. My instinct is that it is a death well-deserved,
and after a burial suitable to its station, the hearsay rule should be allowed
to lie quietly, undisturbed, for eternity.
Allen, supra note 15, at 800; see also, e.g., Faust F. Rossi, The Si/em Rei•olurion in The
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aim is to show how the process of criminal discovery can and should
adapt to that reality to correct the hearsay-discovery balance when the
government relies on hearsay.
I.

THE HEARSAY-DISCOVERY IMBALANCE IN FEDERAL
CRIMINAL CASES

A. Reality Defies Conventional Theory: Criminal Defendants Face
More Hearsay-and More Problematic Hearsay-Than Other
Litigants

Adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975 spurred an
expansion in the scope of hearsay admissible in both civil and criminal
cases.29 The Rules included twenty-seven separately enumerated
hearsay exceptions, and defined another handful of out-of-court
statements as "not hearsay."30 Though those categorical exceptions
largely tracked exceptions recognized at common law,3 1 the Rules
typically opted for the more liberal versions of most common-law
exceptions32 and, in a few notable instances, broadened hearsay
admissibility even further. 33 The coups de grace for expanded
admissibility were the heavily-debated residual exceptions. 34 And the
Litigation Manual: A Primer for Trial Lawyers 640, 653 (John G. Koeltl ed., 2d ed.
1989) (recounting the "rapid erosion of the doctrine of hearsay" as a result of the
Federal Rules of Evidence). Others find that pronouncement a bit exaggerated. See
Roger C. Park, Hearsay, Dead or Alive?, 40 Ariz. L. Rev. 647, 658 (1998) (hereinafter
Park, Dead or Alive?] (concluding, based on a number of factors including the
continuing quantity of judicial opinions and case reversals relating to hearsay, that the
hearsay rule "retains significant influence").
29. See Rossi, supra note 28, at 645-53.
30. See Fed. R. Evid. 803(1)-(23), 804(b)(l)-(4) (exceptions to hearsay rule); id.
Rule 801(d) (out-of-court statements which the Rules define as "not hearsay").
31. See Fed. R. Evid. art. VIII advisory committee's note ("The approach to
hearsay in these rules is that of the common law . . . . The traditional hearsay
exceptions are drawn upon for the exceptions ....").
32. The Rule 803(4) exception for statements for purposes of medical diagnosis,
for example, did not include the traditional prohibition on statements made to a
physician consulted with respect to litigation. See Fed. R. Evid. 803(4) advisory
committee's note. The Rule 804(b)(2) exception for dying declarations was extended
to civil cases. See id. Rule 804(b)(2) advisory committee's note.
33. The Federal Rules of Evidence, for example, expanded the common-law
concept of "statements against interest" to include not only statements affecting a
pecuniary interest, but also statements against penal interest. See id. Rule 804(b)(3) &
advisory committee's note. The Federal Rules also allow for a more generous
approach to the admission of co-conspirator statements. See Bourjaily v. United
States, 483 U.S. 171, 176-81 (1987) (holding that Fed. R. Evid. 104(a) modified the
traditional "bootstrapping" rule of Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942), which
had required independent evidence of conspiracy as a foundation for admission of coconspirator statements).
34. See Fed. R. Evid. 807 (originally codified at Fed. R. Evid. 803(24) and
804(b)(5)). The proposed rule first submitted to Congress would have admitted any
hearsay "not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having
comparable circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness." Revised Draft of Proposed
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process did not stop there. Since 1975, judicial construction of the
Rules-especially of the residual exceptions-has probably pushed
the boundaries of admissibility even beyond what the drafters
envisioned.35
While expanded admissibility has been the clear trend since 1975, it
is less than clear who have been the principal beneficiaries of that
trend, the major "consumers" of this increasing supply of admissible
hearsay. Civil litigants seem like the most likely candidates. After all,
conventional theory suggests that courts should admit hearsay more
cautiously in criminal cases than in civil cases.36 But there is no simple
Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts and Magistrates, 51 F.R.D. 315, 422
(1971). The House of Representatives deleted the provision, finding it injected Mtoo
much uncertainty." R.R. Rep. No. 93-1597 (1974), reprimed in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
7098, 7106. The Senate adopted a more limited version and the Conference
Committee forged the current rule from the Senate version by adding the
requirement of pretrial notice. See id. For a more detailed account of the history of
the residual exception, see Myrna S. Raeder, The Effecr of rlze Carclw/ls on Criminal
Defendants: Little Red Riding Hood Meets r/ze Hearsay Wolf and is Devoured, 25 Loy.
L.A. L. Rev. 925, 925-28 (1992) [hereinafter Raeder, Effecr of Carclw/ls).
Significantly, when the residual exception was recodificd to Ruic 807 in 1997, the
Advisory Committee implicitly predicted new hearsay exceptions still to come. The
avowed purpose of recodification was to "facilitate additions to Rules 803 and 80.t"
Fed. R. Evid. 807 advisory committee's note.
35. See Raeder, Effect of Catdwl/s, supra note 34, at 928-34; Rossi, supra note 28,
at 645-49.
36. Most contemporary observers conclude that courts behave as conventional
theory suggests. Judge Weinstein argues:
In criminal cases, the hearsay rule is suffused with constitutional hues and.
therefore, applied more stringently than in civil cases. This recognizes the
greater danger of prejudice to a criminal defendant, and the operation of
other factors affecting the admissibility of evidence, such as the right of
confrontation, limitations imposed by the privilege against selfincrimination, the right to counsel, and the rather limited discovery
permitted in criminal cases.
Weinstein et al., supra note 16, § 802.04[3)[b), at 802-14 (footnote omitted). Later, he
asserts: "[T]he impact of the hearsay rule is different in civil and criminal cases. This
results from the presence in criminal cases of such factors as the narrower scope of
discovery ...." Id.§ 802.05[1], at 802-15.
The observations of a jurist of Judge Weinstein's stature ob\•iously should not be
discounted. But the authorities he cites to support that observation actually say
nothing about the differences between civil and criminal cases. Instead, the
observation simply rests upon a few appellate decisions reversing criminal con,ictions
where hearsay was admitted. The treatise makes no effort to account for the many
federal decisions affirming convictions where controversial prosecution hearsay was
admitted, nor does it offer any contrasting authority showing the supposedly more
liberal attitude of judges toward hearsay in civil cases.
Other contemporary scholars make similar observations that hearsay is more
strictly controlled in criminal cases. See, e.g., Park, S11bjec1 Maller Approach, supra
note 9, at 87 (noting that courts are "uniformly more liberal in receiving hearsay
evidence in civil cases than in criminal cases"); Van Kessel, supra note 2, at 479, 481 &
n.14 (noting that recent cases show a more conservative approach to interpreting
hearsay exceptions). In part they rely on those hearsay exceptions in the Federal
Rules which explicitly distinguish criminal cases, exceptions which-as I argue below,
see infra Part l.A.1.b.-do very little to benefit criminal defendants as a practical
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means to test the theory to determine who faces the widest range of
admissible hearsay. Federal courts make no effort to "keep score"
among the various classes of litigants. Empirical studies of reported
cases offer some helpful, and surprising, insights.37 But, when making
statistical comparisons between civil and criminal cases, it is hard to
be certain that we are comparing apples to apples. 38
In the following sections, I assess conventional theory in two ways.
First, I examine the three main pillars supporting the theory: (a) the
Confrontation Clause, (b) the Federal Rules of Evidence, and (c) the
exercise of discretion by trial judges in making hearsay rulings. In
theory, each of these offers a source of special protection to criminal
defendants against the expansion of admissible hearsay. Second, I
look at judicial rulings on hearsay's frontiers, opinions expanding the
boundaries of admissible hearsay beyond traditional limits. My
conclusion is that the three pillars of conventional theory account for
little in the way of special protection for criminal defendants. And at
hearsay's frontiers, prosecutors are the most successful of any litigants
in breaking new ground in the admission of hearsay. In reality, it
appears that criminal defendants face a broader range of admissible
hearsay than other litigants. And, more often than civil litigants, they
must contend with the most problematic forms of hearsay: statements
that fall outside the boundaries of traditional hearsay exceptions.
1.

Three Pillars of Conventional Theory: Extra Protections Against
Prosecution Hearsay, or the Illusion of Protection?

In theory, criminal defendants enjoy three sources of extra
protection against the more liberal admission of hearsay that
supposedly occurs in civil cases, or when the defendant himself offers
hearsay. First, the Confrontation Clause limits a prosecutor's use of
hearsay, but has no application when other litigants offer hearsay in
evidence.39 Second, the Federal Rules of Evidence include several
specific limits on hearsay that are unique to criminal cases and, in
matter. Their only other authority is Weinstein's treatise.
37. As far as I am aware, no comprehensive comparison of hearsay in civil and
criminal cases exists to support the apparently widespread assumption that judges arc
more cautious toward hearsay when it is offered against criminal defendants. The
only empirical studies on the subject reach the opposite conclusion. See Swift, Judicial
Discretion, supra note 17, at 482-86 (finding that prosecutors were proportionately
more successful in offering hearsay under Rules 803(1), (2), (3), (4), and (6) than
other classes of litigants); Raeder, Response, supra note 17, at 508 & n.2 (finding
prosecutors the most successful users of "residual" hearsay). My own survey, which
essentially aimed to update Professor Raeder's 1991 survey of residual hearsay cases,
likewise found that prosecutors succeeded more often than other litigants in offering
hearsay under the residual exception, even though one might expect courts to be most
cautious in admitting such "fringe" hearsay against criminal defendants. See infra
notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
38. See infra note 96.
39. See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 814 (1990).
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some instances, apply only to prosecution hearsay ..w Third, at least
partly out of concern for defendants' limited discovery rights, trial
judges are said to exercise their discretion to limit hearsay more
strictly when offered against criminal defendants:11 But a closer look
at the first two of these pillars suggests that neither the Confrontation
Clause nor the Federal Rules of Evidence actually serve to exclude
much prosecution hearsay that would be admissible if offered by other
litigants.42 As for the third pillar, while the overall impact of judicial
discretion is hard to measure, the best available evidence suggests
that, on average, judicial judgment calls actually favor prosecutors
over other litigants in a significant way:13
a. The Confrontation Clause
In theory, the Supreme Court applies the Confrontation Clause as a
kind of super hearsay rule, a constitutional trump card to limit the
admission of especially unreliable hearsay in criminal cases. "The
Confrontation Clause," the Court tells us, "bars the admission of
some evidence that would othenvise be admissible under an exception
to the hearsay rule." 44 When the Federal Rules of Evidence were
40. See Fed. R. Evid. 803(8) (public records); id. Ruic 803(22) (judgments); id.
Rule 804(b)(l) (former testimony); id. Rule 804(b)(2) (dying declarations). Rule
804(b)(3) {declarations against interest) also distinguishes ch•il from criminal cases,
but by limiting defense-offered hearsay in criminal cases more strictly than
prosecution hearsay.
41. Weinstein's treatise contends, "[R)eversible error is found more often in
criminal cases when hearsay is improperly admitted against a defendant.
Consequently, the trial judge's discretion to admit hearsay evidence against a criminal
defendant may be curtailed." Weinstein et al., supra note 16, § 802.04[3)(b). at 802-14
to -15; see also Park, Subject Matter Approach. supra note 9, at 87 (highlighting that
the judicial attitude towards exclusion appears to be stricter in criminal cases): Van
Kessel, supra note 2, at 479, 481 (noting that judges in criminal cases have been "less
radical [and] more uneven").
42 See infra Part l.A.1.a-b.
43. See infra Part l.A.1.c.
44. Wright, 497 U.S. at 814. In recent years. however, at least two members of the
Court, the Justice Department, and several prominent scholars have challenged the
notion that hearsay declarants are "witnesses against" the accused under the
Confrontation Clause. They argue, therefore, that the Clause generally docs not
operate to exclude hearsay at all.
Through an amicus brief filed in White v. l/li11ois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992), the Justice
Department argued that the Confrontation Clause applies only to in-court testimony
and certain forms of "testimonial" hearsay (e.g.• affidavits, depositions. and prior
testimony) created in anticipation of a criminal trial. See id. at 352. The majority in
White rejected the argument with the simple statement that it "comes too late in the
day to warrant reexamination" of the Court's many earlier opinions which, at least
implicitly, had taken the broader view that "witnesses against" an accused included
hearsay declarants in general. Id. at 353. Justice Thomas wrote a concurring opinion,
joined by Justice Scalia, urging more thorough consideration of the government's
position. See id. at 358-66 (Thomas. J., concurring).
The leading scholarly proponent of the argument is Professor Akhil Recd Amar.
See Akhil Reed Amar, The Constitution and Criminal Procedure 89-144 (1997); Akhil
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enacted in 1975, confrontation-hearsay doctrine was at a somewhat
uncertain stage.45 Still, there is little doubt that, twenty-five years ago,
the constitutional exclusionary rule against unreliable hearsay
appeared more formidable than it does today. Indeed, several early
Warren Court opinions could be interpreted to suggest that hearsay
from a nontestifying declarant was admissible only where the
defendant had a reasonable opportunity to cross-examine the
declarant in an earlier proceeding.46 Against that background, it
seems likely that in 1975 Congress expected that Confrontation
Clause concerns ultimately would restrict the range of hearsay
admissible against criminal defendants under the new Rules, while
leaving more room for flexibility when courts applied the same rules
in civil cases.47
But Confrontation Clause history took a different course. In the
twenty-five years since the enactment of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, the Supreme Court has never invoked the Confrontation
Clause to exclude hearsay that was otherwise admissible under the
Rules. 48 Instead of adapting, and narrowing, the codified hearsay
Reed Amar, Confrontation Clause First Principles: A Reply to Professor Friedman, 86
Geo. L.J. 1045, 1045 (1998); Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword: Sixth Amendment First
Principles, 84 Geo. L.J. 641, 647 (1996) [hereinafter Amar, First Principles).
In my view, both the text and history of the Confrontation Clause are consistent
with the Court's view that hearsay declarants should be treated as "witnesses" for
confrontation purposes. See Douglass, supra note 6, at 224-40. However, that does
not lead to the conclusion that the Clause operates to exclude hearsay from criminal
trials. As I have argued elsewhere in greater detail, the Clause guarantees the
adversarial right to "test" whatever hearsay the rules of evidence and the Due Process
Clause permit the prosecution to offer in evidence. See id.
45. The Advisory Committee observed: "Until very recently, decisions invoking
the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment were surprisingly few, a fact
probably explainable by the former inapplicability of the clause to the states and by
the hearsay rule's occupancy of much the same ground." Fed. R. Evid. art. VIII,
advisory committee's note. In drafting the final version of the Rules, the Conference
Committee noted that confrontation-hearsay principles were "under development''
by the courts. See S. Rep. No. 93-1277 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7068.
Rather than attempt to codify confrontation principles into all hearsay exceptions, the
Rules left that process for future refinement by the Supreme Court. See id.
46. See Raeder, Effect on Catchalls, supra note 34, at 930-31 (citing Douglas v.
Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965), and Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965)).
Practically all of the Court's confrontation-hearsay opinions prior to 1975 dealt with
hearsay in the form of testimony from prior judicial proceedings and, accordingly,
focused almost exclusively on the adequacy of defendant's earlier opportunity to
cross-examine. See Douglass, supra note 6, at 202-03 & n.50 (collecting pre-1975
cases). The 1970 plurality opinion in Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 87-88 (1970),
departed from that approach, but offered no clear indication of the Court's future
course.
47. This is especially true in relation to the residual exception. Professor Raeder
makes a strong argument that the residual exception was passed in part because
Congress felt it would have minimal application in criminal cases because of
Confrontation Clause restrictions. See Raeder, Effect of Catchalls, supra note 34, at
931-32.
48. In Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594 (1994), the Court avoided a
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exceptions in criminal cases to conform with the Confrontation
Clause, the Court has adapted its views on confrontation to conform
with the rules of evidence.49 The Court accomplished that feat by
incorporating traditional hearsay exceptions into its "general
approach" to confrontation-hearsay analysis. In its 1980 decision in
Ohio v. Roberts,50 the Court declared that hearsay falling \vithin a
"firmly rooted" hearsay exception satisfies the Confrontation Clause
as well. And in the two decades since Roberts, other than the
"residual" hearsay exception,51 the Court has never found a hearsay
exception that is not "firmly rooted. "52 As a result, other than hearsay
Confrontation Clause challenge to hearsay admitted as a statement against interest by
finding that the hearsay was improperly admitted under Ruic 804(b)(3). See it!. at 605.
The opinion at least suggests that "genuinely self-inculpatory" statements properly
falling within the bounds of 804(b)(3) would likewise satisfy Confrontation Clause
concerns. Id. Perhaps the closest the Court has come to excluding, on constitutional
grounds, hearsay that would have been admissible under the Federal Rules, was in
Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990). There the Court found a Confrontation Clause
violation where hearsay was admitted under a state "residual exception" identical to
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(24). Id. at 811-12. But, because it was dealing with a
state evidentiary ruling, the Court never considered whether the statement was
properly admitted under the rules of evidence. Had the facts in Wright arisen in a
federal court, the Court might simply have ruled the statement inadmissible under
Rule 803(24), and avoided the constitutional issue.
49. See Douglass, supra note 6, at 211 ("The hearsay 'tail' now wags the
constitutional 'dog."'); Jonakait, Co11fro111atio11 Clause, supra note 11, at 558 ("The
confrontation clause is no longer a constitutional right protecting the accused, but
essentially a minor adjunct to evidence Jaw.").
50. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
51. Fed. R. Evid. 807. In Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. at 817-18. the Court found that
Idaho's "residual exception," identical to former Federal Ruic 803(24). was not a
"firmly rooted" hearsay exception.
52. The Court's standard for "firm roots" has been generous:
History, rather than reliability, generally has driven the Court's decisions
identifying "firmly rooted" hearsay exceptions. Even the search for
historically adequate "roots," however, has been Jess than exacting. The
Court has relied upon a rather amorphous mix of chronological age and
widespread acceptance-a sort of historical popularity contest. The Court's
test is so generous that virtually all recognizable hearsay exceptions have
passed. Applying this approach, the Court has ruled that the exceptions for
co-conspirator statements, spontaneous declarations, and statements for
purposes of medical diagnosis are "firmly rooted." In dictum at leas!, the
Court similarly has recognized the firm roots of the exceptions for public
records, business records, dying declarations, and prior 1rial lcstimony
subject to cross-examination. FolJO\ving the Courl's example. federal and
state appellate courts have been quick to fill in the few remaining gaps,
finding sufficiently firm roots in the exceptions for recorded recolleciion,
admissions by an agent, statements regarding the declarant's stale of mind,
and the res gestae exception.
Douglass, supra note 6, at 209-10.
Moreover, given the Court's generous approach 10 idenlifying "firmly rooled"
exceptions, it is hard to imagine that the Courl would find any of the exccplions
currently enumerated in the Federal Rules to be lacking "firm roots." Indeed, in the
Court's view, the presence of a hearsay exceplion among those enumeraled in the
Federal Rules is a critical factor in determining that the exception has "firm roots."
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admitted under the residual exception,53 it seems almost certain that
any hearsay admissible today under the Federal Rules of Evidence is
likewise admissible under the Confrontation Clause.54 Contrary to
what many may have anticipated in 1975, the Court has not carved out
a narrower range of hearsay admissible against criminal defendants.
When it comes to hearsay falling under the "residual" exceptionthe frontier of admissibility under the Federal Rules-the Court gives
us at least a theoretical basis for applying a more restrictive standard
in criminal than in civil cases. Under the "general approach" of
Roberts, hearsay falling outside of a "firmly rooted" exception meets
Confrontation Clause standards only where it possesses
"particularized guarantees of trustworthiness."55 But the Court has
declined to give any teeth to that standard. In its only treatment of
residual hearsay under the Confrontation Clause, the Court offered
no more than a nonexclusive list of factors which might provide such
"particularized guarantees," and granted trial courts "considerable
leeway in their consideration of appropriate factors." 56 Judging from
both the number and the language of reported opinions, the lower
federal courts have used that leeway to admit residual hearsay against
criminal defendants more frequently, and with no more demanding
standard for reliability, than they apply in civil cases.57
See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 355 n.8 (1992). See generally Douglass, supra note
6, at 209 nn.93, 94 (discussing the threshold of what constitutes "firm roots").
Of all the enumerated exceptions in the Federal Rules, there remains doubt that
only one, the 804(b)(3) exception for statements against interest, may not qualify as
"firmly rooted." In Lilly v. Virginia, 119 S. Ct. 1887 (1999), the Court failed to
produce a majority on the issue. Four justices found that statements against interest
by an accomplice that inculpate an accused are not within a firmly rooted exception.
See id. at 1899. Three argued that the statements at issue were not "genuinely selfinculpatory" in any event, and declined to reach the question whether the exception
was "firmly rooted." Id. at 1904-05 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). In its earlier
opinion in Williamson, a majority of the Court strongly hinted that genuinely selfinculpatory statements admissible under Rule 804(b)(3) carried the kind of
"particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" that would render the exception
"firmly rooted" under the Roberts formula. Williamson, 512 U.S. at 605.
53. See Fed. R. Evid. 807.
54. See United States v. Salim, 664 F. Supp. 682, 693 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (Weinstein,
J.) ("Article VIII of the Federal Rules of Evidence is by now-ten years after
promulgation by the Court and adoption by Congress-a 'firmly rooted' set of
hearsay exceptions."); Stephen A. Saltzburg et al., Federal Rules of Evidence Manual
1702 (7th ed. 1999) ("The Supreme Court has come quite close to holding-if it has
not in fact held-that a hearsay statement offered against a defendant in a criminal
case will automatically satisfy the Confrontation Clause if it is admissible under one of
the Rule 803 exceptions.").
55. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
56. Wright, 497 U.S. at 821-22.
57. See Raeder, Response, supra note 17, at 508 & n.2. See generally Douglass,
supra note 6, at 218-19 ("Lower courts searching for 'particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness' have managed only to prove that reliability is in the eye of the
beholder. . . . As an exclusionary rule that purports to establish a constitutional
barrier against unreliable hearsay, independent of the law of evidence ... , [Wright] is
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In sum, the Confrontation Clause does little that the Federal Rules
of Evidence do not already do to regulate hearsay in criminal trials.
The constitutional standard and the rules are essentially redundant.
And, with the few exceptions discussed below, those rules are the
same in civil and criminal cases.
b. The Federal Rules of Evidence

On the surface, the Federal Rules of Evidence lend some support to
the conventional view that criminal defendants face a more carefully
restricted range of admissible hearsay than other litigants. After all,
there are five enumerated hearsay exceptions which limit the
admission of hearsay more severely in criminal cases than in civil
cases.58 But, just as with the Confrontation Clause, the appearance of
a standard favoring criminal defendants is greater than the reality of
modern hearsay practice.
Rule 804(b)(2) does not allow a hearsay exception for dying
declarations in criminal cases other than homicide prosecutions.59 But
dying declarations are seldom admitted in civil cases either.l"'J And
their limitation in criminal cases applies whether the declaration is
offered by the prosecution or defense. Moreover, where the
government really needs the hearsay of a deceased declarant
regarding the circumstances of her death, the residual exception can
erase any limitation imposed by Rule 804(b)(2).M
The hearsay exception for judgments of previous felony convictions
does not allow admission, in criminal cases, of a prior judgment
against someone other than the accused.62 But third party convictions
too malleable to have much of an effect."); see infra text accompanying notes 90-95.
58. The five exceptions are Rules 803(8)(8) and (C) (public records), 803(22)
Gudgments), 804(b)(l) {former testimony), and 804(b)(2) (dying declarations).
59. The dying declaration exception provides:
(2) Statement under belief of impending death:
In a prosecution for homicide or in a civil action or proceeding. a statement
made by a declarant while believing that the declarant's death was
imminent, concerning the cause or circumstances of what the declarant
believed to be his impending death.
Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(2).
60. My own Westlaw search for dying declarations cases under 80-t(b)(2)
produced 43 cases. Only seven were civil cases. Of those. only two admitted the
hearsay.
61. See United States v. Canan, 48 F.3d 954, 959-61 (6th Cir. 1995); Government
of Virgin [<;lands v. Joseph, 964 F.2d 1380, 1388 (3d Cir. 1992).
62. The Rule provides in part:
(22) Judgment of previous conviction:
Evidence of a final judgment ... adjudging a person guilty of a crime ... to
prove any fact essential to sustain the judgment, but not including, when
offered by the Government in a criminal prosecution for purposes other
than impeachment, judgments against persons other than the accused.
Fed. R. Evid. 803(22). The drafters imposed this limit to avoid conflict with Kirby i•.
United States, 174 U.S. 47 (1899). See Fed. R. Evid. 803(:!2) ad,•isory committee's
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are rarely used and seldom relevant in civil cases. 63 The principal use
of Rule 803(22) in civil cases is to admit the prior conviction of a party
to the civil case in order to establish an element of the civil cause of
action or defense against the same party. For example, this occurs
when the victim of an assault sues his already-convicted assailant or an
insurer offers the property owner's arson conviction in defense of its
denial of coverage. In any event, even where a third-party judgment
is relevant, it may face exclusion for reasons other than the hearsay
rule. 64
Rule 803(8), the hearsay exception for public records and reports,
contains two limits which apply only in criminal cases. The first,
803(8)(B), limits the use of police and other law enforcement reports
in a criminal case. 65 As with dying declarations, the limitation applies
whether the government or the defendant offers the report. For
practical purposes, then, the limit probably creates more obstacles for
defendants than for prosecutors. To prosecutors, police generally are
available and predictably cooperative witnesses. Where a police
report contains relevant observations, prosecutors typically prefer to
present that information through the officer's testimony in court,
rather than through hearsay. Thus, in most cases, Rule 803(8)(B)
merely confirms the tactical choice most prosecutors would make in
any event. Moreover, despite what appears to be unequivocal
language in the Rule, most federal courts have ruled that 803(8)(B)
allows the report in evidence where the reporting officer testifies in
person at trial. 66 If the officer's report adds detail, enhances
credibility, or simply reinforces the live testimony, the prosecutor may
have the option to use the hearsay as well. On the other hand,
defense counsel are understandably more wary that they may
note. Kirby was an early Confrontation Clause case where the Court reversed a
conviction for possession of stolen property. To prove the stolen nature of the
property, the trial court had admitted in evidence the record showing conviction of
the thieves. See Kirby, 174 U.S. at 49-50.
63. There appear to be only a handful of reported civil cases admitting third-party
convictions under the hearsay exception. See Saltzburg et al., supra note 54, at 1806-09
(identifying only two such cases among the 17 annotated cases under Rule 803(22)).
64. See Rozier v. Ford Motor Co., 573 F.2d 1332, 1347-49 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding,
in products liability suit against manufacturer of the vehicle occupied by plaintiff's
decedent, that the manslaughter conviction of the driver of the other vehicle, though
admissible under Rule 803(22), should have been excluded under Rule 403 since it
might have led the jury to the mistaken conclusion that the manufacturer could not be
liable if the other driver was criminally responsible for the accident).
65. The Rule provides a hearsay exception for records and reports of public
agencies setting forth "matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which
matters there was a duty to report, excluding, however, in criminal cases matters
observed by police officers and other law enforcement personnel." Fed. R. Evid.
803(8)(B).
66. See United States v. Hayes, 861 F.2d 1225, 1229-30 (10th Cir. 1988); United
States v. King, 613 F.2d 670, 673-74 (7th Cir. 1980); Saltzburg et al., supra note 54, at
1685.
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unwittingly elicit unfavorable details from a police witness. For the
defense, Rule 803(8)(B) poses the tough choice between calling a
potentially adverse witness or foregoing favorable hearsay that an
officer included in her report.
Rule 803(8)(C) is the hearsay exception for reports of fact finding
by government agencies.67 Of the five hearsay provisions which
distinguish criminal from civil cases, 803(8)(C) is probably the only
one which creates any significant practical advantage for criminal
defendants in comparison to other litigants. The Rule 803(8)(C)
hearsay exception receives relatively wide use in civil cases,
particularly auto accident and products liability cases, where litigants
offer the findings of government agents-including police-who
investigate accidents, injuries, and even whole industries.""' The Rule,
on its face, allows such reports in criminal cases only when offered
against the government. But two judicial trends have limited the
advantage which the Rule ostensibly creates for criminal defendants.
First, even in civil cases, courts often exercise their discretion to redact
or exclude such reports when they contain opinions, conclusions, or
findings not clearly supported \vith fact. 69 Conversely, despite the
Rule's apparently unequivocal exclusion of government fact finding
reports offered against criminal defendants, some courts have
admitted such reports when they merely record facts observed by
investigators outside of the "adversarial" process of criminal
investigation, or when they reach conclusions based on reliable
scientific methods.70 These two judicial trends have chipped away
67. The Rule provides a hearsay exception "in civil actions and proceedings and
against the Government in criminal cases," for public agency reports setting forth
"factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted
by law, unless the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of
trustworthiness." Fed. R. Evid. 803(8)(C).
68. See, e.g., Simmons v. Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co., 993 F2d 1326.1327-28 (8th
Cir. 1993) (admitting state trooper's accident investigation report in a FELA action);
Lubanski v. Coleco Indus., 929 F.2d 42, 45-46 (1st Cir. 1991) (finding that a police
officer's report regarding the circumstances of an auto accident may be admissible in
a resulting products liability action if report's conclusions are trustworthy); Jn re
Aircrash in Bali, Indonesia, 871 F.2d 812, 816 (9th Cir. 1989) (admitting an FAA
report on an airline's safety record). See generally Saltzburg et al., supra note 54, at
1769-78 (providing annotations of cases holding evidence admissible when a \\itness is
"trustworthy").
69. See, e.g., Holbrook v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 80 F.3d 777, 7'ir7 (3d Cir. 1996)
(upholding trial court's redaction of diagnosis of mesothelioma from autopsy report
and hospital records); Faries v. Atlas Truck Body Mfg. Co., 797 F.2d 619, 622-23 (8th
Cir. 1986) {holding that a police report should not have been admitted where the
officer did not measure skid marks, based conclusions on statements of interested
persons, and report lacked corroboration). See generally Saltzburg et al., supra note
54, at 1783-84 (providing annotations of cases where police reports are admitted in
civil trials).
70. See Saltzburg et al., supra note 54, at 1684-85 ("Where the risk of
manipulation and untrustworthiness is minimal-in particular where the report
contains unambiguous factual matter made under nonad,•ersarial circumstances-
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much of the advantage that Rule 803(8)(C) otherwise gives a criminal
defendant by expanding the universe of government fact finding
reports admissible against him, while narrowing the universe of
reports admissible in civil cases or against the government.71
The fifth instance where the hearsay rules distinguish civil from
criminal cases appears in Rule 804(b)(1 ), the exception for former
testimony.72 In criminal cases, the Rule allows former testimony only
where the party against whom it is offered had an opportunity and
similar motive to develop the testimony in a former proceeding.73 In
civil cases, the Rule is only slightly more liberal, allowing former
testimony even where the opponent of the hearsay was not a party to
the earlier proceeding, as long as "a predecessor in interest" had an
opportunity to examine the declarant. But the Rule's more restrictive
approach in criminal cases has been nullified by judicial interpretation
of the residual hearsay exception. Under the residual exception,
federal courts have consistently admitted former testimony offered by
the government, even where the defendant was not a party to the
earlier proceeding, as long as the declarant was cross-examined by
someone-typically a co-conspirator-with a motive and interest
similar to the defendant's. 74 Whatever slight advantage Rule
Courts have held that the report should be admitted despite the apparently absolute
language of the Rule."); see also United States v. Enterline, 894 F.2d 287, 288-91 (8th
Cir. 1990) (admitting a police-created computerized list of vehicles reported stolen):
United States v. Dancy, 861 F.2d 77, 79-80 (5th Cir. 1988) (admitting a fingerprint
card offered to show defendant was a convicted felon); United States v. De Water, 846
F.2d 528, 530 (9th Cir. 1988) (admitting a breathalyzer report).
71. What remains is a slightly greater willingness of courts in civil cases to admit
agency findings that sound like opinions or conclusions, as long as they are rendered
by someone with appropriate experience or expertise, and as long as they rest upon
sufficient factual support. Still, the current approach to 803(8)(C) is far from one of
categorical admission of fact finding against civil litigants and prosecutors, and
categorical exclusion when offered against criminal defendants.
72. The exception reads in part:
(1) Former testimony:
Testimony given as a witness at another hearing ... if the party against
whom the testimony is now offered, or, in a civil action or proceeding, a
predecessor in interest, had an opportunity and similar motive to develop
the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination.
Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(l).
73. The legislative history of the Rule reflects that Congress felt it was "generally
unfair to impose upon the party against whom the hearsay evidence is being offered
responsibility for the manner in which the witness was previously handled by another
party." H.R. Rep. No. 93-650 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7075, 7088.
Accordingly, the House rejected a more broadly drafted Rule that would have
admitted former testimony where any party "with motive and interest similar" to that
of the party against whom the former testimony is offered had an opportunity to
examine the witness at the former proceeding. Id. The Conference Committee
accepted the House amendment. See id.
74. See United States v. Sposito, 106 F.3d 1042, 1046-48 (1st Cir. 1997) (admitting
testimony from an unrelated gambling trial against a different defendant under the
residual exception where declarant was cross-examined thoroughly by defense
attorney in the earlier trial); United States v. Shaw, 69 F.3d 1249, 1253 (4th Cir. 1995)
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804(b)(l) may have given to criminal defendants, the residual
exception has taken away.
c. Judicial Discretion in Admitting Hearsay

In admitting or excluding hearsay, as with most evidentiary rulings,
trial courts exercise a range of discretion even when applying
apparently fixed rules.75 Therefore, even if neither the Confrontation
Clause nor the Federal Rules of Evidence create any substantial
hearsay-related advantage for criminal defendants, it remains possible
that judicial discretion alone might provide that advantage. Perhaps
courts more often make discretionary "judgment calls" in favor of
criminal defendants, giving them the benefit of the doubt when
prosecution hearsay gets near the edge of admissibility.71'
Admittedly, it is difficult to measure the collective "discretion" of
hundreds of federal trial judges. Reported opinions may not tell the
full story.77 And direct case comparisons are difficult, given the
variety of factual contexts in which hearsay issues arise. Still, we can
draw some conclusions from what courts say-or do not say-when
they consider hearsay. If discretion is more limited in admitting
prosecution hearsay, then we should expect courts to say so on
occasion. But it is virtually impossible to find opinions in which trial
courts acknowledge that their discretion to admit hearsay against
criminal defendants is more limited than in other circumstances. 7:\1 It is
(finding the testimony of since-deceased witness, subject to cross-examination at trial
of co-conspirator, admissible under the residual exception); United States v. Deeb, 13
F.3d 1532, 1536-37 (11th Cir. 1994) {admitting the testimony subject to crossexamination at the trial of defendant's accomplices under the residual exception);
United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 7-8 {1st Cir. 1990) (admitting the testimony of
now-deceased witness from the earlier trial of codefcndants under the residual
exception).
75. See United States v. Scarpa, 913 F.2d 993, 1015 (2d Cir. 1990) ("[T)he trial
judge is in the best position to weigh competing interests in deciding whether or not to
admit certain evidence. Absent an abuse of discretion, the decision of the trial judge
to admit or reject evidence will not be overturned by an appellate court." (internal
quotations and citations omitted)). Professor Raeder argues that appellate courts too
readily apply an abuse of discretion standard to uphold evidentiary rulings which
really concern an issue of law that should be reviewed de novo. See Raeder, Response,
supra note 17, at 517-18.
76. Several commentators, including Judge Weinstein, contend that judicial
discretion plays an important role in placing stricter limits on hearsay when offered
against criminal defendants. See Weinstein et al., supra note 16, § 802.0-l[3)[b), at 80214 to -15; Park, Subject Matter Approach. supra note 9, at 87; Van Kessel, supra note
2, at 479, 484-85.
77. Evidentiary rulings often are made during trial, without written opinion. And
there is no guarantee that the issues which surface in published opinions provide a
representative sample of hearsay decisions. This is especially true of appellate
decisions in criminal cases. which, as a general rule, consist only of defense appeals
from adverse evidentiary rulings. See infra note 96.
78. My research has disclosed none. Of course, the collective silence of trial
courts on the issue is not especially surprising. Trial courts issue written opinions in
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just as hard to find appellate opinions which say that it should be so
limited. On the other hand, it is quite typical for appellate courts to
begin their assessment of a trial court's decision to admit prosecution
hearsay with the familiar refrain that such rulings will not be reversed
absent an abuse of discretion.79 And that refrain is almost always a
prelude to an opinion affirming a conviction. 80
Judge Jack B. Weinstein contends that trial judges' discretion to
admit prosecution hearsay is curtailed because "reversible error is
found more often in criminal cases when hearsay is improperly
admitted against a defendant."81 But the only available empirical
evidence contradicts that assertion. In her 1991 study of federal court
opinions addressing five hearsay exceptions over a ten-year period,
Professor Eleanor Swift found reversible errors far more likely in civil
than in criminal cases.82 According to her study, even in cases where
appellate courts identified an error in the admission of prosecution
hearsay, they reversed less than 20% of the time, while affirming most
cases under the harmless error standard. The rate of reversals where
errors were identified in civil cases was three times that high. 83 My
own survey of appellate action in post-1991 cases dealing with residual
hearsay documents a similar reluctance among appellate courts to
reverse cases where prosecutors have succeeded in offering residual
hearsay at trial.84 I found reversals in only 6% of such cases.
In sum, neither the language, the sheer numbers, nor the results of
published opinions leave us with much hard evidence that trial judges,
in the exercise of their discretion, apply a more stringent standard to
prosecution hearsay in criminal cases than to hearsay proffered by
other litigants. And a closer look at hearsay admitted under the
residual exception, where judicial discretion is least confined by the
part to justify their decisions in anticipation of appellate review.
79. See Swift, Judicial Discretion, supra note 17, at 479 n.17.
80. See id. at 478.
81. Weinstein et al., supra note 16, § 802.04[3][b], at 802-14.
82. See Swift, Judicial Discretion, supra note 17, at 479-80. Professor Swift
surveyed 237 federal court opinions reporting hearsay rulings under Rules 803(1), (2),
(3), (4), and (6). See id. at 478.
83. Professor Swift found only three reversals in the 16 criminal cases where
appellate courts found that the trial court had erred in admitting prosecution hearsay,
for a reversal rate of 19%. By contrast, of the 21 civil cases where appellate courts
identified error in admitting hearsay, they reversed twelve, or 57%. See id. at 479-80.
Professor Park takes issue with Professor Swift's conclusion, arguing that the results
of her survey show only that "criminal defendants are more likely to appeal from
harmless errors." Park, Dead or Alive?, supra note 28, at 650 n.13. I believe there is
more substance to Professor Swift's results. Criminal defendants, just like other
litigants, have a tactical incentive to choose their best issues for appeal and to jettison
those which may appear frivolous. And even if it is true that criminal defendants
have a lower threshold for choosing issues to raise on appeal, the collective message
sent to trial courts when over 80% of erroneous evidentiary rulings are nonetheless
affirmed seems unmistakable.
84. See infra note 93.
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Rules of Evidence, suggests that prosecutors may be the most
frequent beneficiaries of judicial judgment calls.85
2.

Hearsay's Frontiers: Where Criminal Defendant's Face the Most
Troublesome, and Often the Most Critical, Hearsay

So far, we have seen that the three principal safeguards which might
limit prosecution hearsay more strictly than hearsay in general do not
impose much of a limit. The Confrontation Clause largely mimics the
Federal Rules of Evidence, and those Rules create few meaningful
limits that are unique to prosecution hearsay. To the extent that we
can measure the impact of judicial discretion in the application of
those Rules, there is no evidence that criminal defendants enjoy any
advantage over other litigants.
But in order to appreciate fully the hearsay challenges facing
criminal defendants, we should take one further step. Perhaps the
best way to measure the relative impact of hearsay on criminal
defendants is to look at hearsay's frontiers-the rules and judicial
opinions which expand admissible hearsay beyond traditional limits.
It is important to consider the fringes of admissible hearsay for two
reasons. First, at least from the perspective of traditional evidence
law, such hearsay poses the greatest risks. After all, if traditional
hearsay exceptions rest upon reasonable assessments of reliability,
then the further courts stray from the core of traditional exceptions,
the less reliable such hearsay becomes.86 Second, proponents typically
offer "fringe" hearsay because they really need it. Courts allow it for
the same reason: it is critical to the proponent's case and there is no
available substitute.87 In other words, courts typically admit new and
controversial forms of hearsay where both the risks and the needs for
such hearsay are high.88 And if the stakes are high, then so is the
defendant's need for adequate tools to contest such hearsay, including
the tool of discovery.
85. See infra notes 89-116 and accompanying text.
86. Whether traditional categorical exceptions actually measure "reliability" in
any reliable fashion, of course, is subject to debate. See supra note 3.
87. In fact, the residual exception requires that hearsay be important to qualify for
admission. The exception applies where "the statement is more probative on the
point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure
through reasonable efforts." Fed. R Evid. 807(B).
88. Perhaps the clearest modern examples of need-driven expansions of
traditional hearsay limits are (1) the admission of out-of-court statements by children
regarding acts of abuse, and (2) the admission of grand jury testimony of unavailable
prosecution witnesses. The first has evolved from both legislative and judicial action
aimed primarily at expanding the limits of the traditional exceptions for "excited
utterances" and statements for purposes of mec.iical diagnosis. See infra text
accompanying notes 122-27. The second is the product of a generous. and
controversial, interpretation of the residual exception. See infra text accompanying
notes 100-01. In both instances, prosecutors have been the impetus for the expansion
of admissible hearsay.
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Under the Federal Rules, much of hearsay's frontier is occupied by
the residual exception, where the absence of categorical limits leaves
more room for judicial adventurism.89 But far from suggesting that
courts apply stricter limits to hearsay in criminal cases, federal cases
applying the residual exception suggest exactly the opposite. Based
on the number of reported cases, prosecutors appear to be the most
prolific users of the residual exception at trial. 90 And, statistically
speaking, they are the most successful. A 1991 survey of residual
hearsay cases found that prosecutors succeeded in 81 % of the
reported cases where they offered hearsay under the residual
exception. 91 Civil litigants fared roughly half as well, while criminal
defendants succeeded in only 15% of their efforts to use the residual
exception.92 My own survey of residual hearsay opinions since 1991 93
89. Rule 807, the "residual exception," applies to "statement[s] not specifically
covered by Rule 803 or 804 but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness." Fed. R. Evid. 807. Courts have a considerable range of discretion
in determining what statements are sufficiently reliable under this standard. See
Weinstein et al., supra note 16, 807.03[2][a], at 807-12. In theory, the Confrontation
Clause limits that discretion more severely when prosecutors offer hearsay. See Idaho
v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 814-15 (1990). In practice, there seems to be little difference
between the Rule's requirement of equivalent "circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness" and the constitutional requirement that non-"firmly rooted" hearsay
possess "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." See Douglass, supra note 6, at
216-17 & n.142. Few angels could dance along the thread that separates the two
standards.
90. See Raeder, Response, supra note 17, at 508 n.2. Professor Raeder surveyed
408 reported residual hearsay cases from federal courts from 1975 through July 1,
1991. Prosecutors offered residual hearsay in 171 cases. Civil plaintiffs were a distant
second with 113 cases. See id.
91. See id. Most of the cases included in Professor Raeder's survey were decided
before the Supreme Court's opinion in Idaho v. Wright, a case that certainly held the
potential to cut back on successful use of residual hearsay by prosecutors. But Wright
seems not to have stemmed prosecutors' tide of success. My own survey of post-1991
cases produced results every bit as favorable to prosecutors as Professor Raeder's. See
infra note 93.
92. See Raeder, Response, supra note 17, at 508 n.2. Taking into account the final
outcome of cases after appeal, Professor Raeder found that prosecutors ultimately
succeeded in offering residual hearsay in 138of171 cases, for a success rate of 81 %.
In stark contrast, criminal defendants succeeded in only 11 of 75 cases, a success rate
of 15%. Civil plaintiffs succeeded in 43% of cases (49of113), while civil defendants
succeeded 43% of the time (24 of 49). See id.
93. In order to determine whether the trends identified by Professor Raeder were
still apparent, my research assistant, Michael Gryzlov, performed a Lexis search for
residual hearsay cases since July 1991, the cutoff date for Professor Raeder's survey,
using a search request of "[807 or 804(b)(5) or 803(24)] w/10 hearsay." The request
initially generated over 400 cases. After excluding irrelevant cases and those where
the residual hearsay exception was only an alternative grounds for the court's ruling, I
tabulated the results from the first 100 cases where the court made a definitive ruling
under the residual hearsay exception. Of those 100 cases, 82 involved rulings on
residual hearsay offered at trial. The remaining cases involved residual hearsay
offered in connection with motions for summary judgment or motions for preliminary
injunctions in civil cases. The final results of the survey are based on those 82 rulings
where residual hearsay was offered at trial and no other hearsay exception applied.
In order to distinguish the impact of appellate action, I further divided the sample.
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confirms that prosecutors may still be the most prolific users of
residual hearsay at trial. 94 And these more recent cases suggest an
even higher rate of success for prosecutors.95
Admittedly, factors unrelated to judicial views on hearsay skew
these statistically apparent success rates in favor of prosecutors.96
There were 70 cases with opinions from a United States Court of Appeals, and 12
cases where we identified a trial court ruling with no record of appellate action. The
following tables reflect the results:

-

..
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Fed. Dist. Ct.
#Cases
U.S. Ct. A1m.
Admits Excludes Error Reverses
Civil Plaintiff
0
7
3
0
4
0
0
Civil Defendant
1
9
5
1
0
4
0
Criminal Pros.
2
35
7
0
0
0
Criminal Def.
19
0
0
0
19
1
1

Proponent

Success Rate
Adm. Total
3n 43%
419

44%

33135

94%

1119

5%
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Fed. Dist. Ct.
U.S. Ct. Agg.
Success Rate
Proponent
#Cases
Admits Excludes Error Reverses Adm. Total
4n 57%
Civil Plaintiff
7
4
3
Civil Defendant
2
1/3
33%
3
1

Criminal Pros.
Criminal Def.
Proponent
Civil Plaintiff
Civil Defendant
Criminal Pros.
Criminal Def.

1
1

1
0

0
1

Residual Hearsav Offered at Trial-All Cases
Fed. Dist. Ct.
U.S. Ct. Agg.
#Cases
Admits Excludes Error Reverses
14
12
36
20

1/1
0/1

100%
0%

Success Rate
Adm. Total
7n4 50%
5112 42%
34136
1120

94%

50•lo

94. My survey identified 70 appellate opinions and 12 district court opinions ruling
on hearsay offered at trial under the residual exception. Of those 82 opinions, 36
(44% of the total) were cases where prosecutors were the offering party. Criminal
defendants and both classes of civil litigants trailed far behind. Criminal defendants
offered residual hearsay in 20 cases (24%). Civil plaintiffs were proponents in 14
cases (17%) while civil defendants offered residual hearsay in only 12 cases (15%).
95. My survey showed prosecutors succeeding in an astounding 94% of reported
cases where they were the proponents of residual hearsay. At the opposite end of the
spectrum, criminal defendants succeeded as proponents only 5% of the time. Chil
litigants fell squarely in the middle, with plaintiffs succeeding in 50% of cases where
they were the proponent and defendants succeeding 42% of the time.
96. The biggest problem with empirical comparisons, at least those involving
appellate decisions, is that in criminal cases the government cannot appeal from an
adverse evidentiary ruling at trial. As a result, essentially all appellate opinions
dealing with hearsay in criminal cases arise where the defendant lost the issue at trial,
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Still, the statistics offer clear support for at least one important
conclusion: federal prosecutors seldom see their trial victories
reversed based upon erroneous admission of prosecution hearsay
under the residual exception.97 Application of the harmless error
doctrine accounts for a fair percentage of prosecution victories. 98 But
the greater number of appeals, typically citing the "abuse of
discretion" standard of review, simply find no error in admitting
residual hearsay offered by the government. Thus, at a minimum, the
statistics cast serious doubt on the conventional assumption that trial
courts face stricter limits on discretion in admitting "fringe" hearsay
offered by prosecutors.
Looking beyond statistics, there is further evidence that federal
either because the trial court admitted prosecution hearsay or excluded hearsay
tendered by the defense. That was true of all of the 70 appellate decisions which my
survey identified. The cases where the defendant prevailed in offering or opposing
hearsay at trial are never presented on appeal. Civil litigants, like criminal
defendants, are free to appeal adverse hearsay rulings. Therefore, if we judge the
relative success rate of the parties only by review of appellate decisions, our statistical
success rates will be skewed. We have no way to tell how many defense "successes"
and government "failures" in criminal trials have been screened out of our sample of
cases by the government's inability to appeal. This factor alone probably accounts for
much of the difference among the statistically apparent success rates of prosecutors,
criminal defendants and civil litigants.
In an effort to account for this appellate "screening" factor in criminal cases, my
own survey looked separately at federal district court opinions. Unfortunately, the
vast majority of reported district court opinions on residual hearsay are in civil cases,
primarily cases where the court addresses residual hearsay in ruling on a summary
judgment motion or motion for preliminary injunction. Of the 100 cases surveyed,
only two were district court opinions addressing residual hearsay at trial in criminal
cases. True to form, the government succeeded as proponent of the hearsay in one,
while the defendant failed as proponent in the other.
From my own experience as an Assistant United States Attorney, I also believe a
fair amount of "screening" of inadmissible hearsay occurs in the prosecutor's office
before trial. Sensible prosecutors seek to avoid creation of serious appealable issues
that might result in reversal and retrial. By contrast, because the government cannot
appeal from an acquittal, defense counsel has the opposite incentive when it comes to
hearsay. If the hearsay is favorable, his incentive is to offer it, no matter how
debatable its admissibility.
Accordingly, in comparison to defense counsel,
prosecutors screen more inadmissible, or seriously debatable, hearsay before it is even
offered in evidence.
But, in a different way, this "screening" factor may only highlight the importance of
the generous attitude that federal courts seem to take with residual hearsay offered by
prosecutors. Prosecutors are less likely to "screen" their own hearsay in those cases
where they need it most. In other words, they are more likely to "push the envelope"
with debatable hearsay in those cases where they most need the hearsay to prove
guilt. Those are the very cases where judicial scrutiny ought to be most exacting. Yet
the high rate of prosecution success with residual hearsay suggests the opposite.
Courts seem quite generous in admitting important prosecution hearsay under the
residual exception.
97. My survey found 35 appellate decisions reviewing a trial court's admission of
prosecution hearsay under the residual exception. Only two ended in reversal. See
supra note 93.
98. The appellate court found error 7 of the 35 appeals in the sample surveyed.
The harmless error doctrine saved five out of seven convictions. See supra note 93.
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courts admit "fringe" hearsay most readily at the behest of
prosecutors. The admission of grand jury testimony from unavailable
witnesses is probably the clearest example of judicial adventurism at
hearsay's frontier. 99 Practically without exception, courts make that
departure in admitting hearsay against criminal defendants. 100 Grand
jury testimony no doubt represents one of the riskier classes of
hearsay admitted under the residual exception. It lacks the principal
guarantee of trustworthiness required to admit former testimony
under the traditional hearsay exception: prior examination by the
opposing party. Grand jury testimony is obtained in secret, in an ex
parte proceeding, and by a prosecutor whose principal aim often is to
develop evidence that a particular target committed a particular
crime. Yet, in an increasing number of cases, federal courts have
found adequate "circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness" in
grand jury testimony to satisfy both the residual exception and the
Confrontation Clause. 101
99. By admitting grand jury testimony under the residual exception, courts
circumvent the limit which Rule 804(b)(l) imposes on former testimony, namely, the
requirement that the opponent had an opportunity to examine the witness in the
earlier proceeding. Professor Jonakait argues that admission of grand jury testimony
under the residual exception subverts the basic framework of the Federal Rules, by
ignoring the clear limits Congress intended to place on hearsay under the "former
testimony" exception. See Randolph N. Jonakait, Tlze Subversion ofr/ze Hearsay Rule:
Tlze Residual Hearsay Exceptions, Circumstalllial Guaramees of Tmstwortlziness, and
Grand Jury Testimony, 36 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 431, 441 (1986). Judge Sarokin made
a similar argument in rejecting government efforts to admit grand jury testimony:
"[I]f we allow the residual exception to relax Rule 804(b)(l)'s fairness inquiry and
admit 'trustworthy' grand jury testimony under Rule 804(b)(5), we have allowed the
residual exception to subvert 804(b)(l)'s purpose." United States v. Vigoa, 656 F.
Supp.1499, 1505 (D.NJ.1987), affd, 857 F.2d 1467 (3d Cir. 1988).
100. My own survey of 100 post-1991 cases found 11 cases where the prosecution
succeeded in offering grand jury testimony of an unavailable declarant. I found none
where criminal defendants or civil litigants succeeded. Civil cases, of course, seldom
relate to matters which involve a grand jury investigation. And, even where civil and
criminal cases pertain to the same subject matter, rules of grand jury secrecy• can
prevent civil litigants from gaining access to grand jury transcripts. See Fed. R. Crim.
P. 6(e).
101. See, e.g., United States v. Earles, 113 F3d 796, 799-802 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding
that the totality of circumstances can create enough trustworthiness to make the
hearsay admissible); United States v. McHan, 101 F3d 1027, 1037-38 (4th Cir. 1996)
(same); Curro v. United States, 4 F.3d 436, 437 (6th Cir. 1993) (same); United States
v. Kladouris, 964 F.2d 658, 664 (7th Cir. 1992) (refusing to exclude the testimony
simply because the witness was not cross-examined); United States v. PanzardiLespier, 918 F.2d 313, 316-17 (1st Cir. 1990) (finding evidence admissible after
"exhaustive factual analysis" of "the encompassing circumstances of the case");
United States v. Donlon, 909 F.2d 650, 652-55 (1st Cir. 1990) (same). One
commentator remarked, "The admission of grand jury testimony under Rule
804(b)(5) is a widespread practice, constituting what has become virtually another
enumerated exception." Joseph W. Rand, Note, Tlze Residual Exceptions to r/ze
Federal Hearsay Rule: The Futile and Misguided Auempr to Restrain Judicial
Discretion, 80 Geo. L.J. 873, 902 (1992) (footnote omitted).
That observation may be a bit overstated. There are still a handful of cases where
courts have reversed convictions, typically on Confrontation Clause grounds, based
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The receptiveness of federal courts to prosecution hearsay from
unavailable government witnesses has not been limited to grand jury
testimony. Despite Rule 804(b )(1 )'s explicit limitation on former
testimony offered against criminal defendants, 102 prosecutors have
consistent success in offering hearsay from prior judicial proceedings
where someone-whether or not related to the defendant-had an
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant, 103 and sometimes whereas in the grand jury-there was really no adversarial examination at
all. 104 In addition, federal courts have proved remarkably flexible in
their application of the residual exception to hearsay gathered by
police with an eye toward criminal prosecution. A number of cases
admit such statements from crime victims, eye witnesses, and even
accomplices, even though such hearsay often bears little resemblance
to statements admissible under traditional exceptions. 105
Of course some civil cases "push the envelope" under the residual
exception as well. 106 But such cases seem fewer in number than those
upon erroneous admission of grand jury testimony under the residual exception. See,
e.g., United States v. Gomez-Lemos, 939 F.2d 326, 330-32 (6th Cir. 1991) (reversing a
conviction on Confrontation Clause grounds when a co-conspirator's grand jury
testimony was admitted into evidence when the co-conspirator refused to testify at
trial); United States v. Gonzalez, 559 F.2d 1271, 1272-74 (5th Cir. 1977) (reversing a
conviction because a co-conspirator's grand jury testimony was erroneously
admitted).
102. See supra note 72.
103. See United States v. Sposito, 106 F.3d 1042, 1046-48 (1st Cir. 1997) (affirming
a gambling conviction where the trial court admitted testimony from an unrelated
gambling trial where the defendant was not present); United States v. Shaw, 69 F.3d
1249, 1253-54 (4th Cir. 1995) (admitting te&timony from the trial of defendant's coconspirators which occurred while the defendant was a fugitive); United States v.
Deeb, 13 F.3d 1532, 1538-39 (11th Cir. 1994) (admitting testimony from coconspirator's trial where witness was subject to cross-examination by co-defendants);
United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 7-8 (1st Cir. 1990) (admitting the testimony of a
deceased witness from the trial of co-defendants).
104. See United States v. Seavoy, 995 F.2d 1414, 1418-20 (7th Cir. 1993) (admitting
unavailable accomplice's testimony from guilty plea proceeding).
105. See, e.g., United States v. Dunford, 148 F.3d 385, 393-94 (4th Cir. 1998)
(finding statements made to government investigators by defendant's daughters were
properly admitted under residual exception); United States v. Bradley, 145 F.3d 889,
894-96 (7th Cir. 1998) (approving admission, under residual exception and
Confrontation Clause, of hearsay statement made by the defendant's wife to police
detective, since statement describing domestic violence was made while events were
fresh in her mind, she knew police would investigate and attempt to confirm her
statement, she made statement voluntarily, and she never recanted); United States v.
Accetturo, 966 F.2d 631, 635-36 (11th Cir. 1992) (admitting deceased victim's
voluntary, written statements to police); United States v. Ellis, 951 F.2d 580, 583-84
(4th Cir. 1991) (admitting deceased accomplice's statements to prosecutors and
investigators pursuant to plea agreement).
106. See, e.g.. Brookover v. Mary Hitchcock Mem'l Hosp., 893 F.2d 411, 420-21 (1st
Cir. 1990) (admitting the testimony of patient's mother in a medical malpractice case
concerning patient's disclosure of his futile efforts to summon help from nurses);
Robinson v. Shapiro, 646 F.2d 734, 741-43 (2d Cir. 1981) (admitting testimony of coworker who reported hearing deceased declarant's statements about conditions which
later led to fatal accident).
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admitting prosecution hearsay. 107 Where parallels can be drawn
between civil and criminal cases, the results seem to confirm the
notion that prosecutors hold the advantage over other litigants. For
example, in contrast to the generally favorable treatment of grand jury
testimony offered by prosecutors, the one court which has addressed
the issue in a civil case was far less receptive to such hearsay. 1 v~ In
contrast to criminal cases admitting the statements of unavailable
declarants to police during investigation, hearsay statements obtained
by investigators seem less readily admissible under the residual
exception in civil cases. 109 Extrajudicial statements of deceased or
unavailable victims and witnesses, though occasionally admitted under
the residual exception in civil actions,110 certainly receive no more
favorable treatment than in criminal cases.111
107. My survey found only 12 cases admitting residual hearsay al trial in civil cases,
compared to 34 cases where prosecutors succeeded in offering residual hearsay. More
often in civil cases, courts encountered residual hearsay tendered in connection with
motions for summary judgment or for preliminary injunctions. My survey found 18
such cases out of the sample of 100. See supra note 93.
108. In excluding the hearsay, the court wrote:
[T]he grand jury testimony does not have the requisite circumstantial
guarantees of trustworthiness required by Rule 807. The grand jury
proceeding is the government's show. The government calls the witnesses,
frames the questions, and presents only testimony that is fa\'orable to the
government's theory of the case. The government is under no obligation to
and, as a general rule, does not ask questions that might be exculpatory to
the target of the grand jury investigation. The government may frame the
questions in a way that even neutral testimony appears inculpatory. If the
questions posed by the prosecutor are framed in a way that violates the rules
of evidence, there is no one there to object, much less to make a ruling.
Moreover, a grand jury witness knows that he is not going to be subjected to
cross-examination and that his testimony will not be made public.
In re Industrial Silicon Antitrust Litig., No. 95-2104, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20459, at
*9 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 13, 1998).
109. Compare, e.g., In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 756 F2d 411, 41415 (5th Cir. 1985) (in civil case, excluding statements made in an interview with
government lawyers pursuant to a grant of immunity), and Land v. American Mut.
Ins. Co., 582 F. Supp. 1484, 1485-89 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (in civil case, excluding
statements of deceased victim of personal injuries made to an insurance claims
adjuster), with Bradley, 145 F.3d at 894-95 (admitting hearsay statement of
defendant's wife to police}, and Accetturo, 966 F2d at 634-36 (affirming conviction
where trial court admitted hearsay statements made by unavailable dcclarant to
government agents and finding that the declaranl's expectation that agents would
conduct further investigation to corroborate his statements is an indicator of the
statements' reliability), and Ellis, 951 F.2d at 582-84 (affirming conviction where trial
court admitted statements made to government investigators pursuant to cooperation
agreement).
110. See, e.g., Doe v. United States, 976 F.2d 1071, 1079-81 (7th Cir. 1992) (alleging
child abuse, in civil case, at an Air Force day care center. admitting hearsay
statements of children to their parents). Interestingly, the court in Doe relied almost
exclusively on earlier criminal cases to reach its result. See also Nowell ''· Universal
Elec. Co., 792 F.2d 1310, 1314-15 (5th Cir. 1986) (admitting a \vidow's testimony that
her husband told her an empty varnish drum, which exploded and injured husband,
came from the defendant); Crawford v. City of Kansas City, 952 F. Supp. 1467, 147273 (D. Kan. 1997) (admitting hearsay statements, in a civil case, of deceased security
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Criminal defendants fare the worst of all litigants in offering
hearsay under the residual exception. Defendants have very limited
success in offering hearsay statements gathered during investigation
by police. n 2 Hearsay statements made to defense investigators
seldom find their way into criminal trials. n3 Remarkably, defendants
have less success than prosecutors when they offer hearsay out of the
grand jury, even though a prosecutor was present and questioned the
declarant in that setting.114 Finally, defendants have almost no success
under the residual exception in offering their own out-of-court
guard made during police internal affairs investigation).
111. Compare Wilander v. McDermott Int'!, Inc., 887 F.2d 88, 92 (5th Cir. 1989)
(excluding accident witness's hearsay statement made in anticipation of litigation),
affd 498 U.S. 337 (1991), and Katona v. Federal Express Corp., No. 95-Civ. 10951
(JFK), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3496, at *9-*16 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 1998) (in civil case,
excluding deceased declarant's statements to his wife regarding circumstances of
accident), and Land, 582 F. Supp. at 1487-89 (in civil action, excluding accident
victim's statements to claims adjuster), with Bradley, 145 F.3d at 894-97 (admitting
wife's statement to police who responded to her 911 call regarding abuse), and United
States v. Dunford, 148 F.3d 385, 392-94 (4th Cir. 1998) (admitting statements of
defendants' daughters to government investigators), and United States v. Rouse, 111
F.3d 561, 569-70 (8th Cir. 1997) (admitting statements of alleged child abuse victims
to FBI agent).
112. See, e.g., United States v. Trujillo, 136 F.3d 1388, 1395-96 (10th Cir. 1998)
(affirming trial court's ruling to exclude two FBI 302 reports of unavailable
declarants' descriptions of bank robber); United States v. Colson, 662 F.2d 1389, 1392
(11th Cir. 1981) (excluding taped statements between witness and police in which
witness claimed he procured false testimony against defendant).
113. See United States v. Gaines, 969 F.2d 692, 697-99 (8th Cir. 1992) (affirming
conviction where trial court excluded defense investigator's testimony regarding
statements of defendant's husband). But cf United States v. Sanchez-Lima, 161 F.3d
545, 547-49 (9th Cir. 1998) (reversing conviction where trial court declined to admit
videotaped interviews of defense investigator with later-deported aliens where aliens
were under oath and defense offered government opportunity to attend and
participate in interviews).
114. When defendants offer exculpatory grand jury testimony, they rely most often
on Rule 804(b)(l), the former testimony exception. Under the Supreme Court's
ruling in United States v. Salemo, 505 U.S. 317, 320-25 (1992), grand jury testimony
may meet the requirements of 804(b)(l) where, under the particular facts of the case,
it appears that the prosecutor had a "similar motive" to develop the testimony in the
grand jury. See id. at 322. Defendants appear to have failed more often than they
have succeeded in meeting that test. Compare United States v. Omar, 104 F.3d 519,
522-24 (1st Cir. 1997) (affirming conviction where trial court excluded exculpatory
grand jury testimony offered by defense), and United States v. DiNapoli, 8 F.3d 909,
912 (2d Cir. 1993) (finding no "similar motive" in the Salemo case upon remand from
the Supreme Court), and United States v. Lester, 749 F.2d 1288, 1301 (9th Cir. 1984)
(finding the exclusion of grand jury testimony proper after examining the prosecutor's
"motive and interest"), with United States v. Miller, 904 F.2d 65, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
(suggesting grand jury testimony offered by the defense will almost always meet the
"similar motive" test). Somewhat surprisingly, defendants typically fail to raise, or
courts fail to address, the residual exception as an alternative theory of admissibility.
Salemo never addressed the residual exception. See Salemo, 505 U.S. at 320-25; see
also Omar, 104 F.3d at 523-24 (noting that defendant failed to pursue admissibility
under residual exception, apparently because the testimony was unlikely to be viewed
as reliable).
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statements or those of their accomplices.11s And the residual
exception has done little to overcome the traditional reluctance of the
law of evidence to admit hearsay "confessions" of unavailable
declarants offered to exculpate the accused. 116
The success of prosecutors at the fringes of admissible hearsay is
evident not just in residual hearsay cases, but in cases dealing with
traditional hearsay exceptions as well. Co-conspirator statements are
among the most widely used form of hearsay 117 for federal
prosecutors. For decades, federal courts followed the traditional rule
requiring independent evidence of conspiracy as a foundation for
admitting co-conspirator statements. 118 But the Supreme Court eased
that limitation in 1987, accepting the view of the Department of
Justice that the Federal Rules of Evidence allowed a trial court to
consider the hearsay statement itself as part of the foundation for
admissibility.119 As a result, co-conspirator statements can effectively
create their own basis for admission. This expansion of traditional
hearsay boundaries benefits prosecutors almost exclusively. Criminal
defendants make almost no use of the co-conspirator exception. 120
And civil litigants offer co-conspirator statements much less
frequently than prosecutors. 121
The modern expansion of two other traditional hearsay exceptions
has come largely at the behest of prosecutors. The last two decades
have witnessed a significant increase in judicial acceptance of out-ofcourt statements made by crime victims, especially victims who are
115. See, e.g., United States v. Washington. 106 F.3d 983, 999-1002 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(affirming conviction where trial court excluded defendant's out-of-court statement to
a friend); United States v. Hooks, 848 F.2d 785. 796-98 (7th Cir. 1988) (excluding
statements of two alleged co-conspirators in interview with prosecutor and agents);
United States v. Ferri, 778 F.2d 985, 990-91 (3d Cir. 1985) (excluding defense-offered
hearsay statement of accomplice made to informant after accomplice became aware
of investigation); United States v. DeLuca, 692 F.2d 1277. 1285 (9th Cir. 1982)
(holding trial court properly excluded taped phone conversation in which defendant,
aware he was under investigation, made exculpatory statements).
116. Rule 804(b)(3), the exception for statements against interest, sets a higher
standard for admissibility where such statements are offered to exculpate the accused.
If a statement fails to meet that standard, it almost certainly would not satisfy Rule
807's demand for "circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness."
117. See Fed. R. Evict. 801(d)(2)(E) (defining co-conspirator statements as "not
hearsay").
118. See Glasser v. United States. 315 U.S. 60, 74-75 (1942). The traditional rule
requiring independent evidence was said to prevent hearsay statements from creating
their own foundation for admissibility, that is, pulling themselves up by their own
"bootstraps." Id. at 75.
119. See Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 176-81 (1987).
120. The exception applies to statements made by co-conspirators of the opposing
party. In theory, a criminal defendant could invoke the exception only where the
declarant had "conspired" with the United States Government.
121. While the co-conspirator hearsay "exception" certainly applies in civil cases,
the vast majority of reported 801(d)(2)(E) cases are criminal cases. See Saltzburg et
al., supra note 54, at 1586-1625 (collecting cases); Weinstein et al., supra note 16, at§§
801-807 (same).
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unavailable to testify at trial. 122 The trend is most pronounced in
criminal cases where prosecutors offer hearsay statements from young
children reporting incidents of sexual abuse, 123 but it extends as well to
statements of adult victims of spousal abuse, sexual assaults, and other
crimes. 124 Prosecutors enjoy a remarkable rate of success when they
offer such hearsay. 125 In large measure, that success rests upon the
judicial expansion of the hearsay exceptions for excited utterances and
statements for purposes of medical diagnosis in ways which clearly
depart from traditional limits. 126 At least in the federal courts, that
departure principally serves to increase the range of hearsay
admissible against criminal defendants. 127
With respect to another traditional hearsay exception, statements
against interest, 128 federal courts have ventured more cautiously
122. See Swift, Judicial Discretion, supra note 17, at 490-92.
123. See id. at 490-501. The residual exception also accounts for the admission of a
great deal of child-victim hearsay offered by prosecutors. See, e.g., United States v.
Rouse, 111 F.3d 561, 569-70 (8th Cir. 1997) (allowing admission of testimony of FBI
agent of what three child victims said during initial interview). See generally Saltzburg
et al., supra note 54, at 1951-53 (collecting cases).
124. See, e.g., United States v. Cherry, 938 F.2d 748, 756-57 (7th Cir. 1991)
(admitting rape victim's statements to her doctor about the circumstances of the
assault).
125. See Swift, Judicial Discretion, supra note 17, at 490-501.
126. See id. at 492-98. In fact, the Supreme Court's general approach to hearsay
under the Confrontation Clause may actually have encouraged the expansion of
traditional hearsay exceptions like those for excited utterances or statements for
purposes of medical diagnosis. By effectively exempting hearsay within "firmly
rooted" exceptions from further Sixth Amendment scrutiny, the Court has given
litigants and lower courts an incentive to "pigeonhole" new forms of hearsay within
"firmly rooted" exceptions by expanding the boundaries of those exceptions.
Douglass, supra note 6, at 211 & n.108. See generally Allison C. Goodman, Note, Two
Critical Evidentiary Issues in Child Sexual Abuse Cases: Closed-Circuit Testimony by
Child Victims and Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule, 32 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 855 (1995)
(exploring evidentiary issues in child sexual abuse cases in the context of the
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment).
127. Perhaps because federal courts handle few civil cases alleging sexual abuse of
children, there are comparatively few federal civil cases using the expanded
exceptions to admit victims' hearsay statements. In at least one federal case, a civil
plaintiff profited from the same expansion of traditional hearsay limits, though she
did so by relying on precedent from criminal cases where similar hearsay was offered
by prosecutors. See Morgan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d 941, 948-50 (4th Cir. 1988). In
another federal civil case, the Seventh Circuit relied on the residual exception to
reach a similar result. See Doe v. United States, 976 F.2d 1071, 1079-82 (7th Cir.
1992).
128. The exception provides:
(3) Statement Against Interest.
A statement which was at the time of its making so far contrary to the
declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject the
declarant to civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid a claim by the
declarant against another, that a reasonable person in the declarant's
position would not have made the statement unless believing it to be true. A
statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to
exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances
clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.
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toward hearsay's frontier. 129 Still, they have opened the door, if only
partially, to a class of hearsay that poses unique challenges to criminal
defendants: an accomplice's self-inculpatory statements that also
incriminate the defendant. Typically, such cases begin when an
accomplice gives a full or partial confession shortly after his arrest
and, in the process, implicates his partner in crime. The hearsayconfrontation issue arises when the accomplice fails to testify in
person at his partner's trial. 130 When the Federal Rules were enacted,
there were few reported cases where prosecutors even attempted to
offer an accomplice's hearsay under the exception for statement's
against penal interest. 131 At that time, it was unclear whether such
statements could be admitted under any circumstances without
violating the Confrontation Clause. 132 The Supreme Court has since
reviewed three cases where trial courts admitted accomplice hearsay
as statements against interest, ruling that the hearsay should have
been excluded in each case. 133 Nevertheless, the Court has declined to
Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3).
129. Contrary to the judicial trend toward expanding other hearsay exceptions, the
hearsay exception for statements against penal interest has retained somewhat stricter
limits. In Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594 (199.t), the Court held that
Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3), the federal version of the exception for
statements against interest, applies only to those portions of a narrative which are
"genuinely self-inculpatory" and not to other "collateral" portions of the same
statement. Id. at 600-01.
130. In Lilly v. Virginia.119 S. Ct. 1887 (1999), for example, the confrontation issue
arose when the defendant's brother gave a videotaped statement to police,
implicating the defendant as the shooter in a homicide. At trial, Lilly's brother
asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege. The trial court permitted the prosecution to
offer the videotaped statement in evidence, over Lilly's Confrontation Clause
objection. See id. at 1894-1900.
131. In part, this was because the common-law exception for statements against
interest, as applied in federal courts, extended only to statements against pecuniary
interest, not statements against penal interest. See Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S.
243, 273 (1913). The Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 80-t(b)(3) reports several
state decisions expanding the exception to cover statements against penal interest, but
mentions no federal decisions to that effect.
132. As late as 1986, the Supreme Court gave reason to conclude that the Sixth
Amendment might categorically prohibit use of an accomplice's hearsay statement
implicating the accused, absent cross-examination of the accomplice. See Lee v.
Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 541 (1986) ("[W]hen one person accuses another of a crime
under circumstances in which the declarant stands to gain by inculpating another, the
accusation is presumptively suspect and must be subjected to the scrutiny of crossexamination.").
In the process of enacting the Federal Rules, the House inserted an amendment
that would have rendered inadmissible an accomplice's out-of-court statement
implicating both himself and the accused. The amendment was added to codify the
Confrontation Clause principle established in Bruton \'. United States, 391 U.S. 123,
135-37 (1968). The Conference Committee deleted the provision, preferring to leave
development of constitutional limits to the courts. See S. Rep. No. 93-1277 (1974),
reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7068.
133. See Lilly, 119 S. Ct. at 1887, 1898-1901 (reversing state conviction on
Confrontation Clause grounds because trial court admitted nontestifying accomplice's
videotaped statement inculpating accused); Williamson, 512 U.S. at 605 (holding
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adopt a categorical approach excluding such statements. Indeed, Lilly
v. Virginia, 134 the Court's most recent foray into the murky world of
accomplice hearsay, produced no majority for any approach. The
Court's fragmented opinion leaves lower courts with considerable
leeway to admit "genuinely self-inculpatory" hearsay statements from
accomplices. 135 Accordingly, Lilly may do little to curb the trend of
lower federal courts to admit accomplice hearsay at the behest of
prosecutors where they can show such statements are "genuinely"
self-inculpatory, or where they can show other "guarantees of
trustworthiness." 136 By contrast, criminal defendants have had
comparatively little success in offering self-inculpatory hearsay from
their non testifying accomplices. Indeed, Rule 804(b )(3) itself imposes
stricter limits on such hearsay when offered to exculpate a
defendant. 137 And civil litigants have comparatively few occasions to
accomplice's blame-shifting statements were not "genuinely self-inculpatory" and
therefore not properly admissible under Rule 804(b)(3)); Lee, 476 U.S. at 539-47
(1986) (finding Confrontation Clause violation where the trial court admitted
accomplice's confession inculpating defendant).
134. 119 S. Ct. 1887 (1999).
135. Williamson held that "genuinely self-inculpatory" statements are admissible
under Rule 804(b)(3). Williamson, 512 U.S. at 605. And the Williamson Court further
observed, "the very fact that a statement is genuinely self-inculpatory ... is itself one
of the 'particularized guarantees of trustworthiness' that makes a statement
admissible under the Confrontation Clause." Id. lilly does not disturb that finding.
In his concurring opinion joined by two other Justices, Chief Justice Rehnquist holds
out the possibility that "genuinely self-inculpatory" statements of accomplices might
fit a "firmly rooted" hearsay exception and thereby satisfy the Confrontation Clause
without further inquiry. See Lilly, 119 S. Ct. at 1904-05 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
Justice Thomas agrees that "the Clause does not impose a 'blanket ban on the
government's use of accomplice statements that incriminate a defendant."' Id. at 1903
(Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Stevens' opinion for the four-member plurality
contends that "accomplices' confessions that inculpate a criminal defendant are not
within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule." Id. at 1899. Accordingly. it
seems that the Court has split four to four, or perhaps four to three, on the question
whether any "genuinely self-inculpatory" accomplice statements may fit within a
firmly rooted exception (i.e. Rule 804(b)(3)) and thereby qualify for automatic
admission under the Confrontation Clause. But even Justice Steven's plurality
opinion in Lilly notes that such statements will satisfy the Confrontation Clause if the
admitting court finds sufficient "indicia of reliability." See id. at 1901 (quoting Idaho
v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 822 (1990)). At least eight members of the Court, therefore,
leave the door open to such hearsay in some circumstances.
136. See United States v. Keltner, 147 F.3d 662, 670-71 (8th Cir. 1998) (admitting
accomplice statement that clearly subjected declarant to criminal liability); Earnest v.
Dorsey, 87 F.3d 1123, 1134 (10th Cir. 1996) (admitting hearsay where entire statement
inculpated declarant and defendant equally); United States v. Sasso, 59 F.3d 341, 34550 (2d Cir. 1995) (admitting out-of-court statement by accomplice to defendant's
girlfriend); United States v. Workman, 860 F.2d 140, 143-46 (4th Cir. 1988) (affirming
conviction where trial court admitted a tape-recorded statement of a deceased
accomplice under residual exception).
137. Rule 804(b)(3) provides: "A statement tending to expose the declarant to
criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless
corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement."
Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3). The residual exception seems not to have opened the door
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use accomplice statementsY8
Once again, at the fringes of
admissibility, prosecutors hold most of the cards.
One final example of prosecutorial success at hearsay's frontier
deserves mention, though it is a phenomenon that has been limited to
the states. So far, we have examined the apparent willingness of
federal courts to expand the boundaries of admissible hearsay at the
behest of prosecutors. But federal judges are not alone when it comes
to liberalizing hearsay rules at the expense of criminal defendants.139
In the states, legislatures seem even more anxious to open criminal
courts to inculpatory hearsay. A number of states have enacted
statutes designed to broaden the range of admissible hearsay
statements of child victims of sexual abuse. 140 Some have included
similar "designer hearsay" provisions regarding elderly victims and
victims of spousal abuse. 141 In reaction to public sentiment expressed
over evidentiary rulings in the O.J. Simpson case, California enacted
an even broader provision dealing \vith hearsay statements of
unavailable victims of any "physical injury." 142 Venturing even
further, Florida amended its evidence code in 1990 in an effort to
allow admission of certain self-inculpatory statements of nontestifying
co-defendants.143 Some of these legislative initiatives apply only in

any wider to exculpatory third-party confessions offered by defendants. See, e.g.,
United States v. Hinkson, 632 F.2d 382, 386 (4th Cir. 1980) (excluding third-party
confession where declarant later denied making statement).
138. Though criminal cases present the issue more frequently, there are a few
reported civil cases which address "blame-shifting" statements similar to those at
issue in Williamson and Lilly. See, e.g., Ciccarelli v. Giebner Sys. Group, 862 F. Supp.
1293, 1297-1300 (M.D. Pa. 1994) (applying the 804(b)(3) hearsay exception in an
ERISA case).
139. There is ample evidence that state courts have been equally, if not more,
receptive to prosecution hearsay at the fringes of traditional evidentiary limits. See,
e.g., Lilly v. Commonwealth, 499 S.E.2d 522, 534 (Va. 1998) (admitting, as statement
against penal interest, accomplice's videotaped confession implicating the defendant
in murder); People v. White, 555 N.E.2d 1241, 1246-50 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (relaxing
the requirements of spontaneity and immediacy to admit child victim's statements as
spontaneous declarations).
140. The Comment to the 1986 Amendment to Rule 807 of the Unifonn Rules of
Evidence notes that "[m]ore than twenty states have promulgated rules or enacted
legislation modifying the hearsay rule in various respects to permit the
introduction ... of extrajudicial statements and testimony of children who are the
victims of physical or sexual abuse or who witnessed violent or sexual acts committed
against others." Unif. R. Evid. 807 cmt.
141. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 90.803(24) (West 1999) (creating hearsay exception
for statements of elderly victims of abuse where the circumstances of the statement
provide "sufficient safeguards of reliability").
142. Cal. Evid. Code § 1370 (West Supp. 1998). For commentary on the California
legislation, see Van Kessel, supra note 2, at 530, 538.
143. See Escobar v. State, 699 So. 2d 988, 991 n2 (Fla. 1997) (describing
amendment to Fla. Stat. § 90.804(2)(c)). Of course, the amended statute has given
rise to several successful Confrontation Clause challenges. See itl. at 992-93 (citing
Franqui v. State, 699 So. 2d 1312 (Fla. 1997)).
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criminal cases. 144 All of them are intended, and used, primarily to
assist prosecutors. There is nothing in the realm of civil litigation that
compares to this groundswell of legislative and rule making interest in
expanding hearsay exceptions for prosecutors. 145
In sum, if conventional theory is correct, courts should be most
adventurous in admitting nontraditional hearsay in civil cases or
against prosecutors, and most cautious when considering hearsay
offered against criminal defendants. 146 But the reality of modern
practice defies that theory. Successful efforts to liberalize hearsay
have come most often where conventional wisdom would least expect
them: in criminal cases with hearsay offered by prosecutors. As a
result, criminal defendants probably face more "fringe" hearsay than
other litigants.
There is no doubt that plenty of hearsay finds its way into civil
cases. But the notion that criminal defendants somehow face a
smaller dose of admissible hearsay than other litigants is almost
certainly out of touch with modern practice. Absent readily
enforceable constitutional limits on hearsay-which do not exist
under current Confrontation Clause doctrine-criminal prosecution
generates unique pressures on the hearsay rule. Simply put,
prosecutors need more hearsay. 147 And they often need it from less
than trustworthy sources. More often than other litigants, prosecutors
must look to accomplices, co-conspirators, reluctant victims, and
intimidated, absconded, or dead declarants 148 for the evidence which
will help them meet the heaviest burden of proof that our system
imposes on any litigant. Increasingly, courts and legislatures have
responded to that need by pushing the limits of traditional hearsay
doctrine. One may view such developments as an appropriate
response to antiquated principles of law which limit the search for
144. See, e.g., Cal. Evid. Code § 1228 (applying only "for the purpose of
establishing the elements of the crime" of child sexual abuse); 725 Ill. Comp. Stat.
5/115-10 (West 1998) (same); Md. Code Ann. [Cts. & Jud. Proc.]§ 775 (1998) (out-ofcourt statements of child abuse victims).
145. In fact, concerns over expert testimony-primarily arising from civil casesgave impetus to the only proposal in the history of the Federal Rules which might
actually narrow the range of hearsay admissible in federal courts. A 1999 proposal to
amend Rule 703 would restrict the admissibility of hearsay which forms the basis of
expert opinion. See Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence, Ruic
703, reprinted in Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, 1999 Federal Rules
of Evidence 283, 295.
146. See supra notes 1-17 and accompanying text.
147. See Richard O. Lempert & Stephen A. Saltzburg, A Modern Approach to
Evidence 493-94 (1977); Van Kessel, supra note 2, at 508 ("The prosecution generally
calls more witnesses and relies on hearsay more often than criminal
defendants .... ").
148. See, e.g., Park, Subject Matter Approach, supra note 9, at 109 ("In civil cases.
problems of declarant unreliability and witness fabrication are probably less serious
than in criminal cases because of the different sources from which evidence is
derived.").
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truth. Or one may view them as a shortsighted assault on individual
liberty under the banner of crime control. But whatever one's views
on the developing law of hearsay and confrontation, the result has
been to put criminal defendants at a serious disadvantage when it
comes to contesting hearsay. They face more hearsay, and more
problematic hearsay, than prosecutors or civil litigants. But they do
not possess comparable tools to learn what they are up against.
B. Nondevelopments in the Law of Criminal Discovery: How
Criminal Discovery has Failed to Keep Pace with the £-cpanding
Admissibility of Hearsay
A wider variety of hearsay is admissible in federal courts today than
ever before. And prosecutors have been major beneficiaries of the
trend toward expanded admissibility since adoption of the Federal
Rules of Evidence in 1975. Against that background, I now turn to
the other side of the hearsay-discovery balance. In this section, I take
a brief look backward at developments-or. more accurately,
nondevelopments-in the world of hearsay-related discovery. My aim
is to show how criminal discovery rules and practices have failed to
keep pace \vith the expansion of admissible hearsay spurred by
enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Of course, it would be misleading to suggest that federal criminal
discovery has remained entirely static throughout the modern period
of hearsay expansion. Indeed, criminal discovery was born and raised
to adolescence in the last half-century. As late as 1963, it was still
possible to argue that federal criminal defendants had no pretrial
discovery rights at all. 149 The Supreme Court had not yet identified a
clear constitutional basis for discovery even of exculpatory material. 150
Federal courts occasionally asserted an inherent power to govern
discovery in criminal cases, 151 but discovery was a matter for the
court's discretion, not a defendant's right. Rule 16 originally codified
that approach, providing only that district courts were authorized to
order discovery of defendant's statements and of certain documents
and tangible evidence material to the defense.m In 1957, Jencks v.
149. See Brennan, A Progress Report, supra note 13, at 4-5.
150. Before Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). the Court had not identified
any clear constitutional right to discovery. It had come close in Jencks i·. U11itetl
States, 353 U.S. 657, 665-72 (1957), but it ultimately rested that decision on its
supervisory powers, rather than on the Confrontation Clause. See Pennsylvania v.
Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 68 {1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
151. The notion of a court's inherent power to order discovery. in the absence of
any constitutional or legislative mandate, traces its roots to the observations of Justice
Cardozo, who found "at least the glimmerings" of such power when writing as a
Justice of the Court of Appeals of New York. See People ex rel. Lemon v. Supreme
Court, 156 N.E. 84, 86 (N.Y. 1927).
152 See, e.g., Gevinson v. United States, 358 F.2d 761, 766 (5th Cir. 1966) (treating
Rule 16 discovery of documents as discretionary); United States''· Kaminsky, 275 F.
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United States153 first established a defendant's right to obtain the prior
statements of government witnesses.
But Congress quickly
154
retrenched. The Jencks Act narrowly defined which statements
were discoverable and prohibited courts from ordering disclosure
before the witness testified at trial.
By the early 1960s, criminal discovery restrictions had come under
fire from respected jurists and academics. 155 Even earlier, in the
Nuremburg War Crimes Trials, American prosecutors faced the
embarrassment of a Soviet protest that American rules of discovery
were unfair to defendants. 156 In the face of mounting criticism, the
1960s and 1970s brought significant reforms in criminal discovery. In
Brady v. Maryland, 157 the Court first recognized a defendant's Due
Process right to discover exculpatory evidence. 158 With Giglio v.
United States, 159 that right expanded to cover material for
impeachment of government witnesses. The Brady right was still
growing as late as 1976, when United States v. Agurs 160 confirmed the
government's obligation to disclose some materials even in the
absence of a specific request from the defendant. 161 In 1975, only six
months after enacting the new Rules of Evidence, Congress approved
important amendments to Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, calling for pretrial discovery of a defendant's prior
Supp. 365, 367-68 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (same); United States v. Louis Carreau, Inc., 42
F.R.D. 408, 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (stating that if Rule 16 had been intended to require
disclosure of defendant's statements, it would have used the word "shall" rather than
"may"). See generally Fed. R. Crim. P. 16 advisory committee's note to 1974
Amendment ("[I]t is desirable to require broader disclosure by the defendant under
certain circumstances.").
153. 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
154. 18 u.s.c. § 3500 (1994).
155. Justice Brennan and California Supreme Court Justice Traynor were probably
the most prominent critics of traditional limits on criminal discovery. See William J.
Brennan, Jr., The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for Truth?, 1963
Wash. U. L.Q. 279, 280; Roger J. Traynor, Ground Lost and Found in Criminal
Discovery, 39 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 228, 229-30 (1964). The level of controversy over
criminal discovery is reflected in an outpouring of scholarly commentary in the late1950s and early-1960s. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 16 advisory committee's note to 1966
amendment (collecting articles).
156. See Robert H. Jackson, Some Problems in Developing an International legal
System, 22 Temp. L.Q. 147, 150-52 (1948).
157. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
158. Earlier cases had recognized that prosecutors violate due process through
deliberate use of perjured testimony or fabricated evidence, or deliberate suppression
of exculpatory evidence. See Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213, 215-16 (1942) (finding
prosecutor's misconduct in deliberately suppressing exculpatory evidence violated
fundamental fairness required by Due Process Clause); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S.
103, 112-13 (1935) (stating, in dictum, that prosecutor's deliberate use of fabricated
evidence violated due process). But those early cases turned upon the prosecutor's
deliberate misconduct, not defendant's constitutional right to discovery.
159. 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
160. 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
161. See id. at 110.
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statements, the results of scientific tests, and "material" documentary
or tangible evidence. 162 In contrast to the earlier version of the Rule,
discovery was no longer a matter of the court's discretion. 1b3 It was a
defendant's right under the new Rule 16.1M
But the growth of criminal discovery-at least in federal courtslargely ended by the mid-1970s. In contrast to their expansive
approach to the admission of hearsay under both the Federal Rules
and the Confrontation Clause, federal courts have been cautious in
their approach to issues of "materiality" under Rule 16.1!!.S The
Supreme Court has said little about the Rule, other than to limit its
application to items which rebut the government's case-in-chief, as
opposed to evidence which might support other defense claims. 11>6
And Agurs seems to have set the high water mark for the Brady
doctrine. 167 Later cases have limited Brady by tying "materiality" to

162. Act of July 31, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-64, § 2, 89 Stat. 370, 374-75.
163. The earlier version of Rule 16 provided that "the court may order" discovery
of the items specified in the Rule. Most courts viewed that language as permissive,
not mandatory, meaning that courts still had discretion to deny discovery where they
saw fit. See, e.g., United States v. Louis Carreau. Inc.• 42 F.R.D. 408, 412-13 (S.D.N.Y.
1967) (stating that under Rule 16 courts had the discretion to deny a defendant's
discovery request). The amendments proposed in 1974 and enacted in 1975, made
discovery a self-executing process between the parties. much as in civil cases. And, by
providing that "the government shall permit" discovery of the items listed in the Rule,
the amendments give defendants a basis for compelling discovery from the
government. Fed. R. Crim. P. 16 advisory committee's note to 1974 amendments.
164. The amendments adopted in 1975 required the government to disclose
defendant's prior statements, see id. Rule 16(a)(l)(A). his criminal record, see id.
Rule 16(a)(l)(B), documents and tangible objects material to the preparation of the
defense or intended to be offered in evidence by the government, see id. Rule
16(a)(l)(C), and the results of scientific tests, see id. Rule 16(a)(l)(D).
165. See, e.g., United States v. Vue, 13 F3d 1206, 1208-09 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding
that disclosure was properly denied where the defendant failed to show he would
have been acquitted had INS records been introduced before jury); United States v.
Stevens, 985 F.2d 1175, 1179-81 (2d Cir. 1993) (finding telephone record not
discoverable under Rule 16 where it would not have rebutted government's case and
would only have impacted defendant's decision to testify); United States v. Phillip,
948 F.2d 241, 250 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding videotaped statements of six-year-old child
abuse victim were not material to defense because inconsistent answers would not
have been exculpatory at trial).
166. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 458-62 (1996). In Armstrong,
the Court ruled that a defendant was not entitled to discover government documents
which might back up a selective prosecution claim, absent a preliminary shO\\ing of
discriminatory effect and discriminatory intent. See id. at 468. With respect to Rule
16, the Court rejected defendant's claim that such evidence was "material to the
preparation of defendant's defense." Id. at 462. The Court stated, "(W)e conclude
that in the context of Rule 16 'the defendant's defense' means the defendant's
response to the Government's case in chief." Id.
167. See Sarokin & Zuckerman, supra note 26, at 1104-08 (arguing that the Court
has retreated from its earlier, more liberal application of Brady principles by adopting
a "result-oriented" standard of materiality in United States 1·. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667,
684 (1985), and subsequent cases); cf. Goldberg, supra, note 26, at 56-58 (contending
that Agurs was actually the beginning of Brady's decline).
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the likelihood that undisclosed evidence would have changed the
result at trial. 168
Limitations on witness-related discovery-the limits most relevant
when it comes to hearsay-remain virtually untouched since the
Jencks Act of 1957. Ironically, at almost the same time that Congress
passed new Rules of Evidence and opened the doors of federal courts
to an expanding variety of hearsay, it rejected proposed amendments
which would have expanded witness-related discovery under Rule 16.
In 1974, the Advisory Committee drafted, and the Supreme Court
adopted, a proposed amendment requiring the government to identify
its witnesses before trial. 169 Based primarily upon Justice Department
concerns over witness tampering and intimidation, 170 the Senate
ultimately killed the proposal. 171 Many proponents of liberalized
discovery would have gone further than the Court's relatively modest
proposed amendment. The American Bar Association's Standards
Relating to Discovery and Procedure Before Trial called for pretrial
disclosure not only of the identities of government witnesses, but of
their prior statements as well. 172 But Congress left intact the Jencks
168. In United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985), the Court set the standard for
"materiality" that governs Brady disputes today. Bagley held, "The evidence is
material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed
to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A 'reasonable
probability' is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. at
682. In dissent, Justice Marshall took the Court to task for recasting a Brady standard
that defines materiality "not by reference to the possible usefulness of the particular
evidence in preparing and presenting the case, but retrospectively, by reference to the
likely effect the evidence will have on the outcome of the trial." Id. at 699 (Marshall,
J., dissenting); see also Sarokin & Zuckerman, supra note 26, at 1105 (arguing that
Bagley marks a retreat from Brady through its shift to a "result-oriented" standard).
169. The proposed amendments included a new provision, Rule 16(a)(l)(E), which
would have required the government to disclose the names and criminal records of
witnesses it intended to call at trial. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 16 advisory committee's note
to 1974 amendments. The committee supported the proposal by noting that many
states already required such disclosures before trial, and that the American Bar
Association's Standards Relating to Discovery and Procedure Before Trial called for
pretrial disclosure not only of witness's names but of their prior statements as well.
See id.
170. For a summary of Justice Department opposition to the 1974 amendments, see
Brennan, A Progress Repon, supra note 13, at 6, and Dennis, supra note 26, at 65-69.
171. The House was willing to accept the proposal, after amending it to make the
witness-discovery obligation reciprocal, limiting discovery to three days before trial,
and providing that the court could deny discovery of witness lists upon a showing of
good cause. The Senate struck proposed Rule 16(a)(l)(E) altogether. The
Conference Committee ultimately adopted the Senate version, stating:
A majority of the Conferees believe it is not in the interest of the effective
administration of criminal justice to require that the government or the
defendant be forced to reveal the names and addresses of its witnesses
before trial. Discouragement of witnesses and improper contacts directed at
influencing their testimony, were deemed paramount concerns in the
formulation of this policy.
H.R. Rep. No. 94-414, at 12 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 713, 716.
172. See ABA Standards Relating to Discovery and Procedure Before Trial §
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Act's prohibition on compelled pretrial disclosure of government
witness statements, never seriously considering the ABA Standard.
Although the 1975 debate over government witnesses did not deal
with hearsay directly, it had important implications for hearsayrelated discovery. Absent a rule requiring pretrial notice of the
government's intention to offer hearsay, pretrial identification of
government witnesses would at least provide defendants a place to
start. After all, some government witnesses may consent to an
interview. And an interview can disclose what information is firsthand, and what may be presented as hearsay. An interview can also
identify a potential hearsay declarant and can disclose details about
the declarant or the circumstances under which she spoke. Without a
pretrial witness-disclosure rule, however, defendants are left without
even a starting point for tracking down hearsay. Of course, the prior
statements of government \vitnesses would offer an even more direct
means for a defendant to learn about prosecution hearsay. If the
government expects to call a \vitness to relate hearsay to the jury,
chances are strong the same hearsay \vill appear in the witness's prior
statements. But the 1975 amendments did nothing for defendants on
that score either.
In sum, 1975 saw Congress enact Rules of Evidence that set in
motion the most rapid expansion of hearsay admissibility in our
history. Yet, at virtually the same time, Congress rejected or ignored
proposals that would have given criminal defendants the names and
prior statements of government \vitnesses-tools that would have
provided at least indirect opportunities to anticipate and challenge
prosecution hearsay. By taking a 1970s view of hearsay, but a 1950s
view of criminal discovery, Congress set the stage for the hearsaydiscovery imbalance we see today in federal criminal cases.
Developments in the quarter century since 1975 have done little to
address that imbalance. Later amendments to Rule 16 have
broadened criminal discovery a bit, especially discovery relating to
experts,173• But the bar to pretrial discovery relating to government
witnesses and witness statements remains largely intact today.17"
2.l(b)(i) (Approved Draft 1970). Although several of the proposed Rule 16
amendments were modeled after the ABA Standards, the proposals before Congress
in 1975 conspicuously omitted the ABA's Standard relating to witness statements.
Apparently, the drafters concluded that proposed Rule 16(a)(l)(E) would be
controversial enough without calling for a new look at the Jencks Act's prohibition on
compelled pretrial disclosure of government witness statements.
173. A 1993 amendment added Rule 16(a)(l)(E) and Rule 16(b)(l)(C), requiring
both the government and defense to disclose an intention to rely on expert testimony
and a summary of the expert's opinion and its basis.
174. There has been only one significant crack in the armor protecting against
pretrial disclosure of witness statements. A 1983 amendment added subsection (i) to
Rule 12, requiring the government at a suppression hearing to produce prior
statements of its witnesses. In 1993, an amendment to Rule 26.2 likewise required
disclosure of prior statements after government witnesses testified at detention
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Despite continuing concerns voiced by the judiciary, 175 Congress still
bows to Justice Department arguments that the risks of witness
intimidation are too serious to require such disclosures. With very
few exceptions, federal courts have rejected defense efforts to require
pretrial disclosure of government witness lists. 176 And, insulated by
the Jencks Act, prosecutors remain free to choose when, or if, they
will disclose witness statements before trial. 177
In one respect, a defendant's right to early discovery of prosecution
hearsay may actually have diminished since 1975. The Federal Rules
of Evidence include only one provision that directly links discovery
and hearsay: the pretrial notice requirement attached to the residual
exceptions. 178 But despite their willingness to admit increasingly
adventurous forms of hearsay under the residual exception in criminal
cases, federal courts have been less than demanding in their
application of the notice requirement. 179 The language of the pretrial
notice provision is mandatory. 180 But courts have been generous in
forgiving government failures to comply. 181
hearings and preliminary examinations. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 26.2(g) and advisory
committee's note to 1993 amendment; infra text accompanying notes 371-72.
175. See, e.g., Brennan, A Progress Report, supra note 13, at 10-14 (discussing the
concern that state and federal discovery rules may be too broad); Sarokin &
Zuckerman, supra note 26, at 1099-1100 (noting that restrictions on defendants'
access to information about the government's witnesses before trial impedes
facilitation of plea agreements). In 1994, judicial concerns came to a head when the
Judicial Conference of the United States considered yet another Advisory Committee
proposal regarding pretrial disclosure of government witnesses' names and their
statements. See Pretrial Disclosure Revision to Criminal Procedure Rule Stirs
Controversy, Inside Litig., June 1994, at 11, 11 (1994) [hereinafter Inside Litig.].
176. In capital cases, a federal statute requires the government to disclose a list of
its witnesses before trial. See 18 U.S.C. § 3432 (1994). In noncapital cases, few courts
compel such disclosure. There is no due process right to discover the identities of
prosecution witnesses before trial. See Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559
(1977).
177. Most federal circuit courts view the mandatory language of the Jencks Act as a
strict limit on their power to order pretrial disclosure of government witness
statements. See, e.g., United States v. Malone, 49 F.3d 393, 396-97 (8th Cir. 1995)
{finding that defendant was entitled to discover witness's statements only after
witness testifies on direct examination); United States v. Neal, 36 F.3d 1190, 1197 (Isl
Cir. 1994) (same); United States v. Tarantino, 846 F.2d 1384, 1414-15 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(same). The Fifth Circuit, has held that trial courts retain discretion to order such
pretrial disclosure. See United States v. Blackburn, 9 F.3d 353, 357-58 (5th Cir. 1993).
178. See Fed. R. Evid. 807. In order to invoke the residual exception, the
proponent of hearsay must provide notice of its intention to offer the statement, the
"particulars" of the statement, and the name and address of the cleclarant, all
"sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair
opportunity to prepare to meet" the hearsay. Id.
179. See Raeder, Effect of the Catchalls, supra note 34, at 936 ("The catchall notice
provision has not provided a sufficient opportunity to challenge the hearsay evidence
because of the flexible approach taken by many courts that have permitted notice at
trial."); Rand, supra note 101, at 883-88.
180. The Rule provides, in pertinent part: "[A] statement may not be admitted
under this exception unless the proponent ... makes known ... in advance of the
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Pretrial hearsay "notice" provisions, like that in the residual
exception, seem like a natural accompaniment to rules admitting new
forms of hearsay. Nevertheless, neither the courts nor Congress has
sought to balance the expanding range of hearsay admissible under
the categorical exceptions in the Rules with similarly expanded
pretrial notice requirements. Outside of the residual exception, there
is no notice requirement for newly admissible forms of "fringe"
hearsay,182 even though the challenge of contesting such hearsay is no
different than with residual hearsay.
In some measure, the absence of development in the law of
hearsay-related discovery stems from a lack of pressure from the
defense bar. For a variety of reasons, defense counsel seldom press
the limits of the existing rules of discovery in order to pursue
prosecution hearsay. 183
For example, the Brady rule entitles
defendants to exculpatory material, including so-called "Giglio"
material that may serve to impeach a government witness. There are
dozens of reported cases debating the Brady-Giglio rule in connection
with testifying witnesses. 184 In stark contrast to those numbers, only a
handful of cases apply Brady-Giglio doctrine to the discovery of
trial ... the proponent's intention to offer the statement." Fed. R. Evid. 807.
181. See, e.g., United States v. Parker, 749 F.2d 628, 633 (11th Cir. 1984) (upholding
the admissibility of evidence despite the prosecution's failure to provide notice);
United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1355 (8th Cir. 1976} (allowing evidence to be
admitted despite the government's failure to provide notice on the ground that the
notice requirement is not "inflexible").
182 See supra text accompanying notes 117-38.
183. The principal reason that defendants seldom pursue hearsay-related discm•el)'
may be that they seldom think about impeaching hearsay declarants in the same way
they are familiar with attacking testifying witnesses. An experienced state court trial
judge writes:
As a trial judge ... I sometimes wonder at what seems to me the passing up
of golden opportunities by the able advocate. Foremost among these lost
opportunities is the virtual total neglect to do anything about the other side's
hearsay once it has been admitted by the trial judge into e\•idence. True
enough, the able advocate fought valiantly against the hearsay admission;
but, having lost that position, he does not fall back to the next logical
position-impeaching the hearsay declarant.
Brannon, supra note 7, at 158. The reasons that defense counsel frequently ignore
such opportunities may be more complex. See Douglass, supra note 6, at 222-23
(arguing that Confrontation Clause doctrine itself is partially to blame, by diverting
counsel's time and attention to questions of admissibility to the exclusion of matters
relating to the testing of hearsay before a jury, and by giving defense counsel a tactical
incentive to forego opportunities to impeach hearsay declarants in favor of preserving
"pure" confrontation issues for appeal).
Of course, one practical reason for defense counsel's inaction may be that the lack
of information regarding the government's expected witnesses stymies any efforts to
learn about hearsay declarants. Until a defendant knows who the testifying witnesses
are, and what they are likely to say, he often has no place to start in preparing to meet
hearsay.
184. See Symposium, Twenty-Sixth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure, 85 Geo.
LJ. 775, 1089-90 nn.1113 & 1114 (1997) (collecting cases applying Giglio to a variety
of impeachment material).
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material to impeach the growing legion of hearsay declarants. 185
Similarly, there has been little effort to extend the Jencks Act to
obtain discovery of prior statements of hearsay declarants after their
out-of-court statements have been admitted in evidence. Only one
federal court of appeals has considered a defendant's effort to obtain
"Jencks material" relating to a hearsay declarant. 186 And that court
rejected the argument. 187
Finally, no discussion of discovery developments would be complete
without reference to informal discovery. The federal system of
limited discovery has weathered a variety of criticisms in recent
decades. One could argue that the system has survived only because
most federal prosecutors are reluctant to rely on the strict limits
imposed by the rules. 188 Most discovery in most federal cases occurs
informally, and much of it is earlier and broader than the letter of the
law requires. 189
In many cases, informal discovery provides
defendants with important insights about prosecution hearsay. 190 But
there are serious problems with a system that counts on informal,
voluntary disclosure to solve most of its discovery problems. For one
185. See United States v. Williams-Davis, 90 F.3d 490, 513-14 (D.C. Cir. 1996);
United States v. Hawryluk, 658 F. Supp. 112, 117 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
186. See Williams-Davis, 90 F.3d at 512-13.
187. See id. at 513.
188. The Justice Department itself appears to recognize that the current system
would crumble under the weight of judicial criticism if federal prosecutors themselves
did not routinely provide more discovery than the rules require. In an effort to
forstall Rule 16 amendments requiring pretrial disclosure of government witnesses
and their statements, Jo Ann Harris, Chief of the Department's Criminal Division,
appeared at a meeting of the Advisory Committee and offered to implement a new
internal policy requiring prosecutors to make such disclosures except in unusual cases.
See Inside Litig., supra note 175, at 11.
189. One former Assistant United States Attorney writes:
In practice ... prosecutors and courts recognize that strict compliance with
the rules can easily result in trial by ambush. As such, the practice of many
U.S. Attorney's Offices is to offer earlier and broader discovery to the
defense. That is not to say that there is an "open file" attitude, but there is a
recognition that mere compliance with the rules, unless there is a compelling
reason to refuse to go further, may not be sufficient to fulfill the prosecutor's
duty.
Laurie L. Levenson, Working Outside the Rules: The Undefined Responsibilities of
Federal Prosecutors, 26 Fordham Urb. L.J. 553, 554 (1999) {footnote omitted). For
example, it has become typical practice in most cases for federal prosecutors to
disclose "Jencks material" (i.e., witness statements) before trial, rather than waiting
until after the witness's direct testimony as the Jencks Act permits. See id. at 562-63;
see also United States v. Murphy, 569 F.2d 771, 773 n.5 (3d Cir. 1978) (noting the
prevailing practice of prosecutors to provide Jencks material before trial).
190. Usually, those insights will be somewhat limited. Where prosecutors disclose
witness statements before trial, defendants may be tipped off that a witness will relate
important hearsay. But defendants still lack the formal means to follow up on that
information by compelling the witness or the declarant to submit to pretrial
questioning. Cf Raeder, Effect of Catchalls, supra note 34, at 936 (stating that when
prosecutors provide notice that they intend to use hearsay, it is of limited value where
defense has no right to depose witnesses or available declarants).

2000]

HEARSAY AND CRIMINAL DISCOVERY

2141

thing, the system tends to work best when it matters least.
Prosecutors aiming for guilty pleas have the strongest incentive to
disclose in cases where their evidence is most overwhelming. 1\1 1 In the
weaker cases, the very ones where discovery is most likely to make a
difference to the defendant, there is less incentive for a prosecutor to
disclose and more reason to play "hard ball" when the rules permit it.
Moreover, voluntary informal disclosure works best when it is most
convenient for the prosecutor. Understandably. defense counsel may
feel that an informal discovery request will be more favorably
received if it is not too ambitious or burdensome. In such an
environment, defense counsel are more likely to focus their requests
on the items they deem most essential, particularly prior statements
and impeachment material for prospective government witnesses.
They may be less inclined to push their luck in seeking identification
of hearsay declarants and related impeachment materials. since the
burden of producing such material may appear to be heavier and its
value may appear to be less significant. In effect, an informal system
makes beggars of defense counsel. And, as the old saying goes,
"beggars can't be choosers."
In sum, though criminal trials may no longer be the "game of
blindman's bluff'' 192 that spurred discovery reformers in the 1960s, the
advances in criminal discovery since that time have offered little when
it comes to hearsay. Other than for residual hearsay, defendants have
no right to pretrial notice of the hearsay they must face. Brady,
Giglio, and the Jencks Act remain undiscovered and underused tools
for contesting hearsay. And most significantly, the continued bar
against compelled pretrial disclosure of government witness lists and
witness statements leaves defendants without an important. albeit
indirect, means to stumble across the hearsay they will have to contest
at trial.
C. The Short End of the Stick: Hearsay-Related Discovery Rights of
Criminal Defendants Compared to Those of Civil Litigants and of
Prosecutors
During the last quarter century, criminal discovery practices have
failed to keep pace \vith the expansion of admissible hearsay in federal
courts. As a result, compared to other litigants, today's federal
criminal defendants are in a precarious position when it comes to
191. The United States Attorneys' Manual counsels prosecutors to consider
pretrial disclosure of the names of government witnesses in appropriate cases. One
reason is to "enhance the prospects that the defendant will plead guilty." U.S. Dep't
of Justice, United States Attorneys' Manual§ 9-6.200 (2d ed. 1998). reprilltetl i11 Lloyd
L. Weinreb, Criminal Process: Cases. Comment, Questions 867 (5th ed. 1993). The
manual is available on-line at <http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_roomf
usaml>.
192. United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co .• 356 U.S. 677. 6b'2 (1958) (Douglas, J.).
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hearsay. It is no secret that civil litigants have vastly greater formal
discovery rights than criminal litigants. For reasons which I explain
below, those differences are magnified when it comes to discovery
relating to hearsay. It is perhaps less obvious, though equally true,
that prosecutors enjoy an advantage over criminal defendants in
anticipating an opponent's use of hearsay and in assembling the
"ammunition" necessary to contest it. Thus, if we compare the
hearsay-related discovery opportunities of all classes of litigants, we
find criminal defendants at the bottom of the list.
1.

Civil vs. Criminal Discovery Relating to Hearsay

Neither the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure nor the Rules of
Criminal Procedure explicitly address discovery relating to hearsay. 193
But the two systems of discovery produce starkly different results
when it comes to hearsay. 194 Hearsay seldom takes civil litigants by
193. The one explicit link between hearsay and discovery appears in Rule 807 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence, which requires a proponent of hearsay to provide
notice in advance of trial of an intent to offer hearsay under the residual exception.
See Fed. R. Evid. 807.
194. In large measure, the handicaps facing criminal defendants in preparing to
contest prosecution hearsay simply mirror the fundamental differences between civil
and criminal discovery in general. The scope of civil discovery is designedly broad,
encompassing virtually anything relating to the subject matter of the litigation. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (providing that parties may discover any matter "relevant to the
subject matter involved in the pending action" as long as it "appears reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence"). By contrast, there is no
general rule allowing a criminal defendant to learn the government's case against him.
See Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977). Except for clearly exculpatory
"Brady material," criminal discovery is confined to categories of information
enumerated in Rule 16 and to the narrow category of "witness statements" defined in
the Jencks Act. See 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1994).
Rule 16 gives defendants the right to discover their own statements, see Fed. R.
Crim. P. 16(a)(l)(A), their criminal record, see id. Rule 16(a)(l)(B), documents and
tangible objects which are "material" to the defense or which the government will
offer at trial, see id. Rule 16(a)(l)(C), the results of scientific tests, see id. Rule
16(a)(l)(D), and the substance of anticipated testimony from government experts, see
id. Rule 16(a)(l)(E). The Rule provides for roughly comparable reciprocal discovery
from the defense. See id. Rule 16(b).
The Jencks Act, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3500, defines defendant's right to discover
the statements of government witnesses. The Jencks Act prohibits federal courts
from ordering discovery of witness statements until after a government witness has
testified on direct examination at trial. See 18 U.S.C. § 3500(a) (1994). Once the
witness testifies, the Jencks Act requires the government to produce a narrowly
defined category of prior statements of the witness. See id. § 3500(b ). Rule 26.2 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure essentially restates the Jencks Act, and provides
for reciprocal discovery of the prior statements of defense witnesses. See Fed. R.
Crim. P. 26.2. Significantly, Rules 26.2(g), 12(i), and 46(i) now extend the obligation
to disclose "Jencks" material-witness statements-to include witnesses testifying in
pretrial suppression hearings, preliminary hearings, and detention hearings. See id.
Rules 12(i), 26.2(g), 46(i).
Several provisions in the Rules of Evidence also require pretrial disclosures. See,
e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) (requiring prosecution to disclose evidence of "other
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surprise. Before trial, they can learn the content of any hearsay
statements they must face, identify and, quite often, locate and
question the declarant, and assemble virtually any information
relevant to contest that hearsay or impeach the declarant. By
contrast, the process of criminal discovery often leaves criminal
defendants guessing at the first stage of the learning process. Criminal
defendants have no reliable means even to identify the out-of-court
statements they will face at trial, much less the power to assemble
information to contest such statements. Two aspects of civil
discovery, not present in the criminal process, account for most of the
difference: (1) a civil litigant's obligation to identify both witnesses
and hearsay declarants well before trial, 195 and (2) discovery
depositions. 196
At an early stage in civil litigation, typically without even a formal
discovery request, each party must disclose the names and identifying
data of "each individual likely to have discoverable information," 197a category which includes not only prospective witnesses but also the
declarants of any hearsay which a party might seek to introduce at
trial. By contrast, as we have seen, Congress rejected a proposed rule
requiring pretrial disclosure of anticipated government witnesses. 1" 3
Instead, the Jencks Act provides that government witness
statements-which obviously would serve to identify witnesses-shall
not be the subject of discovery or subpoena before trial. 199 And there
is no criminal counterpart to Rule 26's broad command to disclose any
"individual likely to have discoverable information." As a result,
criminal defendants have no formal discovery tool designed to inform

crimes" which it intends to offer); id. Rule 412 (intent to offer sexual history of
victim); id. Rule 413 (evidence of similar crimes in sexual assault cases): id. Ruic 414
(evidence of similar crimes in child molestation cases): id. Rule 609 (evidence of
conviction over ten years old).
Though the reasons for liberal discovery-promoting truth-seeking by avoiding
surprise, narrowing issues for trial, and encouraging settlement-exist just as fully in
criminal as in civil litigation, they are offset in criminal cases by other concerns,
typically cited to justify more limited discovery in criminal cases: (I) fear that
defendants may seek to influence or intimidate witnesses (or worse): (2) fear that
defendants will use discovered information as a reference point for fabricating
evidence or committing perjury; and (3) unfairness to the government stemming from
supposed constitutional limits on a court's power to order reciprocal discovery from
the defense. See generally Frank W. Miller et al., Cases and Materials on Criminal
Justice Administration 781 (4th ed. 1991) (summarizing the arguments against broad
discovery in criminal cases).
195. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(l)(A).
196. See id. Rule 30.
197. Id. Rule 26(a)(l)(A). The Rule allows courts to opt out of the process of
compelled initial disclosures through local rule or by order in a specific case. Even in
those districts which have such local rules, however, it is commonplace to request
similar information through written interrogatories.
198. See supra text accompanying notes 169-72.
199. See 18 U.S.C. § 3500(a) (1994).
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them who will testify for the government,200 much less to identify
declarants whose "testimony" will come only in the form of hearsay.
Even when a criminal defendant manages to learn of the
prosecution's intention to offer an important hearsay statement at
trial,201 his opportunity to prepare to contest that hearsay pales in
comparison to the rights afforded a civil litigant under comparable
circumstances. The major difference is that the civil litigant has the
right to compel discovery depositions. 202 Where the declarant is alive,
subject to subpoena, and does not invoke a privilege to avoid
testifying-a situation more typical of declarants in civil than in
criminal cases203-the opponent's right to depose that declarant
virtually eliminates the adversarial concerns at the heart of the
hearsay rule. In a deposition, the opponent can subject the declarant
to the full dose of adversarial cross-examination, often more
exhaustively than might be permitted at trial.204 If he likes the results
of the deposition, the opponent often has the option to call the
declarant as a witness at trial, or to use parts of the deposition to
impeach any hearsay offered by the other party.205 By contrast,
200. Capital cases are the exception. There, the government must provide a list of
witnesses before trial. See id. § 3432.
201. While nothing assures a criminal defendant that he has learned about all
significant government hearsay before trial, criminal defendants are not wholly
without means to anticipate prosecution hearsay. Typically, where defendants can
identify prosecution hearsay before trial, it is because: (1) the hearsay consists of a
written statement appearing in a document which the government intends to offer at
trial and the document has been disclosed by the government under Rule 16(a)(l)(C);
(2) the hearsay forms the basis of an expert opinion disclosed under Rule 16(a)(l)(E);
(3) the government gives notice of its intention to offer "residual" hearsay under Rule
807; (4) the government files a pretrial motion in limine which identifies the hearsay
and seeks a pretrial ruling on admissibility; (5) the hearsay is identified in an affidavit
supporting a search or arrest warrant or in testimony at a preliminary hearing; or,
most typically, (6) the government voluntarily provides informal discovery earlier and
broader than the rules require.
202. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 30.
203. Criminal cases are more likely to involve hearsay from unavailable declarants
for a variety of reasons. It is quite common in criminal cases that the witnesses with
the most intimate knowledge of the facts will refuse to testify and invoke the Fifth
Amendment privilege. See, e.g., Lilly v. Virginia, 119 S. Ct. 1887, 1892-93 (1999)
(discussing how declarant, who was defendant's brother and an accomplice in the
crime, refused to testify at trial). It is much less typical for witnesses in civil cases to
invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege. Criminal cases more often give rise to
hearsay from declarants who run or hide out of fear of retribution, or declarants who
are themselves fugitives from the Jaw. Finally, an increasing number of criminal cases
involve hearsay from abused children who are found unable to testify in court or from
abused spouses who are unwilling to testify.
204. Questioning in depositions tends to be longer, more detailed, and covers a
broader subject matter than questioning at trial. Discovery depositions are not
confined to matters admissible at trial, but may encompass any subject reasonably
calculated to lead to admissible evidence. With no judge controlling the proceedings,
and no jury to bore with detail, parties typically feel few time constraints in a
deposition.
205. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(l) ("Any deposition may be used by any party for the
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criminal defendants have no right to take discovery depositions.M As
a result, where the government relies on hearsay from an available
declarant,207 the defendant faces a tough dilemma with little assistance
from the discovery process. If the court admits the hearsay, the
defense may choose to call the declarant to the stand for crossexamination.208 But with no opportunity to depose the declarant
before trial, defense counsel must make that strategic decision in the
dark. Unless he has another reliable source for "ammunition" to
impeach the declarant, or unless he is a risk-taker of the highest order,
counsel often will forgo that opportunity and the hearsay will go
unchallenged.209
Where the declarant of important hearsay is unavailable, a civil
litigant still can depose the witness who relates the hearsay statement,
or other witnesses familiar with the declarant or the circumstances of
the statement, and gather any available information that might expose
weaknesses in the declarant's memory, perception, or credibility.
Moreover, a civil litigant has a broad right to require pretrial
production of documents which might lead to information impeaching
a declarant, whether such documents are in the possession of his
opponent or a third party.210 By contrast, a criminal defendant has no
means to depose anyone who may shed light on the credibility of a
hearsay statement. And his ability to require either the government
or third parties to produce documents before trial is more limited than
a civil litigant's.211
purpose of contradicting or impeaching the testimony of deponent as a witness, or for
any other purpose permitted by the Federal Rules of Evidence.''). Rule 806 of the
Rules of Evidence permits use of deposition testimony to impeach a hearsay
declarant in the same manner. See Fed. R. Evid. 806.
206. The Rules of Criminal Procedure provide for depositions. See Fed. R. Crim. P.
15. But the Rule permits the taking of depositions only "for use at trial" and only in
"exceptional circumstances." Id. Typically. parties employ the Rule when they
anticipate that a crucial \vitness \vill become unavailable before trial. The Rule does
not permit discovery depositions. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 15 advisory committee's notes
to 1974 amendment ("Subdivision (a) ... makes explicit that only the 'testimony of a
prospective witness of a party' can be taken. This means the party's own witness and
does not authorize a discovery deposition of an adverse witness.").
207. Under current doctrine, except in cases of hearsay in the form of former
testimony, the Confrontation Clause does not require the government to demonstrate
that a declarant is unavailable in order to introduce her hearsay statements. See White
v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 353-54 (1992).
208. See Fed. R. Evid. 806.
209. See supra note 11.
210. A civil litigant can obtain any relevant document from his opponent merely by
filing a "Request for Production of Documents." Fed. R. Civ. P. 34. He can obtain
access to third-party documents by issuing a subpoena under Ruic 45. See ill. Rule 45.
In either case, the scope of permissible discovery is not limited to admissible
documents. It encompasses anything reasonably calculated to lead to discovery of
admissible evidence.
211. The government must provide a criminal defendant only those documents it
intends to offer at trial, or other documents "material" to preparation of the defense.
See Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a}(l}(C). The concept of materiality under Ruic 16 is Jess
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The obvious impact of these differences in discovery rights is to
leave a criminal defendant in a much more difficult position than a
civil litigant when it comes to contesting hearsay. The civil discovery
process largely eliminates surprise from hearsay, often allows an
opponent to question the declarant in person, and equips an opponent
with documents and testimony useful to impeach an unavailable
declarant. Criminal defendants, on the other hand, often first learn of
significant, incriminating hearsay when they hear it at trial. Where
they learn about it earlier, they have few formal tools available to
investigate the declarant or the circumstances of the out-of-court
statement.
2.

Prosecution vs. Defense Discovery

On the surface, the process of criminal discovery seems to favor the
defense over the prosecution. Constitutional discovery principles
protect only the defendant; there is no reciprocal Brady obligation
requiring the defense to disclose incriminating evidence to the
prosecution.
The Fifth Amendment generally prohibits such
compelled disclosure. 212 Most of a defendant's reciprocal discovery
obligations under Rule 16 arise only after the government has
complied with defense requests for disclosure.213 And the defendant's
right to government disclosure of documents and tangible objects is
broader than the defendant's reciprocal obligation.214 Indeed, the
generous than the civil discovery standard in Rule 26. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)
(allowing discovery of anything "reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence"). A criminal defendant may subpoena documents from third
parties under Rule 17(c). See Fed R. Crim. P. 17(c). But Ruic 17(c) is essentially a
means to gain pretrial access to otherwise admissible material. It was not intended as
a discovery rule at all. See Bowman Dairy Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 214, 218-21
(1951) ("Rule 17(c) was not intended to provide an additional means of discovery.").
212. The Fifth Amendment, however, does not make all criminal discovery a "oneway street." In Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 85-86 (1970), the Court upheld a
Florida notice-of-alibi provision in the face of a Fifth Amendment challenge. Three
years later, a unanimous Court held that a notice-of-alibi provision which accorded
defendant no reciprocal discovery rights violated the Due Process Clause. See
Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 474-75 (1973). In the wake of Williams, reciprocal
discovery provisions expanded significantly in state practice. See Robert P. Mosteller,
Discovery Against the Defense: Tilting the Adversarial Balance, 74 Cal. L. Rev. 1567,
1574-84 (1986). Reciprocal discovery, conditioned upon defendant's first invoking his
own discovery rights, became a part of federal practice with the 1975 amendments to
Rule 16. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(b) advisory committee's notes to 1974 amendment.
213. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(b)(l)(A)-(B). The only exception is Rule 16(b)(l)(C),
which requires a defendant to disclose a summary of expert testimony where he has
filed a notice under Rule 12.2(b) of intent to present expert testimony regarding his
mental condition.
214. The defendant need only disclose those documents he intends to offer in
evidence, while the government must also disclose any documents "material to the
preparation of the defendant's defense." Compare Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(l)(C), with
id. Rule 16(b)(l)(A). The difference is designed to avoid the clash with the Fifth
Amendment that would arise if defendant were required to produce all "material"
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limited power of the government to compel disclosure of information
from the defense is a principle justification for the limited discovery
rights afforded criminal defendants.215 The rules are fair, the
argument goes, because discovery is limited in both directions. There
may not be much discovery, but at least there is a rough parity in the
process.
In reality, this notion of "discovery parity" is largely a fiction.
Merely comparing the parties' formal, post-indictment rights tells us
little about the relative discovery opportunities of the prosecution and
defense. In many federal prosecutions, that comparison means little
because it ignores the fact that the government does most of its
"discovery" in a grand jury investigation before the indictment is ever
filed. Like discovery depositions in civil cases, grand jury proceedings
empower the government to compel witness examinations on the
record and under oath long before trial, unhampered by rules of
evidence, and subject to very broad concepts of relevance.216
Thorough prosecutors can, and do, exercise that power to anticipate
defenses, to "lock in" witnesses who might prove favorable to the
defense, and to gather impeachment material for use in crossexarnining defense witnesses at trial.217
When it comes to anticipating and contesting adverse hearsay, the
grand jury offers prosecutors most of the advantages that civil litigants
obtain through discovery depositions.
Before the grand jury,
prosecutors can question prospective trial witnesses and identify
statements likely to appear at trial in the form of hearsay. With grand
jury subpoenas, prosecutors can compel available hearsay declarants
information regardless of his intent to disclose it at trial. \Vi/Iiams i•. Florida rests
largely on the notion that a court does not violate the Fifth Amendment by requiring
an "accelerated" pretrial disclosure of evidence that the defendant will disclose at
trial in any event. See Yale Kamisar et al., Modem Criminal Procedure: Cases,
Comments, and Questions 1228-29 (9th ed. 1999).
215. See State v. Eads, 166 N.W.2d 766, 769 (Iowa 1969) ("[S)ince the State cannot
compel the defendant to disclose his evidence, disclosure by the State would afford
the defendant an unreasonable advantage at trial."). See generally Brennan, A
Progress Report, supra note 13, at 7 (summarizing and responding to the claim that
Fifth Amendment restrictions on reciprocal discovery justify limits on the
government's obligations to disclose).
216. See United States v. R. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 301 (1991) (holding that a
grand jury subpoena will not be quashed if there is any reasonable probability that
subpoenaed material will lead to information relevant to the investigation); Kastigar
v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 443 (1972) (acknowledging the government's power to
compel testimony before the grand jury).
217. Federal courts have held that a prosecutor unlawfully abuses grand jury power
by using the grand jury after indictment solely for the purpose of gaining information
for an advantage at trial. See, e.g., /11 re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated
January 2, 1985 (Simels), 767 F.2d 26, 29-30 (2d Cir. 1985) (quashing subpoena as an
abuse of the grand jury process). But there is little practical limit on the government's
ability to use the grand jury before indictment to shore up its case and anticipate
defenses. No rule compels the government to terminate a grand jury investigation
and present an indictment as soon as it has developed probable cause to indict.
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to appear for examination in person. And the grand jury offers the
power to compel testimony and documents from any source that
might limit, contradict, or impeach an unavailable declarant. Better
yet, unlike a civil deposition, the whole process occurs ex parte and in
secret.218 The prosecutor proceeds unhampered by objections. The
witness testifies without counsel at her side.
There is, of course, no "parity" in a grand jury investigation.
Defendants have no control over the grand jury process. In many
cases, they are unaware of the grand jury's investigation until it is
over. Once the investigation is complete, as a general rule defendants
are not even entitled to the transcribed record of grand jury
proceedings unless and until a grand jury witness later testifies for the
government at trial.2 19 In sum, of all litigants, civil or criminal, only
criminal defendants lack the single most effective tool available to
anticipate and contest most hearsay: the right to compel pretrial
examination of witnesses, especially adverse witnesses. 220
The government has another power, not possessed by any other
litigant, that allows prosecutors not only to contest hearsay, but often
to choose whether critical information will appear at trial as hearsay
or through the testimony of a live witness. The government alone has
the power to grant a hearsay declarant immunity from prosecution.221
Equally important in many instances, the government can pursue a
course that other litigants cannot pursue without facing criminal
sanctions for witness tampering. Prosecutors can make "deals" with
witnesses, offering immunity, reduced charges, or favorable
sentencing recommendations in exchange for information or
testimony. 222 These powers give the government tremendous leverage
218. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(d)-(e).
219. See 18 U.S.C. § 3500(a) (1994) (Jencks Act); Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(3).
220. Opportunities to examine adverse witnesses occasionally arise at preliminary
hearings or in other pretrial proceedings. But the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure do not require preliminary hearings once an indictment is filed. See Fed. R.
Crim. P. 5(c). In most cases, federal prosecutors avoid preliminary hearings by
indicting the case before arrest, within ten days after arrest for defendants in custody,
or within 20 days for defendants released pending trial. See id. Most other pretrial
hearings do not require live testimony on the merits of criminal charges and, hence,
provide little opportunity for effective discovery. By contrast, preliminary hearings
are part of routine practice in many states, and they often create significant
opportunities for examination of the prosecution's principal witnesses.
221. See 18 U.S.C. § 6002. The immunity statute provides that, upon application of
the prosecutor, the court "shall" issue an order compeJiing a witness to testify. See 18
U.S.C. § 6003. The effect of the compulsion order is to grant "use immunity" for
testimony compelled by the order. See generally Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 443 (granting
"use immunity" in exchange for compelled testimony). Prosecutors may accomplish a
similar result through contract, by entering into an "immunity agreement" with a
cooperating witness. See United States v. Thompson, 25 F.3d 1558, 1562 (1 lth Cir.
1994) (noting that "basic principles of contract law" govern immunity agreements).
222. See United States v. Singleton, 165 F.3d 1297, 1299-1302 (10th Cir. 1999) (en
bane) (holding that 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2). which forbids giving gratuities to witnesses
in return for testimony, does not apply to the acts of prosecutors in entering into plea
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to shape the hearsay landscape of a criminal trial. It is not unusual for
a hearsay declarant in criminal cases to become "unavailable" for live
testimony solely because she asserts her Fifth Amendment privilege.223
By exercising, or choosing not to exercise, its immunity granting
power, the prosecution can determine whether that declarant's story is
presented at trial as hearsay or live testimony. Not surprisingly, that
decision will be governed in large part224 by which version-live
testimony or hearsay-is more likely to favor the prosecution. If the
declarant seems likely to make a credible witness, the government
may bargain for her live testimony by offering a favorable plea. On
the other hand, where the hearsay comes from an unsavory declarant,
the government may choose to "stand pat" and offer the hearsay.m
By contrast, the defense has no power to open a declarant's mouth
through a grant of immunity.226
Even in gathering information outside of formal, compulsory
processes, the government enjoys substantial practical advantages
over most defendants. Most federal prosecutors have the support of
investigating agents throughout the trial preparation stage of a
criminal case. Once the government has identified a potential defense
witness, or a declarant of significant, exculpatory hearsay, it is a rare
case where the prosecution lacks the resources to contact the witness
or investigate the circumstances of the hearsay. By contrast, most
defendants are represented by appointed counsel who can devote
little time to pretrial interviews or other investigation of prospective
agreements which offer leniency in exchange for cooperation and testimony).
223. See, e.g., Lilly v. Virginia, 119 S. Ct. 1887. 1892-93 (1999) (discussing how
declarant became "unavailable" when he invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege).
224. Another consideration, of course, is the government's interest in prosecuting
the prospective witness. The government can sometimes control that factor as well,
merely by controlling the timing of prosecutions.
225. The government's power to alter the hearsay landscape of a case can extend to
defense hearsay as well. Where the government is able to anticipate a defendant's
intention to offer exculpatory hearsay, the prosecutor's "deal-making" powers can
alter a defendant's plans. In some cases. the government can effectively preempt
defense use of exculpatory hearsay by reaching an immunity agreement with the
declarant, discovering incriminating information through pretrial interviews or grand
jury testimony, then calling the declarant as a government witness at trial. The
witness then explains the earlier hearsay statement as incomplete, out of context, or
inaccurately reported.
226. A number of circuits have ruled that federal courts have no power to grant
immunity to witnesses absent a request from the prosecutor. See, e.g.• United Staes v.
Robaina, 39 F.3d 858, 863 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that "use immunity" can only be
granted upon the Attorney General's request); United States\'. Quintanilla, 2 F.3d
1469, 1483 (7th Cir. 1993) (declining to grant immunity in the absence of a formal
offer from the prosecutor); Grand Jury Proceedings (Williams) v. United States, 995
F.2d 1013, 1017 (11th Cir. 1993) (finding that federal courts cannot grant use
immunity to witnesses testifying under a Rule 26(c) protective order). The Second
and Fourth Circuits have suggested that courts may order immunity in cases where
misconduct by the prosecutor would otherwise result in injustice. See United States v.
Abbas, 74 F.3d 506, 512 (4th Cir. 1996); United States v. Bahadar, 954 F.2d 821. 826
(2d Cir. 1992).
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government witnesses, much less of hearsay declarants. 227 And
defendants' disadvantage in resources is compounded by another
problem: witnesses typically cooperate more readily with police and
prosecutors than with defense counsel or defense investigators. With
time and investigative resources in short supply, defense counsel may
not devote time and energy to pursuing witnesses who are likely to
slam the door in their faces.
II. CORRECTING THE BALANCE: EXPANDING CRIMINAL
DISCOVERY TO CONTEND WITH EXPANDED ADMISSION OF
PROSECUTION HEARSAY

There are two ways to adjust any balance: subtract from one side,
or add to the other. Most scholarly treatment of hearsay in criminal
cases looks only at one side of the balance. There is an extensive
ongoing debate over adjustments to the rules of admissibility, both
under the law of evidence228 and under the Confrontation Clause.229
Most of that discussion assumes a fixed model of the criminal process:
227. One survey of appointed counsel in New York City found that defense
counsel actually interviewed witnesses before trial or guilty plea in only 21 % of
homicide cases and only 4% of other felony cases. See William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy
Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 Yale L.J. l, 42
(1997) (citing Michael Mcconville & Chester L. Mirsky, Criminal Defense of the Poor
in New York City, 15 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 581, 762 (1986-87)).
228. See, e.g., Randolph N. Jonakait, Text, Texts, or Ad Hoc Determinatio11s:
Interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 71 Ind. L.J. 551, 553 (1996) (suggesting
a text-centered approach to interpretation of the Rules of Evidence); Park, Subject
Matter Approach, supra note 9, at 106-07 (advocating the retention of existing hearsay
rules for criminal cases); Swift, Fact Approach, supra note 15, at 1342-43 (formulating
a "foundation fact approach" to hearsay admissibility); Van Kessel, supra note 2, at
485-92 (reviewing arguments and analyses regarding admission of hearsay).
229. A number of excellent works debate the limits of hearsay admissibility under
the Confrontation Clause. See, e.g., Amar, First Pri11ciples, supra note 44, at 693-97
(arguing that Confrontation Clause applies only to testifying witnesses and declarants
who testify through, for example, deposition and affidavit); Berger, supra note 28, at
561-62, 607-12 (arguing for a higher standard of admissibility for statements elicited
by prosecutors and government agents); Richard D. Friedman, Co11frontatio11: The
Search for Basic Principles, 86 Geo. L.J. 1011, 1031-32 (1998) (arguing that the
Confrontation Clause applies only to "testimonial statements," excluding such
statements absent confrontation of the declarant, with no exception for "reliable"
hearsay); Jonakait, Confrontation Clause, supra note 11, at 622 (arguing that the
Confrontation Clause should be restored to its true purpose of preserving the
adversarial process, rather than allowing the clause to fulfill the goals of evidence
law); Charles R. Nesson & Yochai Benkler, Constitutional Hearsay: Requiri11g
Foundational Testing and Corroboration under the Confrontation Clause, 81 Va. L.
Rev. 149, 173-74 (1995) (rejecting the Court's reliance on "arcane rules of evidence"
to define the constitutional rule and arguing that hearsay is admissible under the
Clause only where (1) the trial court "has made an independent foundational finding
that the hearsay is competent" and (2) the "hearsay is independently corroborated").
The full list is too long to include here. For a collection of earlier confrontationhearsay articles, see Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 n.9 (1980), where the Court
chronicled the "outpouring of scholarly commentary" on the hearsay-confrontation
issue.
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a criminal trial which takes place in one, typically brief episode,2..11)
preceded by relatively little discovery. But if we look at hearsay and
discovery as part of a single system that should be in balance, then we
must consider a second way to adjust that balance.:?31 Rather than
debating only whether to subtract some hearsay from one side, we
also should consider how we might add some discovery to the other.
In the four sections which follow, I examine the "discovery" side of
the balance and make some suggestions for expanding a defendant's
access to information relating to prosecution hearsay. Section A
considers a defendant's right to pretrial notice of the hearsay which a
prosecutor expects to use at trial. In Section B, I suggest how Brady
principles,232 Rule 16,233 and the Jencks Act2.'-' may serve as tools for
obtaining ammunition to impeach hearsay. Section C proposes the
limited use of depositions in criminal cases where necessary to give
defendants pretrial access to available hearsay declarants. Finally,
Section D argues for an approach to the question of admissibility
which would increase a prosecutor's incentive to provide early and
complete disclosure regarding hearsay.
In arguing for expanded discovery, I am mindful that any reforms
must accommodate the legitimate public concerns which presently
restrict discovery in criminal cases. Principal among those concerns is
the protection of witnesses.235 The need for speed and efficiency in
230. See, e.g., Park, Subject Matter Approach, supra note 9. at 62 ("The unitary
nature of the American trial makes surprise a greater danger than in other systems.
where adjournments and continuances can mitigate its effect.''): Van Kessel. supra
note 2, at 525, 532. Professor Van Kessel recognizes that certain aspects of the
adversary system in criminal cases, notably limited discovery and the parties' control
over investigation and presentation of evidence. account in large measure for the
hazards of unreliability and unfair surprise which justify the rule against hearsay. See
id. at 525. He calls for an expanded notice requirement for hearsay. and notes with
approval the trend in some states toward broader criminal discovery. See itl. at 532.
Because of his view that significant procedural reform faces "insurmountable
barriers" in the American system, id. at 525. however. Professor Van Kesscl's
principal focus is on adjustments to rules affecting admissibility.
231. Scholars who look at hearsay from a comparative law perspective tend to
focus more on procedural reforms rather than looking solely at rules governing
admissibility. See, e.g., Sean Doran, A Commem 011 Gorc/011 \'an Kesse/'s Hearsay
Hazards in the American Criminal Trial: An Adversary-Orie111etl Approach. 49
Hastings LJ. 591, 593 (1998) ("[I]t is worth paying just as much attention to the
possibilities of procedural reform as to the methods whereby the hearsay rule can be
best accommodated \vithin the existing procedural framework."): cf. DamaSka. supra
note 9, at 428-30 (exploring the connection between common-law hearsay rules and
the "one-shot" nature of common-law trials).
232 See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
233. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 16.
234. See 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1994).
235. Witness-related concerns have formed the heart of Department of Justice
resistance to discovery amendments that would require pretrial disclosure of
government witnesses. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 94-247. at 41 (1975). reprimetl in 1975
U.S.C.C.A.N. 674, 712 (arguing that proposed 1974 amendment to Rule 16 was
"dangerous and frightening in that government witnesses and their familit:s will even
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the criminal process also cannot be overlooked.236 Critics have
blamed expanded discovery for the increased cost and delays which
plague much modem civil litigation.237 The criminal process need not
emulate those failures. My aim is to suggest some avenues for
incremental reform, broadening defense access to information relating
to hearsay, but with minimal impact on other legitimate interests at
stake in the criminal process.
A. Advance Notice of Prosecution Hearsay

"You can't hit what you can't see." Baseball legend Walter
Johnson's account of his pitching aptly describes a defendant's
predicament in the face of some hearsay.238 The first step in
contesting hearsay is simply knowing what is coming. But, like
Johnson's fastball, prosecution hearsay can burst upon a criminal
defendant with little or no time to react. The following sections
discuss two avenues through which a criminal defendant might learn
before trial of the prosecution's intention to introduce a hearsay
statement, and learn the substance of the statement itself. The first
avenue is the most direct: a rule requiring such notice. Today such a
rule exists only for "residual" hearsay admitted under Rule 807.239 I
argue for expansion of that notice requirement to other forms of
prosecution hearsay. A second avenue for learning the substance of
some prosecution hearsay may already exist under Rule 16(a)(1) of
the Rules of Criminal Procedure. I argue that Rule 16(a)(l)(C)-the
rule providing for discovery of documents and tangible evidenceprovides an important avenue for defendants to discover
"documentary" hearsay, statements written or signed by the hearsay
declarant herself, or "recorded" hearsay, statements directly from the
mouth of the declarant which the government possesses in the form of
an audio or video recording. Application of Rule 16(a)(l)(C) to
pretrial discovery of hearsay, however, requires us to address an
additional, complex question: whether the hearsay declarant is a
"government witness" whose statements are protected against pretrial
discovery by Rule 16(a)(2) and the Jencks Act. I suggest several
approaches which would resolve that question in favor of broader
discovery of prosecution hearsay.

be more exposed than they now are to threats, pressures, and physical harm").
236. In federal courts, defendants have both constitutional and statutory rights to a
speedy trial. See U.S. Const. amend. VI; 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (1994) (Speedy Trial Act).
237. See Cound, supra note 13, at 762-63. The extensive amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1993 aimed largely to simplify and streamline
discovery.
238. See supra note 1.
239. See Fed. R. Evid. 807.
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Expanding a Defendant's Right to Pretrial Notice of Prosecution
Hearsay

Under current practice, a defendant's opportunities to anticipate
prosecution hearsay are best described as "haphazard." The Federal
Rules of Evidence explicitly require advance notice only when the
proponent intends to rely on the residual exception.240 In theory,
notice of "residual" hearsay is designed to protect an opponent from
surprise by the most unpredictable, nontraditional, and presumably
least reliable forms of hearsay. But, given the judicial expansion of
some of the more "traditional" exceptions,241 the theory which limits a
notice requirement to "residual" hearsay is open to question. In the
case of a child's hearsay statement alleging sexual abuse, for example,
defense counsel's need for advance notice is not diminished where the
child makes the statement to a doctor or a psychologist, rather than to
a police investigator. Yet a defendant's right to pretrial notice
depends upon whether the trial court ultimately fits a particular
statement into the "pigeonhole" for statements for purposes of
medical treatment242-for which no advance notice is required-or
admits it under the residual exception.243 Presently, no rule entitles a
defendant to pretrial notice that a police officer will testify at trial and
recount an accomplice's post-arrest "statement against interest" which
implicates the defendant.244 But few would argue that a defendant has
any lesser need to prepare to meet such hearsay than he would if, for
example, the same accomplice made the same statement before a
grandjury and the court found it admissible only under Rule 807.245
Moreover, absent a rule requiring pretrial notice, the current
system's heavy reliance on informal discovery2.it. can add to a
defendant's uncertainty in anticipating hearsay. Regardless of the
good faith of the prosecutor, even "open file" discovery may tum out
to be a trap for the unwary. The prosecutor's file may include agents'
240. Rule 807 reads:
[A] statement may not be admitted under this exception unless the
proponent of it makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of
the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to
prepare to meet it, the proponent's intention to offer the statement and the
particulars of it, including the name and address of the declarant.
Id.

241. See supra text accompanying notes 117-38. For a more detailed discussion of
the modem expansion of some of the traditional, categorical exceptions, see
Douglass, supra note 6, at 210-14.
242 See Fed. R. Evid. 803(4).
243. See id. Rule 807.
244. The admissibility of accomplice confessions as "statements against interest"
has occupied considerable attention from the Court in recent years. See supra text
accompanying notes 128-38.
245. See United States v. McHan, 101F.3d1027, 1037-38 (4th Cir. 1996) (admitting
grand jury testimony of deceased co-conspirator).
246. See supra text accompanying notes 188-89.
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memoranda of interviews with some government witnesses. But the
written record of a witness's prior statement is typically less complete
than fully developed trial testimony, which might include hearsay
statements that a memorandum does not. Also, there may be no
grand jury transcripts or interview memoranda at all for some
government witnesses. 247 Even after pouring through an "open file,"
defense counsel has no real assurance that he has seen all significant
government hearsay.
A hearsay-notice rule covering more than just residual hearsay
would provide a measure of protection against such uncertainty. It
would avoid the unfairness that now exists where notice is tied to the
happenstance of which "pigeonhole" ultimately provides the legal
basis for admitting the hearsay. Perhaps most important of all, more
regular advance notice of important hearsay would help to wean
defense counsel from a tradition of "exclusionary thinking," 248 and
allow more realistic opportunities to contest hearsay after it is
admitted in evidence. With more regular pretrial notice, defense
counsel are more likely to find and use ammunition that may
contradict hearsay or impeach a declarant, or to subpoena available
declarants for in-court cross-examination. Since advance notice is the
first step in contesting hearsay, expanding such notice is probably the
most important single reform one could make toward restoring an
adversarial balance when the prosecution proves its case through
hearsay.
One way to accomplish that reform would be to impose a general
rule requiring pretrial notice for all prosecution hearsay.249 But a rule
247. Prosecutors have no obligation to "create" Jencks material. See United States
v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1289 (1st Cir. 1996) (holding that the prosecutor did not
violate the Jencks Act by instructing agents not to take notes during witness
interview); United States v. Bernard, 625 F.2d 854, 859 (9th Cir. 1980) (same). In
some instances, prosecutors may choose not to place a witness before the grand jury.
especially at an early stage in an investigation, in part to avoid creating discoverable
Jencks material.
248. I use the term "exclusionary thinking" to describe an approach to hearsay
which begins and ends with the question of admissibility. Beginning with the basic
law school course on Evidence, lawyers devote considerable attention to excluding
hearsay from trials. But few lawyers, even experienced trial lawyers, pay sufficient
attention to the process of contesting hearsay after it is admitted in evidence. See
Brannon, supra note 7, at 158 (noting trial lawyers' "virtual total neglect" of
opportunities to impeach hearsay declarants).
In a previous article, I argued that the Court's treatment of the Confrontation
Clause as a rule of admissibility leads to exclusionary thinking, and can cause defense
counsel to ignore, or even to avoid, available opportunities to impeach hearsay. See
Douglass, supra note 6, at 221-24.
249. See Van Kessel, supra note 2, at 532 (calling for pretrial notice as a
precondition for admission of all hearsay). Such a proposal may be less revolutionary
than it appears at first blush. For practical purposes, a broad hearsay-notice
requirement already exists in federal civil cases as a result of the command in Rule 26
that parties disclose "all persons with knowledge" about the case, a category which
obviously includes declarants of any significant hearsay. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26. Once a
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requiring the prosecution to identify "all persons with knowledge," as
Rule 26 requires of civil litigants, would run into the familiar
Congressional roadblock against compelled pretrial disclosure of the
identity of government \vitnesses.250 An expanded hearsay-notice
rule, modeled after Rule 807 but covering "all out-of-court statements
which a party intends to offer in evidence," raises the prospect of
voluminous, time-consuming, and largely unhelpful pleadings which
could bury important hearsay amidst a catalogue of every business
record that a party might choose to offer at trial.251 A more realistic
approach would extend a notice requirement in criminal cases to
those forms of hearsay where surprise is most likely to disadvantage a
defendant. In a rough way, such an approach may provide a means to
balance hearsay and criminal discovery, by expanding notice
requirements generally for those categories of hearsay where the law
of evidence and Confrontation Clause rulings have already e:-.-panded
the admissibility of prosecution hearsay.
One problem, of course, would lie in identifying the categories
where pretrial notice should be required. It seems doubtful that a
line-up of selected hearsay exceptions-presumably chosen from
among the categories currently in the Federal Rules-would serve the
purpose. Not all "excited utterances," for example, are equally
significant or equally subject to challenge through attacks on the
credibility of the declarant. Indeed, a major problem with the current
approach is that it ties pretrial notice to the "pigeonhole" under which
the hearsay happens to be admitted. Since our aim would be to
identify types of hearsay where surprise would be most costly, then we
should require pretrial notice: (1) where the hearsay was most likely
to be important, that is, to have an impact on the jury; and (2) where
adversarial testing is most likely to make a difference, that is, where
the risk of unreliability is greatest.252 Using these criteria, we might
declarant is identified under Rule 26, an opponent in a civil case can learn the
substance of any hearsay statements either through written interrogatories or by
taking the declarant's deposition. See id.
A similarly broad requirement is not without precedent in criminal discovery
systems. For example, New Jersey requires prosecutors to disclose "names and
addresses of any persons whom the prosecuting attorney knows to have relevant
evidence or information ...." 31 New Jersey Criminal Practice and Procedure§ 476,
at 538-39 (3d ed. 1999-2000) (discussing Rule 3:13-3(c)(6) of the New Jersey Rules
Governing Criminal Practice).
250. See supra text accompanying notes 170-72.
251. This is McCormick's principal complaint about expanded hearsay-notice
provisions. See McCormick Hombook, supra note 2, at 545 ("[A) notice requirement
has the disadvantage of adding a further complication to an already overcrowded
array of pretrial procedures ....").
252. Similar criteria govern "notice" requirements in other contexts, scattered
through the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Rules of Criminal Procedure. Such
notice requirements typically appear in situations where evidence poses particular
risks of unreliability because, in the absence of adversarial inquiry, the opportunity
and the incentive to faJ?ricate or manipulate such evidence arc relatively high. See,
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require advance notice of hearsay from "impact" declarants like crime
victims and-where identity is in issue-identification eyewitnesses, as
well as from "risky" declarants like accomplices and coconspirators.253 Then, we might add any hearsay statements made to
police during criminal investigation, both because police witnesses are
likely to have an increased impact on many jurors, and because the
adversarial nature of criminal investigation adds to the risk of
unreliability.254 We would then arrive at a notice requirement for all
hearsay from crime victims, identification eyewitnesses, accomplices,
and all hearsay offered through the testimony of a law enforcement
agent reporting statements made in response to criminal investigation.
One could debate whether this list is too broad or too narrow. A rule
requiring pretrial notice of these categories of hearsay would not
eliminate all danger of unfair surprise at trial. It might include some
rather insignificant hearsay on occasion. But it would provide an
effective counterweight to prosecution hearsay in those cases where
liberal admission of hearsay seems most out of balance with limited
criminal discovery rights.
Of course, an expanded pretrial notice rule would not come without
costs. Arguments against the rule might raise (1) witness-related
concerns, (2) concerns with reciprocity of discovery, and (3) efficiency
concerns. The Justice Department has maintained that compelled
pretrial disclosure of witness lists or witness statements poses a serious
threat of witness tampering, harassment, intimidation, or worse.255 No
e.g., Fed. R. Crim. P. 12.1 (notice of alibi), 12.2 (notice of insanity defense). Other
notice requirements focus on evidence most likely to surprise a party because it
relates to issues only tangential to the central claim or defense in the case. See Fed. R.
Evid. 404(b) ("other crimes" evidence), 412(c) (evidence of victim's past sexual
behavior), 413(b) (evidence of similar crimes in sexual assault cases), 414(b)
(evidence of similar crimes in child molestation cases), 609(b) (criminal convictions
more than ten years old).
253. Professor Swift developed the paradigm of the "risky declarant" as one whose
"self-serving" interests raised particular concerns about reliability. See Eleanor Swift,
Abolishing the Hearsay Rule, 75 Cal. L. Rev. 495, 508 (1987). An accomplice whose
confession implicates her partner in crime clearly fits the model.
254. Indeed, historical fears of the power of police to manipulate evidence
obtained through interviews conducted in secret probably induced the Framers to
write the Confrontation Clause into the Bill of Rights in the first place. See Berger,
supra note 28, at 561. To the extent that modem confrontation theory allows the
admission of such hearsay, a pretrial notice provision would be an important first step
toward shedding any available light on the process that gave rise to the hearsay
statements.
Including hearsay reported by the police makes sense for another reason. Because
of the typically close cooperation between police and prosecutors, it will seldom prove
inconvenient for a prosecutor to identify and disclose such hearsay. Typically, the
hearsay will already be recorded in a police report which the prosecutor has in his file.
If the officer testifies to recount the hearsay, his report will be discoverable at trial
under the Jencks Act in any event. See, e.g., United States v. Welch, 810 F.2d 485, 49091 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that the Jencks Act requires the disclosure of a
government agent's summaries and notes when the agent testifies at trial).
255. See supra text accompanying notes 170-72.
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doubt, similar arguments would greet any proposal requiring pretrial
disclosure of hearsay declarants and their statements. No one
questions the importance of witness security, particularly in cases of
violent crime or organized crime where convincing witnesses to talk
may be the prosecution's most difficult challenge. But, as discovery
reform proponents argue, courts could address witness-security
concerns by ordering disclosure as a general rule, but limiting
discovery where the government produced evidence suggesting a
realistic threat of \vitness tampering or intimidation.256 In fact, pretrial
disclosure of witnesses is often the practice in federal prosecutions
today. It is simply left to the unreviewable discretion of the
prosecutor who decides what he will provide through informal
discovery.257
The case for compelled disclosure is even stronger when it comes to
hearsay declarants. Often, the government's need for hearsay arises
because a declarant is dead, has disappeared, or refuses to testify in
court. In those circumstances, the necessity which opens the door to
hearsay largely eliminates \vitness-security concerns. Unavailable
witnesses are an unlikely-sometimes an impossible-target for
tampering and intimidation. Even in the case of available declarants,
the very nature of hearsay reduces concerns over pretrial disclosure of
the declarant's identity. The declarant's story has already been told,
and will be repeated at trial even in the declarant's absence. The
defendant cannot change the hearsay by intimidating the declarant.
Nor can the defendant profit by harming a declarant whose damaging
story will be told in court in any event.:?..c;s If the declarant can add
something that might qualify or explain the damaging hearsay, the

256. See, e.g., Brennan, A Progress Report, supra note 13, at 14 ("[T)he proper
response to the intimidation problem cannot be to prevent discovery altogether; it is
rather to regulate discovery in those cases in which it is thought that witness
intimidation is a real possibility.").
257. Federal law requires pretrial disclosure of witness lists in capital cases. See 18
U.S.C. § 3432 (1994). Most states have rules either permitting or requiring disclosure
of witness lists, and many foreign systems make such disclosures routinely. In fact,
most federal prosecutors voluntarily disclose witnesses ahead of trial in most cases. In
light of these practices, none of which has been tied to evidence of increased threats
to witnesses, it seems less than convincing to insist on a rule that leaves disclosure of
witnesses and their statements entirely in the discretion of the prosecutor. Indeed,
one could argue that intimidation and harassment are just as likely to occur in the
absence of disclosure. Defendants awaiting trial are inclined to make educated
guesses about the prosecution's \vitnesses in any event. Speculation about who is
"snitching" is not an uncommon jailhouse topic. Where defendants are inclined to
threaten or intimidate, they do not require formal notice to start the process. In some
instances, formal pretrial notice might actually serve to protect some nonwitncsses
who would otherwise become targets of a defendant's misguided speculation.
258. Admittedly, retaliation against the declarant is a concern, even though it
would not affect the reporting of hearsay. But the same concern \viii arise in any
event, as soon as the government offers the hearsay at trial. Pretrial disclosure
neither increases nor decreases the prospect of retaliation.
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defendant's only incentive is to deliver her safely to court to tell the
rest of the story.259
Historically, another typical argument against expanded criminal
discovery stems from lack of reciprocity.260 The same argument might
be made against a rule requiring disclosure of the prosecution's intent
to use hearsay. But the Court's approach to reciprocal discovery
under the Fifth Amendment largely undercuts this claim.261 Rule
807's notice requirement applies to the defense as well as the
prosecution. Properly drafted, a broader hearsay-notice rule, applying
equally to prosecution and defense, would satisfy Fifth Amendment
standards and still eliminate concerns that hearsay disclosure would
be a one-way street in favor of the defense.
Finally, one might oppose an expanded pretrial notice rule on
grounds of efficiency. The rule would be an inconvenience to the
disclosing party, who might chafe at the burden of previewing his
entire case in an attempt to disclose which witnesses or documents
were likely to recount hearsay. Moreover, every new rule brings new
litigation. A pretrial disclosure requirement might tum routine
hearsay objections into extended discovery disputes.262
These efficiency concerns, however, are probably more theoretical
than real. There is no evidence that notice provisions under Rule 807
and in other contexts263 have created overwhelming burdens for
litigants. Most trial lawyers take account of any significant hearsay in
preparing for trial in any event, as they construct arguments in favor
of admissibility.
Notice to the opponent would impose a
comparatively minor burden and would reduce unnecessary
guesswork in the opponent's trial preparation. Moreover, disclosure
of documents, transcripts, recordings and sometimes agents' interview
memoranda-which often contain the hearsay statements which the
government expects to use at trial-is already a routine part of

259. Of course, there might remain witness-security concerns regarding any witness
who must appear in court to relate hearsay statements. Disclosure of the hearsay
typically would disclose its source. But, as with any other witness, the court could
limit discovery in response to evidence justifying real concerns over safety or
tampering. Of course, federal courts already have a track record with a hearsaynotice rule. Nothing suggests that Rule 807's notice provision has created serious
hazards for hearsay-relating witnesses.
260. See Brennan, A Progress Report, supra note 13, at 7.
261. In Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970), for example, the Court upheld
Florida's notice of alibi rule against a Fifth Amendment challenge. See id. at 102-03;
supra text accompanying notes 212-14.
262. See McCormick Hornbook, supra note 2, at 545 (noting that hearsay-notice
requirements might unnecessarily complicate pretrial proceedings).
263. See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 404(b), 412(c), 413(b), 414(b), 609(b) (requiring the
government to provide notice of "other crimes" evidence, evidence of victim's past
sexual behavior, evidence of similar crimes in sexual assault cases, evidence of similar
crimes in child molestation cases, and criminal convictions more than ten years old,
respectively).
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voluntary discovery provided by federal prosecutors in many cases.2t.t
Finally, if properly administered, an expanded hearsay-disclosure rule
need not lead to lengthy discovery disputes. The purpose of notice is
to avoid unfair surprise, not to increase the odds of excluding
probative evidence.265 A disclosure rule should be flexible enough to
permit courts to grant recesses or change the order of presenting some
evidence to avoid surprise to an opponent. By showing such flexibility
in dealing with other discovery conflicts in both civil and criminal
trials, courts have proved quite able to dispose of notice-related
disputes without serious disruption to the trial process.~1.16
In fact, a broader rule requiring pretrial notice of hearsay likely
would add to the efficiency of federal criminal trials. Important
hearsay issues too often arise in the heat of a criminal trial. A notice
rule would encourage resolution of such issues through the more
deliberate process of a pretrial motion in limine. Perhaps most
important, assuming that most parties would comply \vith a pretrial
notice rule in good faith, the rule should actually reduce the number
of claims of unfair surprise-and resultant delays-that now arise
when hearsay erupts unexpectedly in a criminal triat!b7 Finally, in the
case of available declarants, pretrial notice would minimize delays and
disruptions at trial by allmving time for defense counsel or
investigators to contact the declarant and serve a trial subpoena.
Of course, rulemaking for federal courts is a laborious process.
And there is no prospect that an expanded hearsay-notice provision in
the Federal Rules of Evidence is close at hand. Still, even in the
absence of an amendment to the Rules, federal courts have the power
to order pretrial notice of the government's intention to rely on
hearsay. The drafters of Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
264. See Levenson, supra note 189, at 562-63. A pretrial disclosure rule could be
drafted to provide that disclosure of documents or recordings containing the hearsay
statements would satisfy the rule. That would avoid the unnecessary burden of
requiring a party to file a separate pleading, for example, identifying every business
record as a hearsay statement.
265. Exclusion, of course, could remain an available sanction for repeated or willful
violations.
266. In fact, federal courts already pursue such a flexible approach when they apply
Rule 807. See Rand, supra note 101, at 885-88.
267. Federal courts already possess the power to grant recesses and regulate the
order of proof to address problems of unfair surprise. See Fed. R. Evid. 61 l(a). It is
less certain that they possess the power to exclude evidence based on surprise alone.
Compare United States v. Cole, 857 F.2d 971. 976 (4th Cir. 1988) (suggesting evidence
can be excluded under Rule 403 on grounds of unfair surprise), with Fed. R. faid. 403
advisory committee's note ("The rule does not enumerate surprise as a ground for
exclusion ...."). A rule requiring pretrial notice of hearsay would make that power
explicit, as Rule 807 now does for residual hearsay. See Fed. R. Evid. 807. But the
grant of such power does not require the court to use the sanction of exclusion in
every case. Courts have exercised flexibility in administering Rule 807. \\ith the aim
of avoiding surprise without excluding probative evidence. They could. and should,
follow a similar approach under an expanded pretrial notice rule.
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Procedure explicitly noted that the Rule "prescribe[s] the minimum
amount of discovery to which the parties are entitled. It is not
intended to limit the judge's discretion to order broader discovery in
appropriate cases."268 The Supreme Court has recognized the
inherent power of federal courts to order discovery in the absence of a
legislative mandate,269 and lower federal courts have exercised that
power in a variety of circumstances.270 Most closely on point, federal
courts have exercised that inherent power to order the government to
disclose witness lists before trial,271 even though Congress has rejected
proposals that would mandate such disclosure as a general rule.272 If
federal courts can compel pretrial identification of witnesses, then
certainly they can require identification of hearsay declarants where
witness security concerns are diminished and unfair surprise is more
likely.
Whether courts have the same inherent authority to order pretrial
disclosure of the substance of hearsay statements is more problematic.
It is arguable that the Jencks Act precludes such compelled disclosure
under the theory that the declarant is a "government witness." 273 But,
as outlined below, there are substantial reasons to dismiss the Jencks
Act as a limit on pretrial discovery of prosecution hearsay.
2. Rule 16: An Opportunity to Discover Written or Recorded
Hearsay, Or a Rule Against the Compelled Pretrial Disclosure of
Hearsay?
Aside from discovery controlled by Brady's constitutional
principles,274 Rule 16 governs most aspects of pretrial discovery in

268. Fed. R. Crim. P. 16 advisory committee's notes to 1974 amendment.
269. See, e.g., United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 231 (1975) (recognizing "the
federal judiciary's inherent power" to require discovery of witness statements). A
similar power exists in civil cases. See Weinstein et al., supra note 16, § 802.05[1 ), at
802-15 (noting that the trial judge has discretion, pursuant to Rule 16 of the Rules or
Civil Procedure, to require parties at the time of the pretrial conference to indicate
the existence of statements whose admissibility is problematic).
270. See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 936 F.2d 1508, 1515 (7th Cir. 1991)
(recognizing court's inherent authority to order pretrial disclosure of list or
government witnesses); United States v. Carrigan, 804 F.2d 599, 603 (10th Cir. 1986)
(recognizing the district court's inherent authority to order pretrial deposition of a
government witness even though Rule 15 did not authorize such a deposition).
271. See United States v. Fletcher, 74 F.3d 49, 54 (4th Cir. 1996) (recognizing
court's inherent authority to order pretrial disclosure of list of government witnesses):
Moore. 936 F.2d at 1515 (same).
272 See supra text accompanying notes 170-72.
273. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(a) (1994) ("[N]o statement or report in the possession of the
United States which was made by a Government witness or prospective Government
witness (other than the defendant) shall be the subject of subpena [sic], discovery, or
inspection until said witness has testified on direct examination in the trial of the
case.").
274. See infra text accompanying notes 333-37.
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federal prosecutions.275
Rule 16(a)-which relates to defense
discovery from the government276-gives us two, somewhat
antagonistic commands. First, Rule 16(a)(l) is a rule compelling
disclosure. It specifies five categories of information which, upon
request, the government must provide to the defense. 277 Second, Rule
16(a)(2)-which incorporates the Jencks Act278-is a rule forbidding
courts to compel disclosure. It limits the reach of the discovery rights
created in Rule 16(a)(l) by prohibiting any compelled pretrial
disclosure of the statements of government witnesses and prospective
witnesses.279 These dual commands reflect an uneasy compromise
between the drafters' efforts to permit discovery of the most critical
elements of the government's case on the one hand, and Congress'
reluctance to require pretrial discovery that would disclose the
identity and statements of government \vitnesses on the other.
Unfortunately, the drafters left us with little clue where to fit
hearsay in that compromise. Neither Rule 16, nor the Jencks Act, nor
their respective legislative histories explicitly mentions hearsay. To
understand how, or if, these rules apply to prosecution hearsay, we
must consider two questions. First, what hearsay-related information
does Rule 16(a)(l) compel the government to disclose? Second, are
hearsay declarants government "witnesses" or "prospective
witnesses" whose statements are protected from compelled pretrial

275. Defendants have no general right to learn the government's case. See
Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977).
276. Rule 16(b) provides for reciprocal discovery from the defense. See Fed. R.
Crim. P. 16(b).
277. Rule 16(a)(l) requires the government, upon request of the defendant, to
disclose: (A) statements of the defendant, (B) defendant's criminal record, (C)
documents and tangible objects material to preparation of the defense or which the
government intends to offer in evidence at trial, (D) reports of scientific examinations
and tests, and (E) a summary of expert witness testimony. See id. Ruic 16(a)(l)(A)(E).

278. 18 U.S.C. § 3500. The Jencks Act requires disclosure of a narrowly defined
category of government witness statements, but only after the witness has testified at
trial or in a pretrial proceeding. See id.
279. Rule 16(a)(2) provides:
(2) Information Not Subject to Disclosure.
Except as provided in paragraphs (A), (B), (D), and (E) of subdivision
(a){l), this rule does not authorize the discovery or inspection of reports,
memoranda, or other internal government documents made by the attorney
for the government or any other government agent investigating or
prosecuting the case. Nor does the rule authorize the discovery or
inspection of statements made by government witnesses or prospective
government witnesses except as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3500.
Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(2). Thus, the Rule contains two limits on disclosure. First, it
creates a form of government "work product" privilege, exempting internal
government reports and memoranda from discovery that Rule 16(a)(l)(C) might
otherwise require. Second, Rule 16(a)(2) makes it clear that, with respect to
government witness statements, the Jencks Act trumps any disclosure that Rule
16(a)(l) might otherwise require.
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disclosure under Rule 16(a)(2) and the Jencks Act? We will consider
these questions in turn.
a. What Hearsay-Related Information Does Rule 16(a)(l) Require to
Be Disclosed?

Of the five categories of discoverable information listed in Rule
16(a)(l), only one-Rule 16(a)(l)(A), which relates to discovery of
the defendant's own statements-has attracted much attention as a
tool for discovery of hearsay. In retrospect, that attention has proved
unfortunate because 16(a)(l)(A) is ill-suited to that task and because
litigation over 16(a)(l)(A) may have diverted attention from
potentially more fruitful arguments. Instead, Rule 16(a)(l)(C)which relates to discovery of documents and tangible objects-may
offer more promise as a device for discovering prosecution hearsay
before trial.280
I.

Rule 16(a)(l)(A)

This subsection of the Rule establishes defendant's right to pretrial
discovery of his own statements. On its face, it seems to have nothing
to do with discovery of the out-of-court statements of anyone other
than the defendant. For the first decade after the Rule took effect,
however, defendants enjoyed some success in extending the reach of
the Rule to cover an important and widely-used form of prosecution
hearsay: the out-of-court statements of defendant's co-conspirators.
Following the lead of Judge Weinstein,281 a number of courts reasoned
that, since co-conspirator statements are admissible under the hearsay
rules as "vicarious admissions" of the defendant,282 they should
likewise be treated as defendant's statements for purposes of pretrial
discovery. 283 The theory of co-conspirator statement discovery under
Rule 16(a)(l)(A), however, reached its zenith by 1985.284 Today, it
280. In requiring discovery of the basis of an expert opinion, Rule 16(a)(l)(E) also
may bring about disclosure of some prosecution hearsay. In fact, it may reveal
inadmissible hearsay which will nonetheless form the basis of the expert's opinion. See
Fed. R. Evid. 703 (expert need not base opinion on admissible evidence).
281. See United States v. Percevault, 61 F.R.D. 338 (E.D.N.Y. 1973) (Weinstein,
J.), rev'd, 490 F.2d 126 (2d Cir. 1974).
282. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E). The rule classifies co-conspirator statements
as "not hearsay." Id.
283. This breakthrough was especially significant in light of the growing number of
drug and organized crime conspiracy cases in federal courts since the 1970s. Such
cases often rely upon co-conspirator "hearsay" statements admissible under Rule
801(d)(2)(E), and discovery of such statements can be a critical step in preparing the
defense.
284. See United States v. Roberts, 793 F.2d 580, 583-86 (4th Cir. 1986) (statements
of co-conspirators discoverable under Rule 16(a)(l)(A) where co-conspirator not
expected to testify as government witness), rev'd en bane, 811 F.2d 257, 258-59 (4th
Cir. 1987); United States v. McMillen, 489 F.2d 229, 231 (7th Cir. 1972) (same);
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stands rejected after a series of appellate decisions relying on the
"plain language" of the Rule to establish that, Rule 801(d)(2)(E)
notwithstanding, co-conspirators are not "the defendant" and their
statements are not discoverable under Rule 16(a)(l)(A).w
Despite its early success, Rule 16(a)(l)(A) seems unlikely to be
resurrected as a tool for discovering co-conspirator hearsay, and
probably for good reason.286 Aside from the fact that the "vicarious
admission" theory stretches both the language and the purpose of the
Rule, the theory seems doomed for more practical reasons as well.
The government typically comes into possession of co-conspirator
statements through one of three means: either (1) a co-conspirator
makes post-arrest statements to a law enforcement agent who reports
them in a memorandum and will testify about them at trial; or (2)
during the course of criminal activity, a co-conspirator makes
statements to an undercover agent or informant who can then testify
at trial regarding the statements; or (3) the government obtains an
audio or video recording of a co-conspirator's statement in the course
of committing the crime. Regardless of one's view of the "vicarious
admission" theory, Rule 16(a)(l)(A) is either unhelpful or
unnecessary in each of these three cases. In the first case, the
vicarious admission theory does not even apply, because the postarrest statement is not made "in furtherance of the conspiracy" and,
hence, would not be admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) in any event.
In the second case, in order to disclose the co-conspirator's statement,
the government must also disclose the "statement" of a prospective
United States v. Konefal, 566 F. Supp. 698, 706 (N.D.N.Y. 1983) (same). By 1985, one
treatise noted, the view reflected in these decisions was the "more \\idely accepted
interpretation of R. 16(a)(l)(A)." See 8 Jeremy C. Moore et al., Moore's Federal
Practice CJ! 16.05[1], at 16-77 (2d ed. 1985).
In a clear example of the widening hearsay-discovery imbalance, federal courts
retreated from this rule of discovery at the same time the Supreme Court was
expanding the admissibility of co-conspirator hearsay. See Bourjaily v. United States,
483 U.S. 171, 176-81 (1987) (holding that Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a) modified
the traditional "bootstrapping" rule of Glasser \'. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 74-75
(1942), which had required independent evidence of conspiracy as a foundation for
the admission of co-conspirator statements); United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 400
(1986) (abandoning the unavailability requirement for admission of co-conspirator
hearsay under the Confrontation Clause).
285. See United States v. Rivera, 6 F3d 431, 439 (7th Cir. 1993); United States v.
Tarantino, 846 F.2d 1384, 1418 (D.C. Cir. 1988); /11 re United States, 834 F2d 283,
286-87 (2d Cir. 1987); United States v. Roberts, 811 F.2d 257, 258-59 (4th Cir. 1987)
(en bane); see also United States v. Jackson, 757 F2d 1486, 1493 (4th Cir. 1985)
(Wilkinson, J., concurring) ("To attempt, as some courts ha\'e done, to justify
discovery of the co-conspirator's statement as a 'vicarious admission' of the defendant
is to make one person out of two ...." (citations omitted)).
286. In cases where one of the defendants is an organization such as a corporation
or labor union, Rule 16(a)(l)(A) still carries some potential to provide pretrial access
to some important hearsay statements. In 1994, the Rule was amended to require the
government to disclose statements of corporate officers or agents whose words or
conduct might legally bind the defendant organization.
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government witness-the undercover agent or informant who will
relate the hearsay at trial. Such a statement of a prospective
government witness is protected from disclosure by the Jencks Act.287
Finally, the "vicarious admission" theory is unnecessary in the third
case because, as I outline below, the audio or videotape is a
"document or tangible object" discoverable under Rule 16(a)(l)(C).
ii. Rule 16(a)(l)(C)
The unsuccessful effort to bring co-conspirator statements under
Rule 16(a)(l)(A) was the defense bar's only sustained foray into
hearsay-related discovery under Rule 16. That choice seems
misguided in retrospect, not only for the reasons outlined above, but
also because Rule 16(a)(l)(C) is a rule of potentially broader
application when it comes to prosecution hearsay. Ironically, Rule
16(a)(l)(C) has been largely ignored as a device for discovering
hearsay. 288
Rule 16(a)(l)(C) gives defendants a right to discover any
"documents and tangible objects" which are "material to the
preparation of the defendant's defense" or which "are intended for
use by the government as evidence-in-chief at the trial." 289 Though
the Rule says nothing of hearsay, its language literally covers a broad
category of important hearsay frequently used by prosecutors: out-ofcourt statements which the government will offer in evidence in their
"original" written or electronically recorded form, rather than through
the testimony of a third party.290 Thus, documents and tangible
objects discoverable under Rule 16(a)(l)(C) can include some of the
most critical hearsay a defendant may face. For example, Rule
16(a)(l)(C) would include: the tape recording of a phone call between
co-conspirators discussing an upcoming transaction involving the
defendant; the medical record reflecting a child's account of sexual
abuse; a murder victim's recorded "911" call; an accomplice's
videotaped confession to police; and, more routinely, a wide variety of
business or public records documenting anything from complex
287. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(a) (1994).
288. In the many cases debating discovery of co-conspirator statements under Rule
16(a)(l)(A), most defendants appear to have ignored the alternative argument that
Rule 16(a)(l)(C) permits discovery of co-conspirator statements contained in
"documents" (other than internal government memoranda) or in "tangible objects"
such as audio tapes.
289. Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(l)(C). The Rule also applies to documents and things
which were "obtained from or belong to the defendant." Id. On occasion, such items
might contain important admissible hearsay, such as a co-conspirator's statements
recorded on defendant's answering machine or found in a letter written to the
defendant.
290. The function of the third-party witness in introducing such hearsay is to
authenticate the document or recording that contains the hearsay statements. See Fed.
R. Evid. 901.
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financial transactions to the daily weather.291 Indeed, such hearsay
can have special impact on a jury precisely because it is in writing, or
in a tangible, audible, or viewable form. 292
Of course, not every government document or tape recording is
discoverable under Rule 16(a)(l)(C) simply because it contains a
hearsay statement the government may offer at trial. Rule 16{a){2)
precludes discovery of internal government memoranda. Such a
memorandum would not become discoverable merely because it
reported hearsay.293 Likewise, the Jencks Act protects against
compelled pretrial disclosure of any statement of a witness who will
testify at trial for the government. The testifying witness's statement
does not become discoverable merely because it recites hearsay
statements of someone else. Still, the potential reach of Rule
16(a)(l)(C) as a device for discovering written or recorded hearsay is
significant; it applies typically where the government possesses the
most devastating forms of hearsay: statements written by the
declarant, or recorded from the declarant's own mouth.2'>.i
There remains, however, a potential roadblock to discovery of
hearsay under Rule 16(a)(l)(C). Hearsay statements cannot be the
subject of a pretrial discovery order if the hearsay declarant is a
291. Given the scarcity of reported decisions, it is hard to gauge how frequently
today's criminal defendants employ Rule 16(a)(l)(C) in this manner, or how often
federal courts support those efforts. Certainly prosecutors routinely disclose volumes
of documentary evidence under the Rule without giving a moment's thought to the
fact that they are really disclosing the written or reported statements of multiple,
sometimes anonymous, hearsay declarants. But whether prosecutors and courts
always view audio and video recordings of hearsay-or even some forms of written
hearsay-as discoverable under 16(a)(l)(C), is far from clear. A number of decisions
seem to assume that such recordings are "tangible objects" discoverable under
16(a)(l)(C). Throughout the co-conspirator hearsay debates under 16(a)(l)(A),
however, defendants and courts alike seemed to ignore the possibility that tape
recordings of co-conspirator statements were discoverable under an alternate theory
provided by 16(a)(l)(C).
292. An audio or videotape, for example, brings the dcclarant's voice to the jury's
ears or his image to their eyes. Jurors are more likely to remember and place
emphasis upon such statements than upon hearsay that is merely related by another
government witness.
293. If an agent testified at trial regarding hearsay he recorded in a memorandum,
however, the memorandum might then become discoverable after his direct
testimony. The agent would be a "witness called by the United States," and his prior
written statement-the memorandum-would be subject to discovery at trial under
the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500(b). See United States v. Welch, 810 F 2d 485, 490-91
(5th Cir. 1987).
294. Rule 16(a)(l)(C) can operate not only to require disclosure of documentary or
recorded hearsay, but also to provide additional discovery relating to that hearsay.
The Rule covers documents and things "material" to preparation of the defense, a
category broad enough to include any document or tangible evidence that may shed
light on the credibility of the declarant or the circumstances under which the hearsay
statement was made. Thus, a defendant may invoke Ruic 16(a)(l)(C) before trial,
first, to obtain access to written and recorded hearsay in government hands, and
second, to gather some of the ammunition that may assist in impeaching a hearsay
declarant or discrediting a hearsay statement.
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"government witness" under the Jencks Act. To that question we
turn next.
b. Are Hearsay Declarants "Witnesses" or "Prospective Witnesses"
Whose Statements are Protected by Rule 16(a)(2) and the Jencks
Act from Compelled Pretrial Disclosure?

We often think of the Jencks Act as a rule of discovery. It functions
that way at trial. After a government witness has testified on direct
examination at trial, the Jencks Act requires the government, upon
defendant's request, to produce a narrowly defined category of the
witness's prior statements.295
In the first instance, however, the Jencks Act is a rule against
compelled discovery. The first sentence of the Jencks Act provides:
In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States, no
statement or report in the possession of the United States which was
made by a Government witness or prospective Government witness
(other than the defendant) shall be the subject of subpena [sic],
discovery, or inspection until said witness has testified on direct
examination in the trial of the case.296

Rule 16(a)(2) makes it clear that, as a rule against compelled
pretrial discovery, the Jencks Act trumps any provision in Rule
16(a)(l) that might otherwise require pretrial disclosure of
government witness statements.297 To determine whether Rule 16
creates any right to discover hearsay before trial, therefore, we must
first determine whether the hearsay declarant is a "Government
witness or prospective Government witness" under the Jencks Act. If
295. The Jencks Act states:
After a witness called by the United States has testified on direct
examination, the court shall, on motion of the defendant, order the United
States to produce any statement (as hereinafter defined) of the witness in
the possession of the United States which relates to the subject matter as to
which the witness has testified.
18 u.s.c. § 3500(b).
Under the Jencks Act, a "statement" is: (1) a written statement made by the witness:
(2) "a stenographic, mechanical, electrical or other recording;" or (3) a grand jury
transcript. 18 U.S.C. § 3500{d). The notes or memoranda of an agent or attorney
reporting the substance of an interview with a witness are not "statements" of the
witness under the Jencks Act unless the notes or memoranda are shown to the witness
and "signed or otherwise adopted or approved" by her. See United States v.
Roseboro, 87 F.3d 642, 645-46 (4th Cir. 1996) (defendant not entitled to discover
agent's notes where agent did not read them in their entirety to witness and ask
witness to approve them); United States v. Ramos, 27 F.3d 65, 69-70 (3d Cir. 1994)
{defendant not entitled to discover agent's notes which were neither verbatim recital
of interview nor writings signed or approved by witness).
296. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(a).
297. Rule 16(a)(2) provides: "Nor does [Rule 16] authorize the discovery or
inspection of statements made by government witnesses or prospective government
witnesses except as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3500." Fed. R. Crim. P. 16{a){2).
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she is a witness, then her hearsay statements are not discoverable until
trial. If she is not, then-as we explored in the previous sectionRule 16(a)(l)(C) may authorize discovery of a \vide range of
documentary and electronically recorded hearsay and related
information.298
At the outset, we can set aside one category of declarant from all
the others. The declarant whom the government expects to call at
trial is obviously a "prospective Government witness" as described in
the Jencks Act. The clear language of the Jencks Act prohibits
compelled pretrial disclosure of her statements. But what of the more
typical hearsay declarant-the one who is never expected to testify at
trial?
There are more than a few reasonable arguments for treating
nontestifying declarants as "witnesses" under the Jencks Act. We
might begin with a textual argument. After all, the word "witness," in
its broadest sense, simply means someone who sees, hears, or
perceives an event. Hearsay declarants certainly fit that definition.
Functionally, hearsay declarants fit an even narrower definition of the
term "witness." The government uses hearsay declarants, like other
"witnesses," to relate information to the jury. Hearsay declarants
simply do so indirectly through the words of a testifying witness or
through a writing or recording.
There is more to the textual argument. The Jencks Act restricts
discovery regarding government witnesses "other than the
defendant." But the Fifth Amendment prohibits the government
from calling the defendant as a prosecution \vitness. 299 He could only
be a "government witness," therefore, through the admission in
evidence of his earlier hearsay statements. If hearsay declarants are
not "witnesses" under the Jencks Act, one could argue, there would
be no need to include the phrase "other than the defendant" in its
text. To avoid treating that phrase as meaningless surplusage, the
textualist might argue, hearsay declarants must be "witnesses."
We could turn next to judicial interpretation of the Rule. In an en
bane ruling on discovery of co-conspirator statements, the Fourth
Circuit embraced a government argument that discovery was
precluded under Rule 16(a)(2) and the Jencks Act.300 The court found
that even nontestifying co-conspirator declarants should be treated
like testifying "government \vitnesses" under the Jencks Act. Its
decision rested on a broad view of the "witness safety" purposes
which gave rise to the Jencks Act. The Fourth Circuit majority argued
that treating declarants as "witnesses" under the Jencks Act comports
with the congressional purpose of protecting from pretrial harassment
298. See supra text accompanying notes 289-94.
299. See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971) (stating that criminal
defendants have an unqualified right not to testify).
300. See United States v. Roberts, 811 F.2d 257, 258-59 (4th Cir. 1987) (en bane).
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or intimidation those who provide information which the government
needs to prove its case.301 That approach, the court noted, also
provides an added measure of protection for those testifying witnesses
who must relate spoken hearsay at trial, since disclosure of hearsay
could likewise disclose the identity of the testifying witness and the
information he provided to the government.302 The Fourth Circuit
does not stand alone. The Second Circuit likewise has applied the
Jencks Act to overturn a pretrial order compelling the government to
disclose statements of nontestifying co-conspirators.303
There is also an attractive constitutional basis for treating hearsay
declarants as "witnesses" under the Jencks Act. In applying the
Confrontation Clause to hearsay, the Supreme Court has explicitly
stated that the hearsay declarant is a "witness against" the accused for
Sixth Amendment purposes.304 Congress passed the Jencks Act in
part to implement the Court's ruling in Jencks v. United States,305 a
decision which-though not explicitly based on constitutional
principle-was clearly driven by Confrontation Clause concerns.306 If
the Jencks Act, at least indirectly, is a child of the Confrontation
Clause, then it makes sense to interpret the key term in the Jencks
Act just as we interpret the same term in the Sixth Amendment.
Following that reasoning, the declarant is a "witness" under both the
Confrontation Clause and the Jencks Act.307
301. See id. at 259 ("The phrase 'witness safety' incorporates our concerns about
those persons whose inculpatory statements may be introduced at trial. The
dichotomy the dissent would have us draw between declarants and witnesses is utterly
unrealistic.").
302. See id.
303. See In re United States, 834 F.2d 283, 287 (2d Cir. 1987). At least one district
court within the Second Circuit, however, contends that In re United States does not
reach so far. See United States v. Murgas, 967 F. Supp. 695, 715 (N.D.N.Y. 1997)
("The Jencks Act has no application to the statements of those other than actual or
prospective government witnesses. It does not expressly prohibit the pretrial crossdisclosure of nonwitness coconspirator codefendant statements.
Indeed, that
particular issue could not have even been before the Second Circuit in In re United
States.").
304. See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 352 (1992). For a more detailed discussion
of the status of declarants as "witnesses" under the Confrontation Clause, sec
Douglass, supra note 6, at 225-26; supra note 44.
305. 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
306. See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 68 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
("Jencks was based on our supervisory authority rather than the Constitution, 'but it
would be idle to say that the commands of the Constitution were not close to the
surface of the decision."' (quoting Palemo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 362-63
{1959) (Brennan, J., concurring))).
307. In a previous article, I suggested that the Court's treatment of declarants as
"witnesses" under the Confrontation Clause called for similar treatment under the
Jencks Act:
The Jencks Act provides for the discovery of the witness's statements
"[a]fter a witness called by the United States has testified on direct
examination." For Confrontation Clause purposes at least, the Court tells us
that a hearsay declarant is a "witness against" an accused. The hearsay
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Finally, treating declarants as "witnesses" under the Jencks Act fits
neatly with their treatment under Rule 806 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence. Rule 806 provides that the opponent may attack the
declarant's credibility with any evidence that would be admissible for
that purpose if the declarant testified in person.:>as When a
government \vitness testifies at trial, the Jencks Act requires the
government to disclose prior statements by the witness on the same
subject matter.309 Such "Jencks material" often forms the grist for
defendant's cross-examination. If Jencks applies to declarants just as
to testifying \vitnesses, then it likewise requires production of the
declarant's other relevant statements once hearsay is admitted in
evidence. Rule 806 then permits defendant to use those statements to
impeach the declarant just as he might use them in impeaching a
testifying \vitness.
Despite this array of arguments, however, serious difficulties arise if
we recognize the declarant as a "witness" under the Jencks Act. For
one thing, we would put the Jencks Act and Rule 807 at odds. Rule
807 compels the government to disclose residual hearsay statements
before trial. But if the declarant is a "government witness," then the
Jencks Act forbids courts to compel the same disclosure that Rule 807
requires. The easy answer to that conflict may be that Rule 807,
enacted years after the Jencks Act, is simply an exception to Jencks'
general rule against compelled disclosure. Pretrial disclosure of
residual hearsay is especially important, one might argue, so the
exception makes sense.
But an even larger problem looms if nontestifying hearsay
declarants are ''\vitnesses" under the Jencks Act. Business records,
public records, and other documents routinely disclosed by the
government during pretrial discovery are chock full of assertions by
declarants who \vill never testify. If such declarants are government
witnesses covered by the Jencks Act, then no court could compel
declarant's "testimony," in the form of hearsay, is offered in evidence in the
As an exercise in interpreting statutory
government's case-in-chief.
language, then, it takes no large leap to conclude that a declarant is a
"witness called by the United States" under the Jencks Act and that she has
in effect "testified on direct examination" once the government has
introduced her hearsay statements.
Douglass, supra note 6, at 265-66.
While I continue to believe that a defendant's right to discover statements of
government "witnesses" should extend to statements of hearsay declarants, I am now
convinced that application of the Jencks Act to hearsay is far more complex than I
originally believed. As I outline below, see infra text accompanying notes 309-18,
there are perhaps equally persuasive arguments that at least some hearsay declarants
should not be treated as "witnesses" under the Jencks Act. Of course, since the
Jencks Act is a two-edged sword-requiring discovery at trial, but prohibiting pretrial
discovery of witness statements-neither interpretation offers an unqualified
opportunity to expand the range of hearsay-related discovery.
308. See Fed. R. Evid. 806.
309. See 18 U.S.C. § 3500(b) (1994).
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production of such documents before trial under Rule 16(a)(l)(C).
The absurdity of such a rule would be immediately apparent to any
prosecutor or defense attorney who has ever tried a white-collar case,
a money-laundering charge, an organized crime matter, or any other
case where the government's proof includes a volume of significant
documentary evidence. Of course, if all hearsay declarants are
"witnesses" under the Jencks Act, then defendant has no right to
pretrial discovery of the recorded 911 phone call of a victim, the
videotaped post-arrest "statement against interest" of an accomplice,
the medical record reflecting the child-victim's account of sexual
abuse, or the tape-recorded phone call between his co-conspirators,
even where the government expects to offer those very items in
evidence at trial. It is hard to imagine that Congress expected the
Jencks Act to gut Rule 16(a)(l)(C) so severely.
The "witness safety" rationale which led the Fourth and Second
Circuits to extend Jencks protection to hearsay declarants is also open
to question. Certainly, there are plenty of hearsay declarants for
whom safety, intimidation, and witness tampering poses no concern at
all. Some declarants are dead, some are inaccessible, and some are
even anonymous. Moreover, unlike trial testimony, the content of
hearsay is fixed before trial. No amount of tampering with the
declarant will change the statement. Of course, tampering with a
witness who might recount the declarant's out-of-court statement
remains a problem. But, in most cases of written or recorded hearsay,
there is no such witness. The jury gets the hearsay straight from the
mouth-or the pen-of the absent declarant.310 Using the Jencks Act
to prevent pretrial disclosure of hearsay in every case seems like
exploding a bomb to kill a mosquito. It may hit the desired target, but
the residual damage is hard to justify.311
Finally, when it comes to judicial authority, there is precedent
conflicting with the views of the Second and Fourth Circuits, but in a
different context. In United States v. Williams-Davis, 312 the District of
Columbia Circuit ruled on the defendant's request at trial for
disclosure of Jencks material of a nontestifying hearsay declarant after
the government introduced the hearsay in evidence. 313 The court held
310. One could theorize a "witness safety" concern for the witness whose testimony
might be necessary to authenticate written or recorded hearsay. But such an
argument seems far-fetched.
311. It is worth observing that Rule 807 of the Federal Rules of Evidence requires
pretrial disclosure of the substance of hearsay, along with the name and address of the
declarant. Yet Congress incorporated that notice requirement in the residual hearsay
exceptions with no apparent fear for "declarant safety." There is no evidence that
hearsay disclosure under the Rule has led to harassment of declarants. And if a
particular case gave rise to realistic safety concerns, courts certainly have the power to
delay disclosure.
312. 90 F.3d 490 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
313. See id. at 512-13.
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that the declarant was not a "witness" under the Jencks Act and,
accordingly, the Jencks Act created no right to discover the
declarant's prior statements.314 Reciting the arguments for and against
treatment of the declarant as a "witness" under the Jencks Act,
however, is easier than resolving the issue. Still, a few observations
may point toward solutions. First, judicial interpretation of the Act
has been inconsistent, and that inconsistency is unfair to defendants.
When defendants have sought pretrial discovery, courts have shielded
hearsay from disclosure by ruling that declarants are "witnesses"
under the Jencks Act.315 When defendants have sought discovery at
trial, courts have denied discovery on the grounds that declarants are
not witnesses.316 In other words, "Heads, I win. Tails, you lose."
Obviously, the government cannot have it both ways. At a minimum,
defendants should be entitled to (1) discovery of written and recorded
hearsay before trial \vith no restriction imposed by the Jencks Act, or
(2) discovery at trial of all relevant prior statements of the declarant,
after hearsay has been received in evidence. Either result, applied
consistently, would improve the current state of affairs.
Second, it is at least worth considering whether a middle-ground
might avoid some of the disadvantages of either interpretation of the
Jencks Act. One could support an argument that some nontestifying
declarants are "\vitnesses" under the Jencks Act, while others are not.
In the Jencks Act, the word "Government" prominently precedes the
word ''\vitness." An observer of an event, one might argue, only
becomes a "Government \vitness" when she testifies at triaP 17 or a
"prospective Government \vitness" when she reports her observations
to the authorities for the purpose of using the information in a

314. See id. at 513 ("[T]hat a declarant is treated as a witness for purposes of Rule
801(d)(2)(E) or Rule 806 does not mean he becomes one for purposes of the Jencks
Act."). At least one federal district court has reached the same conclusion. See
United States v. Padilla, No. Sl-94-CR-313-CSH, 1996 WL 389300, at 0 2 (S.D.N.Y.
July 11, 1996).
315. See In re United States, 834 F.2d 283, 286-87 (2d Cir. 1987); United States v.
Roberts, 811F.2d257, 259 (4th Cir. 1987) (en bane).
316. See Williams-Davis, 90 F.3d at 512-13; Padil/a, 1996 WL389300, at OZ.
317. In the Confrontation Clause context, Justice Scalia made a similar argument:
The Sixth Amendment does not literally contain a prohibition upon
[hearsay], since it guarantees the defendant only the right to confront "the
witnesses against him." As applied in the Sixth Amendment's context of a
prosecution, the noun "witness"-in 1791 as today-could mean either (a)
one "who knows or sees any thing; one personally present" or (b) "one who
gives testimony" or who "testifies," i.e., "[i]n judicial proceeciings, (one who)
make[s] a solemn declaration under oath, for the purpose of establishing or
making proof of some fact to a court." The former meaning (one "who
knows or sees") would cover hearsay evidence, but is excluded in the Sixth
Amendment by the words following the noun: "witnesses against him." The
phrase obviously refers to those who give testimony against the defendant at
trial.
Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 864 (1990) (Scalia. J., dissenting).
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prosecution.318 Hearsay statements made under other circumstances
by someone who will never testify in court-like the "statements" of a
payroll clerk compiling a business record, a co-conspirator's phone
call to order the next shipment of heroin, or even the frightened 911
call of an assault victim seeking aid-are not the statements of a
"Government witness" under this view, even though the government
might later choose to offer them in evidence in a criminal trial. A
sworn statement to police or a videotaped interrogation of an
accomplice, on the other hand, would be the statement of a
"Government witness" even though the declarant never appeared in
the courtroom.
There are several virtues to this middle-ground approach. First, it
gives defendant pretrial access under Rule 16(a)(l)(C) to written or
recorded hearsay which the government will put in evidence in its
original form, except where the declarant made the statement in an
interview with police or prosecutors. And statements to authorities in
connection with prosecution are seldom admissible in any event,3 19
except where the government relies on the residual exception.320 In
those cases, Rule 807 would provide an independent avenue for
pretrial discovery. 321 Second, at trial this approach would provide
discovery of Jencks material in cases where the government succeeded
in introducing grand jury testimony of an unavailable declarant, postarrest statements of an accomplice, or a victim's statement identifying
her assailant to police. These and similar cases of hearsay created
during criminal investigation are often the ones where impeaching a
hearsay declarant is most important and where access to Jencks
material is, therefore, most critical.322 On the other hand, this middle318. At least one circuit has concluded that persons interviewed by government
agents are "prospective Government witnesses" under the Jencks Act even if the
government decides not to call them as witnesses. See United States v. Mills, 810 F.2d
907, 910 (9th Cir. 1987). Logically, those same interviewees would remain
"prospective Government witnesses" if the government intended to present their
"testimony" in the form of hearsay through the mouth of the interviewing agent.
319. See, e.g., Lilly v. Virginia, 119 S. Ct. 1887, 1901 (1999) (finding an accomplice's
post-arrest confession not admissible under Confrontation Clause); Williamson v.
United States, 512 U.S. 594, 600-01 (1994) (holding that only "genuinely selfinculpatory" portions of accomplice's post-arrest statement may be admitted under
hearsay exception for statements against interest).
320. The many federal cases admitting grand jury testimony would fall in this
category. See supra text accompanying notes 99-101.
321. The Rule 807 pretrial notice requirement would have to be viewed as an
exception to the Jencks Act's prohibition on pretrial disclosure of statements of
government witnesses. No other interpretation of the Rule, however, would make
sense. Otherwise, Rule 807 and the Jencks Act would be hopelessly contradictory.
See supra text accompanying notes 309-10.
322. As a general rule, these are the cases where the credibility and consistency of
the declarant, rather than the circumstances giving rise to the statement, are our
principal concern in assessing the accuracy of the statement. Hearsay created during
the adversarial process of criminal investigation often carries the greatest dangers of
unreliability. See, e.g., Lilly, 119 S. Ct. at 1905 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (noting
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ground approach would not require production of Jencks material
relating to a business record or a co-conspirator statement-forms of
hearsay which are viewed as reliable more because of the context in
which they are made than because of the credibility of the declarant.m
Finally, this approach to the "witness" dilemma may be most
consistent with the \vitness-security aims of the Jencks Act. It
provides comfort to witnesses approached by police investigators, and
thereby encourages cooperation with authorities. But it does not
preclude disclosure when the statement is made without regard to any
criminal investigation.324
Admittedly, neither the "pick one" nor the middle ground solution
to the declarant-as-\vitness dilemma is fully satisfactory.m A better
solution would be to change the rules and eliminate the problem. The
complexity of this issue, evidenced by the inconsistent judicial
approaches, cries out for a legislative or rulemaking "clean up." The
present muddle exists because rulemakers really gave no thought to
hearsay when they wrote the discovery rules, and gave little thought
to discovery when they wrote the hearsay rules:~ZL> A coordinated
approach makes more sense.
that "accusatory statements taken by law enforcement personnel with a view to
prosecution" raise more serious reliability concerns than similar statements made to
friends or family members outside of an investigative context); cf. Berger. supra note
28, at 561-62 (arguing that concerns over police power to manipulate evidence
obtained through ex parte investigation was a principal concern underlying the right
of confrontation).
323. See United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 395 (1986) (noting that coconspirator's in-court testimony "seldom will reproduce ... the evidentiary value of
his statements during the course of the conspiracy").
324. Of course, declarants whose statements merely found their way into police
hands would not be without protection. Courts. in their discretion, can always delay
disclosure in the face of real security concerns.
325. One problem with any middle-ground approach is that it adds a layer of
complexity. It would require a court lo determine if a statement was made in an
investigative setting before deciding whether the Jencks Act applied. A rule applying
consistently to all declarants would be simpler to administer.
There is another possible approach that would preserve both defendant's right to
discover documentary hearsay under 16(a)(l)(C) and also his right to obtain the
equivalent of "Jencks material" after a hearsay declarant testified at trial. Courts
might adopt the view that a nontestifying declaranl is not a .. ,,itness" for Jencks Act
purposes, thereby freeing Rule 16(a)(l}(C) discovery of written or recorded hearsay
from the impediments the Jencks Act would otherwise impose. Under this approach,
the Jencks Act itself would create no right to "Jencks material" regarding the
declarant even after the hearsay was introduced in evidence. Nevertheless, one might
argue that the Confrontation Clause creates such a right, especially where the
declarant's prior statements are essential to effective impeachment of the hearsay
statements. See Douglass. supra note 6, at 267-68 (suggesting that Confrontation
Clause creates right to discover prior statements of hearsay declarants); cf.
Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39. 61-62 (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring)
("[T]here might well be a confrontation violation if ... a defendant is denied pretrial
access to information that would make possible effective cross-examination of a
crucial prosecution \vitness. ").
326. To add to the muddle. declarants-as "witnesses"-are not exactly fish and
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The simplest step would be to amend Rule 16 by providing that
nothing in subsection (a) of the Jencks Act would preclude pretrial
discovery of any hearsay statement which the government will offer in
evidence at trial.327 Such a rule would at least remove the Jencks Act
as an impediment to discovery of written and recorded hearsay under
Rule 16(a)(l)(C) and would explicitly harmonize the Jencks Act with
Rule 807 and any future hearsay-notice provisions that Congress
might approve. 328 A helpful second step would be to amend
subsection (b) of the Jencks Act to make it clear that, once hearsay is
offered in evidence, the defendant is entitled to see any other
statements the declarant may have made on the same subject matter.
Without such a right, the defendant's opportunities for contesting
hearsay under Rule 806 would be substantially diminished.
Amendments such as these would allow defendants to see and hear
before trial the same written or recorded hearsay that the government
expected the jury to hear. At trial, they would give the defendant the
same basic tools to contest hearsay that the Jencks Act provides when
a government witness testifies. Perhaps most important, they would
bring predictable rules to a difficult area where, so far, judicial
inconsistency has added to the hearsay-discovery imbalance that
already plagues criminal cases.
B.

Discovering Ammunition to Impeach the Hearsay Declarant

Learning what hearsay "fastballs" the government may throw is
only the first step in contesting prosecution hearsay. The next step is
gathering ammunition that will help to impeach the declarant's story.
In the case of a testifying government witness, much of the
ammunition a defendant needs for impeachment rests in government
files. During investigation, the government may have assembled a
substantial volume of information about key government witnesses.
Often, the prosecutor's file will contain notes and memoranda of
interviews, transcripts of grand jury testimony, written statements and
documents, or correspondence authored by the witness. In the case of
cooperating or immunized witnesses, the government will have the
agreements reflecting any benefits available to the witness as a result
not exactly fowl. They function like witnesses. But only on limited occasion do they
pose the same witness-security concerns as testifying witnesses.
327. Alternatively, an even more cautious approach would provide that nothing in
subsection (a) of the Jencks Act would preclude pretrial discovery of any statement of
a nontestifying declarant which the government expected to offer in evidence at trial.
This approach would give testifying declarants the same protection as other witnesses.
328. A broader approach would be to repeal subsection (a) of the Jencks Act
altogether. That would at least allow federal courts, in their discretion, to order
pretrial discovery of witness statements in those circumstances where witness security
was not a significant concern. Of course, that solution takes us well beyond hearsay,
and into the broader debate about federal discovery reform generally. See generally
Brennan, A Progress Report, supra note 13, at 11-14.
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of her testimony. Police records will report the witness's prior arrests
and convictions. Presentence reports often will contain unsavory
details of the witness's past.
Government agents may have
memorialized statements of one witness that undercut the credibility
of another.
In many cases, especially where hearsay is crucial to the
prosecution's case, government files will offer a source of
impeachment material for hearsay declarants no less fertile than that
available for testifying witnesses.329 The most obvious example would
be the now-unavailable declarant whose former testimony the
government plans to offer under Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(l)
or Rule 807. In an earlier proceeding-perhaps at a preliminary
hearing, before a grand jury, or even in an earlier trial-the
government already examined that witness.
As a result, the
government's files are likely to include the kinds of information
assembled for any other testifying \vitness. Co-conspirator hearsay,330
a staple of modern federal prosecutions, comes from a class of
declarants-usually the defendant's confederates in crime-in whom
the government obviously has an investigative interest, and about
whom it is likely to have obtained considerable, often unflattering
information. Young child-abuse victims, whose stories often emerge
at trial through the mouths of others, quite often will have been
interviewed by police, physicians, or counselors. The records of those
contacts may prove critical in assessing the credibility of child
declarants. In all of these instances, and more, government files may
contain a raft of raw material useful for impeachment of the hearsay
declarant.
Federal criminal defendants have three basic tools for discovering
ammunition to impeach government witnesses. First, Brady v.
Maryland3 31 creates a constitutional right to discovery of exculpatory
evidence.
Second, Rule 16(a)(l)(C) allows for discovery of
documents and tangible items that may serve to impeach a witness.
Third, once a \vitness testifies at trial, the Jencks Act requires the
government to disclose all relevant written or recorded statements of
the \vitness.332 Properly applied, these same three tools can provide a
defendant a fair opportunity to impeach prosecution hearsay.

329. In other instances. of course, the government is likely to have assembled a
much slimmer record-if any at all-regarding hearsay declarants whose statements it
will offer at trial in the form of hearsay. After all, investigating agents arc unlikely to
devote significant effort to compiling dossiers on individual payroll clerks whose
collective input creates a report admissible at trial under the business records
exception to the hearsay rule.
330. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E).
331. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
332 See 18 U.S.C. § 3500(b) (1994).
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Applying Brady and Giglio to Hearsay

The Due Process Clause creates limited rights to discover
exculpatory material.333
In Brady, the Court held that "the
suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused
upon request violates due process where the evidence is material
either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad
faith of the prosecution."334 A decade later, in Giglio v. United
States,335 the Court extended Brady to evidence which undermined the
credibility of a government witness. Brady and Giglio establish the
right to discover a significant variety of information critical to the
cross-examination of government witnesses.336 For example, courts
have found Brady violations in the nondisclosure of benefits offered
to a witness in exchange for testimony, a witness's prior criminal
convictions, "bad acts," or inconsistent statements.337
333. Aside from the basic Sixth Amendment right of an accused to "be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation," see U.S. Const. amend VI, the Constitution
does not address criminal discovery rights. Perhaps not surprisingly, then, the Court
has made it clear that defendants have no comprehensive constitutional right to learn
the government's evidence before trial. See Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559
(1977).
334. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
335. 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
336. Although Brady is typically regarded as a tool of pretrial discovery, it is not a
rule of fixed time limits. Belated Brady disclosures seldom lead to reversal of
convictions, as long as the information becomes available in time for defendant to use
it at trial. Moreover, the Jencks Act, which prohibits discovery of a government
witness's "statements" until after the witness has testified on direct examination. can
preclude pretrial discovery of the witness's prior inconsistent statements absent
government agreement to earlier disclosure. See United States v. Trevino, 89 F.3d
187, 189 n.2 (4th Cir. 1996); United States v. Lewis, 35 F.3d 148, 151 (4th Cir. 1994).
337. See, e.g., East v. Scott, 55 F.3d 996, 1004 (5th Cir. 1995) (requiring disclosure
of a witness's criminal history); United States v. Kelly, 35 F.3d 929, 936-37 (4th Cir.
1994) (requiring disclosure of witness's suspicious banking activity and cult
membership); Jacobs v. Singletary, 952 F.2d 1282, 1287-89 (11th Cir. 1992) (requiring
disclosure of witness's prior inconsistent statements); United States v. Kiszewski, 877
F.2d 210, 215-16 (2d Cir. 1989) (requiring disclosure of agent-witness's personnel file
containing allegations of professional misconduct).
Still, Brady is far from a rule requiring pretrial disclosure of all information useful
to defense counsel in preparing to cross-examine government witnesses. It falls short
of that mark in at least two important respects. First, since the Brady rule applies
only to "exculpatory" information and not to incriminating or merely neutral
information, Brady does not protect a defendant against inculpatory surprisesagainst government "land mines." Brady discovery alone, then, provides defense
counsel incomplete information in making the important tactical choices of which
lines of questioning to pursue, or even whether to cross-examine a given witness at all.
Second, although Brady generally requires disclosure of a government witness's prior
inconsistent statements, without access to the full record of all the witness's prior
statements the defendant may miss important opportunities for impeachment by
omission or subtle change in emphasis. See Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 667
(1957).
Flat contradiction between the witness's testimony and the version of events
given in his reports is not the only test of inconsistency. The omission from
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Brady and Giglio should apply just as readily where the "witness"
to be impeached is a hearsay declarant, even though she may never
appear in person at trial. 338 Information is discoverable under Brady
where it is both "favorable to an accused" and "material."
Undisclosed evidence is "material" under Brady where there is "a
reasonable probability that its disclosure would have produced a
different result."339 Information impeaching a hearsay declarant can
fit comfortably \vithin that formula. First, incriminating hearsay, just
like the testimony of a live government witness, can lead a jury to
convict. Accordingly, evidence impeaching that declarant is just as
"favorable" as evidence impeaching a live witness.
And, in
appropriate cases, evidence impeaching a hearsay declarant will meet
the Brady standard of "materiality." Although hearsay is "second
hand" testimony, it is not always "second rate." It is not hard to find
cases where an absent hearsay declarant is the government's star
witness.340 While it is probably true that juries tend to discount
hearsay in comparison to live testimony.~' that tendency makes it no
the reports of facts related at the trial, or a contrast in emphasis upon the
same facts, even a different order of treatment, are also relevant to the crossexamining process of testing the credibility of a witness's trial testimony.
Id.
338. Surprisingly, there are only a small handful of reported cases applying Brady
principles to discovery aimed at impeachment of hearsay declarants. See, e.g., United
States v. Williams-Davis, 90 F.3d 490, 513-14 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (finding that the
requested material was not in fact favorable to the defense); United States v.
Hawryluk, 658 F. Supp. 112, 116-17 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (granting defendant's request for
production of documents in part). But there seems to be no controversy over the
notion that Brady applies to information impeaching hearsay declarants, just as it
applies to impeachment material for testifying witnesses. Both \Vi/Iiams-Davis and
Hawryluk readily reach that conclusion.
339. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 422 (1995). That "reasonable probability," the
Court tells us, arises "when the government's evidentiary suppression 'undermines
confidence in the outcome of the trial."' Id. at 434 (quoting United States \'. Bagley,
473 U.S. 667, 678 (1985)). If the undisclosed evidence relates solely to impeachment
of a government witness, then it is "material" only when there is (1) a reasonable
probability that it would affect the jury's assessment of the witness's credibility, and
(2) a reasonable probability that the witness's testimony would affect the outcome of
the trial. Nondisclosure of powerfully impeaching evidence may not constitute a
Brady violation where it relates to the credibility of a witness whose testimony is
insignificant or merely cumulative. Similarly, nondisclosure of evidence relating to a
crucial government witness may not violate Brady where its impeachment value is
limited, or where the defendant had other, equally effective means of impeaching the
witness.
340. See, e.g., Lilly v. Virginia, 119 S. Ct. 1887 (1999) (declarant is defendant's
brother and accomplice in robbery-murder): White v. Illinois. 502 U.S. 346, 349-50
(1992) (young child, alleged victim of abuse, is hearsay declarant): Idaho v. Wright,
497 U.S. 805, 809 (1990) (same); Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 142 (1892)
(declarants are two key \vitnesses in murder case).
341. See Margaret Bull Kovera et al., Jurors' Perceptions of Eyewimess and
Hearsay Evidence, 76 Minn. L. Rev. 703, 719-22 (1992) (concluding that jurors rely
more heavily on eyewitness testimony than on hearsay); Peter Miene ct al., Juror
Decision Making and the Eva/11atio11 of Hearsay Evide11ce, 76 Minn. L. Rev. 683, 688-
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less likely that information impeaching a hearsay declarant will satisfy
the Brady standard of materiality. Impeaching evidence which
provides the "last straw" which would cause the jury to reject entirely
the already-discounted story of a hearsay declarant is no less material
than evidence which might raise the first glimmer of doubt about an
otherwise unimpeached witness who testifies in person.
Moreover, treating declarants as witnesses for Brady-Giglio
purposes is consistent with the Supreme Court's treatment of hearsay
declarants under the Confrontation Clause. The Court insists that the
hearsay declarant is a "witness against" an accused within the
meaning of the Sixth Amendment. 342 It would make little sense to
ignore the declarant's role as "witness" in applying discovery
principles under the Due Process Clause.
While it seems clear as a general notion that Brady applies with
equal force to information which may impeach a hearsay declarant,
hearsay does present some special considerations in applying the
Brady materiality standards. Three important differences come to
mind. The first, and most obvious, is a matter of timing. Consider, for
example, the classic method of impeachment designed to demonstrate
bias or self-interest of the witness. The cross-examiner may confront
the witness with her plea agreement, demonstrating that she has
bargained for a sentence reduction in exchange for testimony.
Implicitly at least, counsel's questions will suggest that the witness has
shaded her story to please the government in an effort to win a more
favorable sentencing recommendation. The plea agreement is
significant, and its nondisclosure may violate Brady, because it relates
to the witness's self-interest at the time she testifies. By contrast, a
hearsay declarant "testifies" before trial, at the time she utters the
hearsay statement. To be "material" for Brady purposes, impeaching
information relating to self-interest must reflect the declarant's
motivation at the time she made the hearsay statement. Thus, for
example, if the hearsay consists of the recorded statements of a coconspirator declarant during the course of the conspiracy, a plea
agreement signed following arrest weeks later is not "material" under
Brady, though that same agreement may well be material if the same
declarant had made the same statements as a testifying witness at
trial. 343
92, 699 (1992) (concluding that jurors discounted hearsay in comparison to other
evidence).
342. See White, 502 U.S. at 353.
343. Bowman v. Gammon, 85 F.3d 1339 (8th Cir. 1996), offers a straightforward
example of this timing issue. There, the state's principal witness, Anthony Lytle,
initially offered testimony on direct examination that failed to implicate Bowman in
the charged murder. The state then introduced the text of a prior inconsistent
statement, given by Lytle to the police, in which he claimed to have seen Bowman
stab the victim to death. In his live testimony, Lytle said his hearsay statement was a
lie, induced by police mistreatment. On federal habeas corpus review, Bowman
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A second special consideration in applying Brady materiality
concepts to hearsay can arise from the context in which the declarant
utters the hearsay statement. Some hearsay consists of former
testimony in a judicial proceeding. But most hearsay arises from a
context quite different from the courtroom. That difference can
matter when we attempt to assess the impeachment value-and
therefore the "materiality" under Brady-of some types of evidence
relating to the hearsay declarant. When the patient tells the doctor
"where it hurts," for example, we expect the patient to reply truthfully
out of pure self-interest.344 An oath and cross-examination hardly
seem necessary.345 It is the context that lends credibility to the
claimed a Brady violation when the government failed to disclose an alleged "secret
deal" which provided sentencing benefits to Lytle. The district court found that there
was such a deal and that it had not been disclosed before trial. Normally. of course,
nondisclosure of a government "deal" with a significant prosecution witness would be
a classic Brady violation. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). But on
these facts, the district court found no Brady violation and the Eighth Circuit
affirmed. The critical fact was the timing of the "deal" in relation to the hearsay
statement. The deal was struck sometime after Lytle made the hearsay statement
implicating Bowman in the murder. The deal could not have motivated Lytle to lie in
his earlier statement. The undisclosed deal, therefore, was not "material" under
Brady. See Bowman, 85 F.3d at 1343-44; see also lVilliams-Dm·is, 90 F.3d at 514
("Many of [the declarant's] statements introduced at trial were recorded as he and
others went about committing the crimes, and it seems improbable that these would
be vulnerable to impeachment. All the statements of his that were admitted were
made before his arrest, so that they could not have been affected by his later plea
agreement." (emphasis omitted).
Other methods of impeaching a hearsay declarant may not raise such concerns
about timing. In cases of impeachment by inconsistent statement, for example, it may
not matter whether the declarant uttered the inconsistent version before or after
making the statement which the government offers in evidence at trial. The
declarant's change of story, at either time, could affect the jury's view of her
credibility. The same analysis might apply to the declarant's criminal convictions or
"bad acts." Though the conviction or the act might occur after the declarant made
the hearsay statement, they still might be probative of an untrustworthiness that
would affect the jury's assessment of the declarant's credibility.
344. See Fed. R Evid 803(4) advisory committee's note.
345. In the courtroom, we rely on three basic conditions to promote reliable
testimony, or at least to permit the jury to detect unreliable testimony. First, the
witness testifies under oath, a process which, in theory at least, both "induce[s) in the
witness a feeling of special obligation to speak the truth," McCormick Hornbook,
supra note 2, at 426, and subtly reminds her of the legal sanction of a perjury
conviction for lying. Second, the witness faces both the accused and the jury. in
person, when she testifies. Personal presence serves both to chasten the \\itness-it is
harder to lie before an audience, and especially to lie "to the face" of the subject of
the falsehood-and to permit the jury to assess credibility by obsening the demeanor
of the \vitness. Finally, the defendant can cross-examine the testifying \\itness. The
very prospect of cross-examination tends to induce truth-telling. while crossexamination itself exposes limits, inconsistencies, and personal weaknesses that the
jury may take into account in assessing credibility.
The principle justification for the hearsay rule, of course, is that some or all of those
three protections are absent when the declarant tells her story outside of the
courtroom. Still, a great deal of hearsay is admissible under exceptions to that
general rule. Typically, we justify those exceptions where the circumstances
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statement, not the honesty or dishonesty of the declarant. In weighing
the evidentiary value of some admissible hearsay, then, the
circumstances under which the statement was made can be more
important than any assessment of the personal trustworthiness of the
declarant. Because the personal trustworthiness of the declarant may
play a limited role in evaluating some forms of hearsay, information
relating to a declarant's honesty may prove less "material" under
Brady than similar information that would impeach a live witness.
Conversely, since the circumstances surrounding the hearsay
statement may be critical to an assessment of its truth, information
raising questions about those circumstances is especially likely to meet
the materiality standard of Brady.
An example helps to illustrate the difference. Imagine a defendant,
"Dan," on trial for conspiracy to distribute cocaine. Imagine the
government calls two co-conspirator witnesses, "Cory" and "Connie,"
who testify that they regularly went to Dan's house to pick up
packages of cocaine. If the prosecution possesses records showing
that Cory had three prior convictions for perjury, and that Connie
twice falsified her name and personal data to obtain employment,
chances are strong such information may be "material" to Dan's
defense under the Brady standard because of its likely effect in
impeaching the government's two principal witnesses.346
Now change the facts a bit. Assume now that Cory and Connie
never testify at trial. Instead, the government plays an audio tape of a
recorded phone conversation in which Cory tells Connie, "meet me at
Dan's for the shipment," to which Connie responds, "Okay, but don't
forget the money to pay Dan for our three kilos of you-know-what."
The court admits the recording as the statements of co-conspirators
under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E). Under this scenario,
Cory's perjury convictions and Connie's fraudulent acts take on far
less significance in evaluating the evidentiary value of their
statements. Both Cory and Connie may be untrustworthy characters.
But now their personal trustworthiness seems less important than
their obvious self-interest in being in the right place with the money to
complete their transaction. 347 As a result, their convictions and
surrounding the statement provide a reasonably adequate substitute for the usual incourt safeguards.
346. See, e.g., East v. Scott, 55 F.3d 996, 1004 (5th Cir. 1995) (finding witncss·s
criminal history "material"); United States v. Kelly, 35 F.3d 929, 937 (4th Cir. 1994)
(considering a witness's suspicious banking activity and cult membership "material"
under Brady); United States v. Kiszewski, 877 F.2d 210, 215-16 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding
agent-witness's personnel file "material" where it contained evidence of professional
misconduct).
347. As the Court noted in United States v. Jnadi, 475 U.S. 387 (1986):
When the Government . . . offers the statement of one drug dealer to
another in furtherance of an illegal conspiracy, the statement often will
derive its significance from the circumstances in which it was made.
Conspirators are likely to speak differently when talking to each other in
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fraudulent acts are less likely to make a difference to a jury and
therefore are less likely to be "material" for Brady purposes.>t\\ On
the other hand, if the government possessed evidence that, at the time
of the phone call, Cory and Connie were aware their calls were being
recorded by police and that they had a motive to "frame" Dan, those
facts might be powerful evidence of fabrication and thus "material"
under Brady.
A third issue may arise in applying Brady principles to hearsayrelated discovery. And this issue takes us back to the question of
admissibility. What if the government fails to disclose information
that would have led the court to exclude the hearsay altogether?~9
For example, imagine a case in which the court admits hearsay under
a Rule 804 exception, finding that the declarant is "unavailable"
because her whereabouts are unknown. 350 But imagine further that
the prosecutor has neglected to look carefully through his file which,

furtherance of their illegal aims than when testifying on the witness stand.
Even when the declarant takes the stand, his in-court testimony seldom will
reproduce a significant portion of the evidentiary value of his statements
during the course of the conspiracy.
Id. at395.
348. The diminished impeachment value of prior convictions or "bad acts" in
impeaching co-conspirator statements is important for another reason as well. Often
co-conspirators are tried together, and frequently the government's evidence includes
the out-of-court statements of one or more co-conspirators admitted under Rule
801(d)(2)(E). A serious dilemma can arise where one defendant seeks to introduce a
prior conviction to impeach a co-conspirator declarant who also happens to be a
nontestifying codefendant. Admission of the conviction prejudices that co-defendant,
but failure to admit it might limit the first defendant's right to challenge the hearsay
statements.
In many cases the solution to that dilemma becomes apparent by recognizing the
diminished value of a prior conviction to impeach most co-conspirator hearsay. If the
conviction has limited impeachment value, but poses a significant risk of prejudice to
the nontestifying co-defendant, then the court has discretion to exclude the
conviction, either under Rule 609 or Rule 403. Compare United States v. Robinson,
783 F.2d 64, 67 (7th Cir. 1986) (affirming the trial court's refusal to admit a prior
conviction for the purpose of impeaching hearsay where declarant was nontestifying
co-defendant), with United States v. Bovain, 708 F.2d 606, 613 (11th Cir. 1983)
(allowing prior convictions to impeach nontestifying co-defendant whose hearsay
statements had been admitted in evidence).
349. Few federal courts have had occasion to consider the application of Bratly
principles where undisclosed evidence may have affected an evidentiary ruling. In
United States v. Williams, 10 F.3d 1070, 1075-77 {4th Cir. 1993), the defendant argued
that the government improperly \vithheld information that would have changed the
trial court's ruling on a suppression motion. The Fourth Circuit "decline(d) to
address definitively on the merits the issue of whether Bratly should call for disclosure
of material evidence at pre-trial suppression hearings." Icl. at 10n. The court found
that the nondisclosed information would not have affected the suppression decision in
any event.
350. See Fed. R. Evid. 804(b} ("The follO\ving are not excluded by the hearsay rule
if the declarant is unavailable as a \vitness."). Rule 804(b) creates hearsay exceptions
for (1) former testimony, (2) dying declarations, (3) statements against interest, and
(4) statements of personal or family history. See id.
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in fact, contains a note from the declarant showing her new address. 351
Is such information "favorable to an accused" under Brady where it
would lead to the exclusion of incriminating hearsay? If it is, then
how do we apply the Brady materiality standard to such a case?352
The first question seems easy enough. Giglio tells us that the
government must disclose information that serves to discredit a
government witness. It follows that information would be at least as
"favorable" under Brady where it would remove that witness's
testimony from the trial altogether. Logically, the same analysis
would hold true for information that would result in the exclusion of
hearsay. What could be more favorable to the defense than to
exclude the evidence altogether? One could argue, perhaps, that
disclosure is required only where information negates the substance of
a criminal charge, but not where it aids the defendant only
"indirectly" by affecting an evidentiary or procedural ruling. But the
language of Brady is quite broad, encompassing any "favorable"
information, not just directly exculpatory evidence. Both Giglio and
later comments from the Court seem to foreclose any narrower
reading. 353
The "materiality" issue is more complex. Normally, exculpatory
information is "material" where there is a "reasonable probability that
351. Under Brady, it would not matter whether the prosecutor's oversight was
inadvertent or intentional. Bad faith is not an element of a Brady violation. See
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
352. Where Brady material may have an impact on admissibility, the timing of
disclosure obviously takes on additional importance. Consider, for example, a case
where the government seeks a pretrial ruling under the "residual" hearsay exception
in an effort to introduce hearsay statements from a young child abuse victim to a
social worker. To admit the statement, the court must find sufficient "circumstantial
guarantees of trustworthiness." Fed. R. Evid. 807; see also Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S.
805, 817-18 (1990) (stating that the Confrontation Clause requires courts to find
"particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" in order to admit hearsay under the
residual exception). In making that finding, the trial court may consider a variety of
factors including, among others, the child's consistency in repeating the same
information without contradiction on several occasions. See id. at 821-22. Imagine
further that the government possesses a written or recorded prior statement of the
child that is inconsistent with the account she gave to the social worker. Certainly, if
the court admits the hearsay, the prior inconsistent statement is discoverable, as
Giglio material, and perhaps also as Jencks material, so that the defendant can use it
to impeach the declarant. But disclosure should come earlier, since the court must
consider the inconsistent statement among the factors relating to admissibility. In
such a case, the government's constitutional obligation to disclose Brady material
affecting the admissibility determination would "trump" any time limits imposed by
the Jencks Act, even if the court found the declarant to be a "witness" under the
Jencks Act.
353. A passage in United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985), supports the notion
that Brady principles apply to any nondisclosures that adversely affect the defense,
not simply to nondisclosure of information that is "directly" exculpatory. There, the
Court stated that "the reviewing court may consider directly any adverse effect that
the prosecutor's failure to respond [to a discovery request] might have had on the
preparation or presentation of the defendant's case." Id. at 683.
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its disclosure would have produced a different result.",;s.i Where
undisclosed information might affect the court's decision to admit
hearsay, the issue of "materiality" requires a two-step inquiry. First,
the court must determine whether the nondisclosed information
would have changed the ruling that admitted the hearsay in evidence.
Unlike most Brady "materiality" questions, which require a court to
assess the likely impact of evidence on a jury's fact finding, this
inquiry simply requires the court to reconsider a ruling under the law
of evidence. The only difference is that the court now takes into
account the previously undisclosed information. If the court would
have admitted the same hearsay statements in any event, then the
previously undisclosed information is not "material" under Brady,
unless it would have impacted the trial in some other way.
But what if, as in our hypothetical case, disclosure of the
information would have caused the court to exclude the hearsay
altogether? The government's nondisclosure has allowed the jury to
hear inadmissible hearsay. Under the typical Brady standard, a
reviewing court still would not disturb the conviction unless it found a
"reasonable probability" that the jury would have reached a different
result without the inadmissible evidence.,;ss But the typical Brady
standard seems out of place here. Normally, when an appellate court
finds that a jury has heard inadmissible hearsay, the court must
reverse the conviction unless it finds the error was "harmless,",;56 a
standard more generous to the defendant than the "reasonable
probability" standard under Brady.351 Which materiality standard
should we apply?
One might argue that we should treat this case like other Brady
nondisclosures, and require the defendant to show a "reasonable
354. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 422 (1995).
355. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
356. In cases of nonconstitutional error, a conviction will be set aside where the
error "had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's
verdict." Kyles, 514 U.S. at 435 (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619. 623
(1993)). Some errors in the admission of hearsay may fall in that category. But,
because the standard for hearsay admissibility under the Confrontation Clause has
been tied so closely to the hearsay rules themselves, see Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56,
66 (1980) (finding that hearsay falling within a "firmly rooted" exception is
presumptively admissible), many errors in admitting hearsay against criminal
defendants will amount to constitutional error as well. In such cases, the standard for
harmless error is more generous to the defendant, requiring that a conviction be
reversed unless the error was "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Chapman v.
California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967); see also Lilly v. Virginia, 119 S. Ct. 1887. 1901
(1999) (calling for the application of the Clzapma11 standard where hearsay was
admitted in violation of Confrontation Clause).
357. The Court has explicitly recognized that the Brady standard of materiality
imposes a higher burden on the defendant than the harmless error standard for
nonconstitutional errors. See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 435-36. The defendant's burden is
lower still in cases of constitutional error, such as Confrontation Clause violations. See
supra note 356.
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probability" of a different outcome. After all, why should the
government pay the heavier price when it fails to disclose information
that only indirectly relates to guilt? But the better argument favors
use of the "harmless error" standard. It would be anomalous for the
government to profit from a higher standard where its own failure to
disclose exculpatory information led to the erroneous admission of the
evidence in the first place. It makes more sense to treat this case like
any other where a court admits evidence in error. The error requires
reversal and a new trial, unless it is "harmless."
In sum, though hearsay raises a few special considerations in
applying Brady's materiality standard, the general principles of Brady
should apply with equal force when the target of impeachment is
hearsay rather than live testimony. Indeed, courts should demand an
even more exacting adherence to Brady in the case of hearsay, where
the lack of traditional cross-examination increases the danger of
undiscovered contradictions. Properly applied, Brady should be a
defendant's principal tool for compelling disclosure of material for
impeachment of hearsay.
2.

Rule 16(a)(l)(C)-Documents Material to Preparation of the
Defense

Earlier, I discussed Rule 16(a)(l)(C) as a tool for obtaining pretrial
disclosure of written or recorded hearsay which the government
intends to offer in evidence at trial.358 The Rule has a second function
relating to government hearsay. Its broad command to disclose
documents and tangible items "material to the preparation of
defendant's defense" should encompass any items which may assist a
defendant in preparing to impeach or rebut a hearsay statement. Such
items might range from a declarant's "rap sheet," to crime scene
photos depicting a declarant's obstructed vantage point, to written
correspondence suggesting inconsistencies or ambiguities in a
declarant's account of events.
For most such items, Rule 16 overlaps with Brady. Any tangible
item "material" under the Brady standard should be covered by Rule
16(a)(l)(C) as well.359 But a specific Rule 16 request for items
shedding light on government hearsay may require the government to
go beyond Brady. In theory at least, the threshold of "materiality"
under Rule 16 is lower than under Brady.360 Brady "materiality"
358. See supra text accompanying notes 288-94.
359. The Advisory Committee's Notes to Rule 16 reflect that the Rule was
designed to encompass Brady material: "Although the Advisory Committee decided
not to codify the Brady Rule, the requirement that the government disclose
documents and tangible objects 'material to the preparation of his defense'
underscores the importance of disclosure of evidence favorable to the defendant."
Fed. R. Crim. P. 16 advisory committee's notes to 1974 amendment.
360. In practice, many courts seem to merge the two. Often, courts simply treat
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requires a showing that undisclosed evidence is significant when
measured against the government's evidence as a whole. By contrast,
information may be "material to the preparation" of the defense
simply because it helps defendant get ready for trial. 361 Rule 16, then,
should cover more than those items which directly impeach a hearsay
declarant. It should extend, for example, to documents which might
assist a defendant to locate and interview an available declarant, to
identify another witness who could contradict or qualify a hearsay
statement, or to prepare his own \vitnesses to respond to hearsay.302
3. Jencks Material: Prior Statements of the Hearsay Declarant
One of the most common, and most effective, forms of crossexamination is impeachment by prior inconsistent statement.36..' When
a government witness testifies, the Jencks Act often provides the
defendant with ammunition for such impeachment.
Once a
government witness has testified on direct examination, the Jencks
Act requires the government, upon the defendant's request, to
disclose all relevant prior statements of the witness.™ In some
instances, of course, the Jencks Act merely duplicates the
requirements of Brady and Giglio. Prior inconsistent statements can
be both "favorable to the accused" and "material" under the Brady
standard. But Jencks goes further. It requires disclosure of any prior
statements that fall \vithin its coverage,365 regardless of whether they
are inconsistent or exculpatory. That difference can be significant,
because changes in testimony often are subtle. A \vitness may be
impeached by change of emphasis or by prior omission, as well as by
direct contradiction.366 By providing access to the complete record of
a witness's prior statements, Jencks may open avenues for
impeachment that Brady material would not.
Rule 16 and Brady requests together, with little effort to distinguish their standards of
"materiality." See, e.g., United States v. Cadet, 727 F.2d 1453, 1468 (9th Cir. 1984).
Other courts cite different materiality standards while reaching the same results under
both. See, e.g., United States v. Uphoff, 907 F. Supp. 1475, 1480 (D. Kan. 1995).
361. See United States v. Mandel, 914 F.2d 1215, 1219 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that
Rule 16 permits discovery that is "relevant to the development of a possible defense"
if the defendant can show that the "[g]ovemment is in possession of information
helpful to the defense." (citation omitted)).
362 See United States v. George, 786 F. Supp. 56, 58 (D.D.C. 1992) (holding that
documents, to be discoverable under Rule 16, must "play an important role in
uncovering admissible evidence, aiding witness preparation, corroborating testimony
or assisting impeachment or rebuttal" (citation omitted) (internal quotations
omitted)).
363. See, e.g., Mauet, supra note 11, at 246 ("Raising prior inconsistent statements
is the most frequently used impeachment method at trial.").
364. 18 u.s.c. § 3500(b) (1994).
365. The Jencks Act's definition of "statement," however, is a rather narrow one.
See supra note 295.
366. See Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 667 (1957).
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The Jencks Act can be just as important when the defendant seeks
to impeach hearsay. As we have already seen, whether the Jencks Act
applies at all to hearsay declarants is a complex and unsettled
question. 367 Jencks is also a two-edged sword, preventing pretrial
discovery of witness statements, while allowing limited discovery at
trial. But to the extent that courts adopt the view that hearsay
declarants are "government witnesses" under the Jencks Act, then
defendants should take full advantage of the side of that sword that
cuts in their favor. 368 When the government succeeds in offering
hearsay in evidence, Jencks should compel the same kind of disclosure
it requires for a testifying witness. The government must turn over
the complete record of the declarant's relevant prior statements. And
though the declarant may never appear in the courtroom, the
defendant nevertheless can use those prior statements to challenge the
credibility of hearsay in much the same manner that he would use
prior statements to impeach a testifying witness.369
Indeed,
impeachment of an absent declarant by prior inconsistent statement
offers a major advantage over live cross-examination. The absent
declarant cannot explain away the inconsistency.370
One final issue regarding application of the Jencks Act to hearsay is
worth noting. A 1983 amendment to Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure made the Jencks Act applicable at suppression
hearings. Similar amendments in 1993 extended Jencks discovery to
various other proceedings, including preliminary hearings and pretrial
detention hearings.371
If hearsay declarants are "government
witnesses" for Jencks purposes, then these amendments may have
367. See supra text accompanying notes 295-316.
368. Unfortunately, the dearth of reported cases suggests that few defendants use
the Jencks Act in an effort to obtain prior statements of hearsay declarants. See
United States v. Williams-Davis, 90 F.3d 490, 512-13 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (noting that this
case was the first in any Circuit to raise the question whether the Jencks Act requires
disclosure of prior statements of a hearsay declarant).
369. See Fed. R. Evid. 806. For a more detailed description of the process of
impeaching an absent hearsay declarant, see Douglass, supra note 6, at 251-60.
370. Typically, the defendant would impeach the declarant by offering extrinsic
evidence of the prior inconsistent statement, for example, a transcript, written or
recorded prior statement, or the testimony of a witness who can recount the prior
inconsistent statement. In the case of a testifying witness, Rule 613(b) requires that
the witness be given an opportunity to explain or deny the prior statement. See Fed.
R. Evid. 613(b). But Rule 806 explicitly removes the requirement that the declarant
be afforded an opportunity to deny or explain the prior statement. See id. Rule 806.
371. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 5.l(d) (relating to preliminary hearings), 26.2(g) (relating
to various proceedings outside of trial), 46(i) (relating to detention hearings).
The utility of these rules as a pretrial discovery device is limited for several reasons.
First, suppression hearings generally do not address the merits of criminal charges.
As a result, few suppression hearings require the government to call its principal trial
witnesses. Second, because many cases are indicted before arrest, or shortly
thereafter, there are few preliminary examinations in federal practice. Third, though
detention hearings under Rule 46 occur often, the evidence often focuses on the
defendant's criminal history and other personal history, rather than the crime itself.
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created much broader discovery opportunities than their drafters may
have anticipated. Unlike suppression hearings, preliminary hearings
always, and detention hearings sometimes, require the government to
present evidence on the merits of the criminal charge. At preliminary
hearings and pretrial detention hearings, it is quite typical for the
government to present its case largely through hearsay. Rather than
calling the witnesses they expect to use at trial, prosecutors more
often use investigating agents to summarize the accounts of those
witnesses. Clearly, these expanded "pretrial Jencks" rules require the
government, upon request, to turn over relevant prior statements of
the testifying agent.372 But if hearsay declarants are "witnesses" as
well, then the government also must disclose the relevant prior
statements of each declarant whose information the agent
summarizes. As a result, the preliminary or detention hearing could
turn into a broad vehicle for discovering the grand jury testimony, and
the written or recorded statements of witnesses who will testify for the
government at trial.
C.

Discovery Depositions of Available Hearsay Declarants

Confrontation Clause doctrine now allows the prosecution to
present most hearsay without first showing that the declarant is
unavailable to testify in person.373 While the most troublesome forms
of prosecution hearsay tend to come when declarants are
unavailable,374 there remain important classes of hearsay admitted
regularly against criminal defendants when the declarant is alive,
capable of testifying, and subject to subpoena. Co-conspirator
statements, spontaneous declarations, statements for purposes of
medical diagnosis, and business records-among others-all are
admissible under the Rules of Evidence and the Confrontation Clause
regardless of the declarant's availability.375
372. Often, such materials would include the agent's investigative reports on
matters mentioned in his testimony.
373. See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 353-54 (1992) (holding that under the
Confrontation Clause, in cases involving forms of hearsay other than former
testimony, the government is not required to show unavailability of the declarant as a
condition to admitting hearsay); United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 391-400 (1986)
(holding co-conspirator hearsay admissible without showing that declarant
unavailable).
374. See, e.g., Lilly v. Virginia, 119 S. Ct. 1887 (1999) (overruling state court's
admission of confession of accomplice who invoked Fifth Amendment privilege).
Almost all of the cases admitting grand jury testimony under the residual hearsay
exception involve unavailable declarants. See, e.g., United States v. Earles, 113 F3d
796, 799-801 (8th Cir. 1997); United States v. McHan, 101 F3d 1027, 1037-38 (4th Cir.
1996); Curro v. United States, 4 F.3d 436, 436-37 (6th Cir. 1993): United States v.
Kladouris, 964 F.2d 658, 663-64 (7th Cir. 1992); United States\'. Pall7.ardi-Lespier, 918
F.2d 313, 315-19 (1st Cir. 1990); United States v. Donlon, 909 F.2d 650, 652-54 (1st
Cir.1990).
375. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E) (co-conspirator statements), 803(2) (excited
utterances), 803(4) (statements for purposes of medical diagnosis), 803(6) (business
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The Supreme Court has hinted at least that the defendant's right to
subpoena such declarants and cross-examine them at trial effectively
eliminates any concern over confrontation. After all, the Court
suggests, if the defendant wants confrontation he has the means to
bring it about. 376 But as a practical matter, there are significant risks
to a defendant in the Court's approach. Cross-examining an adverse
witness is a bit like tap dancing through a minefield. And without
sufficient discovery, counsel performs that dance in the dark. Few
experienced trial lawyers will risk asking questions on crossexamination when they cannot safely anticipate the answers. 377 Even
fewer will take the risk of calling a witness to the stand for the sole
purpose of asking such questions. 378
The Court's recent rulings on confrontation of available declarants
illustrate the dangers inherent when the admissibility of hearsay falls
out of balance with a defendant's discovery opportunities. The Court
offers nothing to balance expanded admissibility under the
Confrontation Clause with access to the information necessary to
contend with it. Confrontation law has put new pressure on the
adversarial process of impeaching available declarants. But without
some kind of pretrial access to the available declarant, the right to
impeach her may be little more than an illusion.
In civil cases, an opponent of hearsay can achieve such access
through discovery depositions. 379 However, in criminal cases, the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do not authorize discovery
depositions by the prosecution or defense. 380 And there has been no
serious effort to install them as a regular part of the federal criminal
process.381 But without debating the merits of more extensive
records).
376. See Inadi, 475 U.S. at 397 ("[If the defendant] independently wanted to secure
[the declarant's] testimony, ... [t]he Compulsory Process Clause would have aided
[him] in obtaining the testimony ....").
377. See Mauet, supra note 11, at 220 ("Ask questions that you know the witness
should answer in a certain way .... "); Irving Younger, The Art of Cross-Examination
23 (ABA Litigation Section Monograph Series No. l, 1976) ("[N]ever, never ask a
question to which you do not already know the answer.").
378. See Jonakait, Confrontation Clause, supra note 11, at 617 n.158 ("Time-worn
admonitions tell the advocate not to call someone without knowing what he will
say.").
379. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 30.
380. Rule 15 authorizes depositions, but only for the purpose of preserving
testimony, not for discovery. See supra note 206.
381. Discovery depositions in criminal cases are not without precedent. A few
states allow defense discovery depositions as a matter of right. See N.D. R. Crim. P.
15; Vt. R. Cr. P. 15. Florida and Texas, populous states with large urban jurisdictions
and active criminal dockets-and with no reputation for being "soft on crime"-both
permit discovery depositions in criminal cases. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.220(h); Tex. Crim.
Proc. Code Ann. § 39.02 (West 1999). The American Bar Association, admittedly an
organization where defense lawyers tend to dominate criminal justice policy, calls for
discovery depositions in criminal cases under limited circumstances. See Standards for
Criminal Justice, Standard 11-5.2 (3d ed. 1996) [hereinafter ABA Standands]. As
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reforms, the idea of discovery depositions has special merit in that
limited class of cases where the government is allowed to rely on
hearsay to prove significant, contested facts without putting an
available declarant on the witness stand. There are at least three good
reasons for allowing depositions under these limited circumstances:
(1) enhancing accuracy; (2) fairness to the defendant; and (3) costeffectiveness.
First, allowing depositions of available declarants increases
accuracy in the fact-finding process at trial. When neither side
chooses to call an available declarant for live testimony, it is not
necessarily because the hearsay is accurate and incontestable.
Frequently, it is because neither side is willing to take the risk of what
an uncooperative witness might say.382 The hearsay is fixed and
predictable. The uncooperative declarant is not. Thus, the proponent
of the hearsay is content to leave "well enough" alone. Without
pretrial access to the declarant, the opponent often will choose to
avoid the risk of calling a live witness who may merely confirm or
even amplify the hearsay statement. The jury never hears the full
version from the mouth of the declarant. It remains in the dark
because of the tactical choices made by the parties. But neither choice
is based upon the likelihood that the hearsay is accurate. More
important, in the absence of an opportunity to question the declarant
before trial, neither choice is made with complete knowledge of the
facts. If we believe that an adversary system produces accurate
results, it is at least in part because we e:>..-pect each party to present
early as 1974, the Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure called for discovery
depositions as of right for criminal defendants. See Unif. R. Crim. P. 431, 10 U.LA.
130 (1974).
382. This was exactly the case in United States i•. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387 (1986). lnadi
was charged and convicted of conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine. See id. at
388-89. At trial, the government offered in evidence several audio tapes which
contained statements of co-conspirators, including a person named Lazaro who was
reluctantly willing to testify. Over defense objection, the court admitted the tapes
under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E). See id. at 390-91. lnadi then raised a
Confrontation Clause objection, arguing that the Clause prohibited introduction of
hearsay unless the government first demonstrated that the declarant was unavailable.
The trial court asked defense counsel if she wanted the government to produce the
witness, and counsel responded only that she would ask her client. See id. at 390. The
government apparently had no interest in Lazaro as a witness and made only a
perfunctory effort to secure his presence. The defendant, who could have issued his
own subpoena and insisted on further efforts to produce Lazaro, never even answered
the Court's simple question, "Do you want him to testify?" See id.
Inadi is not an aberration. The Inadi Court noted, "[T)he actions of the parties in
this case demonstrate what is no doubt a frequent occurrence in conspiracy cascsneither side wants a co-conspirator as a witness." Id. at 397 n.7. Similarly, in Dutton i·.
Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970), the Court noted, "Counsel for Evans informed us at oral
argument that he could have subpoenaed (the declarant) but had concluded that this
course would not be in the best interests of his clienL" lei. at 88 n.19; see also Lowery
v. Collins, 988 F.2d 1364, 1368-70 (5th Cir. 1993) (noting that neither the plaintiff nor
the defendant sought to secure the testimony of the child-complainant).
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the facts favorable to its side. Allowing hearsay from available,
nontestifying declarants defeats that expectation when the opponent
has no way to learn what the declarant might say on the witness stand.
Second, the case of the available declarant presents the starkest
example of unfairness that results when rules of admissibility are out
of balance with rules of discovery. Modern confrontation doctrine
and the law of evidence allow the prosecution to shift to the defendant
all the risk of dealing with an uncooperative, but available
declarant.383 No other litigant in the federal system must contend with
such risk, because criminal defendants are the only class of litigant
with no right to compel pretrial examination of adverse witnesses or
hearsay declarants.384 Confronted with the prospect of adverse
hearsay, a civil litigant need only schedule a deposition and can crossexamine the declarant at will. Although prosecutors cannot take
discovery depositions, the ex parte process of grand jury investigation
is typically a more than adequate substitute.385 Only the criminal
defendant has no means of access to an available defendant before
trial, other than through a voluntary interview. And those can be
hard to come by.
Third, allowing depositions of at least some available declarants
may actually reduce the costs of criminal justice. Opponents argue
that the principal costs of discovery depositions are associated with
the time they demand from prosecutors and defense counsel, costs
born entirely by the state in cases with public defenders or other
appointed counsel. 386 Especially in those systems which allow
depositions as of right, opponents complain of the number and length
of discovery depositions. And, they note, when the state is paying the
tab the defendant has no cost-driven incentive to set any limits. But a
rule limiting discovery depositions to hearsay declarants whom the
government does not expect to call at trial would have different
economic consequences. First, there would be little concern with the
number of such depositions. Cases of important hearsay from
available declarants are relatively few in number.387 In addition,
383. See Jonakait, Confrontation Clause, supra note 11, at 614-19 (arguing that
lnadi unfairly transfers the risk of confronting an available declarant from the
prosecution to the defense).
384. See supra text accompanying notes 202-09.
385. The prosecutor might not have the option to put the declarant before a grand
jury, however, where the hearsay comes to light only after the case has been indicted.
Due Process concerns can restrict a prosecutor's use of the grand jury to continue
investigation after an indictment has been returned. See Jn re Grand Jury Subpoena
Duces Tecum Dated Jan. 2, 1985 (Simels), 767 F.2d 26, 29-30 (2d Cir. 1985) (stating
that the prosecutor may not use grand jury subpoena for the sole purpose of trial
preparation).
386. See John F. Yetter, Discovery Depositions in Florida Criminal Proceedings:
Should They Survive?, 16 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 675, 684-86 (1988) (summarizing
arguments advanced by opponents and proponents of criminal discovery depositions).
387. Normally, a prosecutor would prefer to call an available and cooperative
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where defendant regarded such hearsay as significant enough to call
for a deposition, the prosecutor would have the option to avoid the
burden of a deposition simply by informing the defense that he would
call the declarant as a witness at trial.~~
If we take the Supreme Court at its word, allowing such depositions
would virtually eliminate any Confrontation Clause contests at trial or
on appeal over the admission of hearsay from an available
declarant.389
Moreover, one might limit costs by permitting
depositions only upon a motion establishing a particular need, as in
cases where the available declarant refused counsel's request for an
interview.390 Given such a rule, the very prospect of a deposition
would lead some reluctant declarants to speak informally with counsel
in order to avoid the burden of a formal deposition. Public defenders
and defense investigators might spend less time on unproductive
encounters with reluctant witnesses. In that respect, a deposition rule
limited to uncooperative declarants might actually simplify the
process of trial preparation and decrease costs. And. in cases where
witness intimidation was a legitimate concern, appropriate protective
orders could issue. Finally, a rule authorizing discovery depositions
would carry the same benefit as any rule expanding discovery. It
would assist both prosecution and defense counsel in evaluating the
case. A likely result might be an increase in resolutions through plea
agreement.391
Of course, justifying reform in theory may be a great deal easier
than bringing it about in practice. In light of the fate of much less
ambitious discovery reform proposals,3in one could expect that a
proposal to amend Rule 15 to permit discovery depositions as a
general practice in criminal cases would be a political nonstarter
declarant as a trial witness, rather than rely on hearsay.
388. By making prosecutors more likely to present live testimony in the place of
hearsay, the mere prospect of a deposition would tend to a\'oid trial and appellate
contests over the admissibility of such hearsay. More importantly. as a matter of
fairness, it would reduce the number of occasions where prosecutors choose to use
hearsay and thereby shift to the defendant the burden of producing the declarant at
trial. For a variety of practical reasons, the government is normally in a better
position than the defense to locate and subpoena an available declarant. See Jonakait,
Confrontation Clause, supra note 11, at 616.
389. See United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 397 (1986) (suggesting, at least
implicitly, that the defendant's Compulsory Process right to subpoena an available
declarant, combined with his right under Federal Rule of Evidence 806 to subject that
declarant to hostile questioning, satisfied any concerns over confrontation).
390. This is the approach called for by the ABA Standards. See ABA Standards,
supra note 381, Standard 11-5.2. The ABA Standard permits discovery depositions,
upon motion by either prosecution or defense, where there is no writing summarizing
the witness's knowledge. where the witness has refused a \'Oluntary interview, and
where the interview is necessary "in the interests of justice." Id.
391. See Unif. R. Crim. P. 431 commentary at II2. IOU.LA. 130 (1974), reprinted
in Yetter, supra note 386, at 679.
392 See supra text accompanying notes 169-72.
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before Congress.393 A more modest alternative, aimed only at
correcting the existing hearsay-discovery imbalance in cases of
available declarants, may be more attainable. A sensible starting
point would be a rule authorizing federal courts, in their discretion, to
allow a discovery deposition where: (1) hearsay was disclosed before
trial; (2) the court found it admissible; (3) the hearsay was important
evidence regarding a contested fact of consequence to the case; and
(4) the declarant refused informal requests for an interview with the
opponent.
An alternative approach might achieve the same result with no
amendment to existing Rules. At least one federal Circuit Court of
Appeals has held that, Rule 15 notwithstanding, federal courts have
the inherent authority to order discovery depositions in unusual cases.
The Tenth Circuit upheld a trial court's order allowing the defense to
take depositions as a sanction for government misconduct which
discouraged prospective government witnesses from talking
informally with defense counsel.394 But there is nothing that restricts
that inherent power to cases of misconduct affecting access to
witnesses.395 A defendant is just as severely disadvantaged when a
witness makes an independent choice to refuse an interview. That
disadvantage is multiplied when the Confrontation Clause allows the
government to proceed by hearsay, in effect daring the defense to
take the risk of putting the declarant on the stand for "blind" crossexamination. If "unusual circumstances" can justify the exercise of a
court's inherent power to ensure the fairness of its own proceedings,
then few circumstances present a better case for asserting that power.
Exercise of this inherent power in appropriate cases would allow
federal courts to experiment with the use of depositions where they
would be most effective to remedy the imbalance that the Court's
confrontation doctrine has created. And, in the process, federal
courts and rule makers might learn that discovery depositions in
criminal cases are not so frightening after all.

393. Rule 15 now authorizes depositions only for the purpose of preserving
testimony for use at trial. Though the language of the Rule is not explicit, its history
and subsequent judicial interpretation make it clear that the Rule does not authorize
a federal court to order depositions solely for purposes of discovery. See Fed. R.
Crim. P. 15 advisory committee's note; United States v. Carrigan, 804 F.2d 599, 602
(10th Cir. 1986) (noting that Rule 15 "does not contemplate use of depositions of
adverse witnesses as discovery tools in criminal cases").
394. See Carrigan, 804 F.2d at 602-04.
395. The inherent power of federal courts to order discovery has been established
for decades, and extends to circumstance where discovery is necessary to avoid
unfairness. Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957), requiring disclosure of prior
statements of government witnesses, is probably the most prominent example of the
exercise of such power. See id. at 670-71.
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D. Creating An Incentive for the Prosecutor to Disclose: Discovery as
a "Circumstantial Guarantee of Trustworthiness"

The preceding sections have addressed a variety of methods to
enhance the opportunities of criminal defendants for learning more
about prosecution hearsay and learning it earlier in the litigation
process. Each of those methods involves the use of discovery devices
such as Rule 16, Brady, discovery depositions, or pretrial notice rules
like Rule 807. But there may be an even more effective way to shed
greater light on prosecution hearsay before trial. Courts can increase
disclosure simply by making evidentiary rulings which place a
substantial value on discovery as a factor in admitting hearsay. The
framework for doing so is already in place, under both the Federal
Rules of Evidence and the Confrontation Clause.
Rule 807 requires a proponent to give advance notice of his
intention to offer residual hearsay.396 In effect, the Rule encourages
disclosure by making it the "price" for admitting hearsay. If the
proponent fails to give notice, he risks the exclusion of hearsay. The
same principle can apply in a broader context. To admit hearsay
under Rule 807, a court must find "circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness" that are "equivalent" to those which support other
hearsay exceptions.397 If courts regard full discovery as one such
"guarantee," then the proponent of hearsay has a strong incentive to
reveal all he can about the declarant and the circumstances
surrounding the hearsay statement.
The same notion holds true where hearsay must overcome a
Confrontation Clause challenge. For hearsay fitting traditional-or
"firmly rooted"-exceptions, the Confrontation Clause no longer
forms much of a barrier.398 But for residual hearsay, and perhaps a
few other controversial forms of hearsay, the Clause requires courts to
find "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" before admitting
such hearsay.399 Prosecutors would have more of an incentive to make
full disclosure if courts insisted that discovery was an important
"guarantee" of trustworthiness in admitting hearsay under the
Confrontation Clause.
It is not hard to envision how courts might apply this approach in
practice. The clearest example would arise in a case where the
government sought a pretrial ruling on the admissibility of residual
396. See Fed. R. Evid. 807.
397. Id.
398. Hearsay falling within a "firmly rooted" exception is presumptively admissible
under the Court's current approach to confrontation. See Lilly v. Virginia, 119 S. Ct.
1887, 1894 (1999) (citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980)).
399. See id. at 1899-1901 (plurality opinion) (holding that accomplice statements
inculpating the accused are not within a "firmly rooted" hearsay exception); Idaho v.
Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 817-18 (1990) (finding that the residual exception is not "firmly
rooted").
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hearsay from an available declarant whom the prosecutor did not
expect to call as a witness at trial.400 The court could simply inform
the prosecutor that it would be more inclined to look favorably upon
such hearsay if the government produced the declarant for pretrial
examination by the defense, along with copies of any prior statements
by the declarant. The court's power to order a discovery deposition
would not be in issue; nor would the court have to determine whether
the Jencks Act prevented it from ordering production of declarant's
prior statements before trial. Instead, the government would have the
incentive to provide discovery "voluntarily" if it wanted the hearsay in
evidence. The same approach would work to encourage discovery
where the declarant was unavailable. If the court viewed discovery as
an important guarantee of trustworthiness, then it might condition its
ruling admitting hearsay on full disclosure of the declarant's prior
statements, criminal record, and any other information that might
shed light on the declarant or her statement. If the court was satisfied
that full disclosure gave defendant a fair chance to contest the
hearsay, then the court would admit the statement in evidence.
There is a sound basis supporting an approach which views
discovery as a "guarantee of trustworthiness" under both Rule 807
and the Confrontation Clause.
In both contexts, the term
"trustworthiness" is something of a misnomer. Hearsay testimony
may have sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness even though it is not
particularly believable. For example, former testimony can be
admissible under the Rules of Evidence and the Confrontation Clause
even though it may contain internal contradictions or inherently
implausible statements. 401
Cross-examination, the core of the
400. In fact, there are relatively few cases of residual hearsay from available
declarants, because of the requirement that the hearsay be "more probative on the
point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure
through reasonable efforts." Fed. R. Evid. 807. Normally, the live testimony of the
available declarant would be "more probative," except in unusual cases involving
failing memories or recalcitrant witnesses with changing versions of events.
The scenario described in the text might also arise in cases where the declarant was
physically accessible but not deemed "available" to testify as a witness at trial as, for
example, in the case of a small child who made out-of-court complaints regarding
sexual abuse. Indeed, some state rules condition the admission of such hearsay on
procedures giving defense counsel discovery opportunities, including pretrial notice of
the particulars of the statement and the right to take the deposition of the witness
who will relate the hearsay at trial. See, e.g., Md. Ann. Code art. 27, § 775(c)(4)
(1957). In similar cases, the Uniform Rules of Evidence grant defendant a right to
question the child in a setting less formal than the courtroom. See Unif. R. Evid.
807(b) ("Before a statement may be admitted ... the court shall, at the request of the
defendant, provide for further questioning of the minor in such manner as the court
may direct.").
401. "Classic" former testimony, where the same defendant was present at an
earlier proceeding and had an opportunity to cross-examine, is admissible under Ruic
804(b)(l). Federal courts have also admitted other forms of "near miss" former
testimony under the residual exception as well, in cases where a party having similar
interests conducted cross-examination of the witness. See, e.g., United States v. Shaw,
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adversarial testing process, is a sufficient "guarantee of
trustworthiness." In formulating the Confrontation Clause standard,
the Court explicitly equated "guarantees of trustworthiness" with
circumstances where "adversarial testing would add little to [the
hearsay statement's] reliability." 402
In effect, "guarantees of
trustworthiness" are substitutes for cross-examination. And discovery
certainly fits that definition better than many "guarantees" which
federal courts have endorsed as grounds for the admission of
hearsay.403 Discovery directly enhances an opponent's ability to test
hearsay, either through actual cross-examination in a deposition, or
through access to information that may be offered at trial to impeach
or qualify the out-of-court statement of an absent declarant.
If federal courts are inclined to admit a broader range of hearsay
against criminal defendants-as they clearly seem to be-then they
should be equally inclined to allow defendants the tools for a fair
challenge to that hearsay. At least when they venture toward
hearsay's frontiers-admitting hearsay which falls outside "firmly
rooted" exceptions for Confrontation Clause purposes-federal
courts already possess the power to provide those tools in the form of
more complete discovery. That power arises whenever they look for
"guarantees" that hearsay is trustworthy. They need only make it
clear that full disclosure is one such guarantee. Prosecutors will
understand the message.
CONCLUSION
Hearsay and discovery are out of balance in the federal system.
Despite theoretical protections in both the Federal Rules of Evidence
and the Confrontation Clause, in reality federal criminal defendants
face a broader range of admissible hearsay than other litigants. But
they have fewer tools to contend \vith it.
I have suggested a handful of new discovery tools that would help
to correct that imbalance, including amendments to Rule 15 allowing
discovery depositions of some available declarants; changes in the
Rules of Evidence to expand pretrial notice beyond the residual
exception; and amendments to Rule 16 and the Jencks Act to require
69 F.3d 1249, 1254 (4th Cir. 1995) (admitting testimony from trial of defendant's coconspirators which occurred while defendant was fugitive); United States v. Deeb, 13
F.3d 1532, 1539 (11th Cir. 1994) (admitting testimony from co-conspirators trial where
witness was subject to cross-examination by co-defendants).
402 Wright, 497 U.S. at 821.
403. In Wright, the Court provided a nonexclusive list of "guarantees of
trustworthiness" to guide courts in applying its flexible standard for assessing nonfirmly rooted hearsay. See id. at 821-22. Accepting Wright's broad invitation, lower
federal courts have found sufficient "guarantees" in a wide variety of circumstances,
and often have contradicted one another in the process. See Douglass, supra note 6, at
218 ("Lower courts searching for 'particularized guarantees of trustworthiness' have
managed only to prove that reliability is in the eye of the beholder.").
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pretrial disclosure of written or recorded hearsay and disclosure at
trial of prior statements of hearsay declarants. Further, I have
suggested how the Brady doctrine can create important opportunities
for shedding light on prosecution hearsay. But courts need not await
new rule-making or legislation to begin a process that is already
overdue. Federal courts possess the inherent power to order broader
discovery than existing rules now require. Equally important, at least
in cases of hearsay falling outside of traditional exceptions, they have
the power to condition evidentiary rulings on the government's
willingness to make earlier and broader disclosures. In those cases,
courts can begin to correct the hearsay-discovery balance simply by
making discovery a factor in their decisions to admit hearsay.
I do not pretend to offer a complete prescription for discovery
reforms that would shed light into every unexplored corner of
prosecution hearsay. Nor do I suggest that even the most liberal
discovery rules would justify the elimination of all restrictions on
hearsay in criminal cases. What I hope to do through this Article is to
encourage a new discussion about hearsay that begins where most
traditional discussions end: when hearsay is admitted in evidence. In
my view, the time is ripe for such a discussion because the major
battles for excluding hearsay in the last two decades have been lost,
often for very good reasons,404 and there is little reason to expect a
large-scale counterattack in favor of excluding more hearsay from
criminal trials. Today, criminal defendants cling to a Maginot Line of
admissibility, hunkered down behind increasingly futile evidentiary
and constitutional objections to hearsay, while more advanced
weaponry rumbles around their flanks. 405 Given that state of affairs, I
wonder that the future of "hearsay reform" in criminal cases may lie
not so much with rules which regulate admissibility, but with pretrial
and trial procedures which enhance a defendant's ability to contest
whatever hearsay is admitted in evidence. Rather than limit our
discussion to adjustments in the rules of admissibility, we should give
404. While observations that the hearsay rule is "dead" may be a bit exaggerated,
see Park, Dead or Alive?, supra note 28, few would deny that the rule is showing the
wear and tear of battle. The truth is that in a world of increasingly complex litigation
in an increasingly mobile society, hearsay evidence has become increasingly
convenient. And particularly when compared with the carefully rehearsed trial
testimony of many courtroom witnesses, much hearsay no longer sparks judicial
concern over its reliability. Indeed, the Supreme Court itself has expressed a
preference for "the evidentiary value" of some forms of hearsay over that of live
testimony. United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 395 (1986) (noting that coconspirator's in-court testimony "seldom will reproduce ... the evidentiary value of
his statements during the course of the conspiracy.").
405. The Maginot Line, constructed after World War I along the eastern border of
France, was conceived in an age of trench warfare and viewed as an impenetrable
barrier to any German assault. In May 1940, it proved ineffectual against a
mechanized German army which swept around it to the north and captured Paris in a
matter of weeks. See John Keegan, The Second World War 59-67, 84-85 (1990).
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more thought to adjusting the criminal process itself to account for the
increasingly generous rules admitting prosecution hearsay. The
process of criminal discovery offers a natural place to begin that
discussion.

Notes & Observations

